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This dissertation presents a series of observational studies of opposition to 
immigration (  ) in the European Union. A substantial portion of the public seems 
to prefer a more exclusionary form of democracy, but how large, how vocal, and 
how organized that portion is varies considerably. I investigate exclusionism, a 
dimension of individual belief about how extensive political membership should be 
that tends to reflect how denizens prioritize political and cultural aspects of 
membership. In situating exclusionism, I shed light on three puzzles: Which of an 
individual’s concerns are the strongest determinants of  ? Which national 
developments are the strongest determinants of an individual’s   ? How are the 
effects of an individual’s concerns shaped by national context? Exclusionism 
predicts   in more countries in the EU than do ideology or religion. Post-9/11 
conflicts increase   but not as dramatically as do increases in the Muslim 
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population (suggesting perhaps that Islamophobia outpaces security risks).    is 
highest in new countries of immigration, but polarization is most pronounced in 
older countries of immigration, where ongoing national developments have created 
unusually large generational gaps, religious differences, and disagreements about 
exclusionism. Political interest is key for explaining large differences in opinion, too. 
Exclusionism increases  , even in low-immigration countries, among individuals 
with little interest in politics but only slightly; at high levels of individual interest 
and immigration, exclusionism’s effects are substantial. My findings reveal major 
challenges to integration policy in high-immigration countries: migrants and natives 
are unlikely to see eye-to-eye at any level of political interest, and there is near 
complete disagreement on immigration policy between politically-interested 
Muslims and politically-interested Christians. Methodologically, I introduce 
techniques to analyze polarization, and my findings have implications for best 
practices in cross-national survey research. 
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Introduction: The Challenge of Immigration 
Integration and migration have long confronted European countries with the 
question of “who belongs.” Approximately 32.5 million people in the European 
Union are immigrants, a magnitude comparable to the United States’ immigrant 
population of roughly 40 million and a sizeable portion of the estimated 214 million 
immigrants worldwide (United States Census Bureau 2012, Eurostat 2014, 
International Organization of Migration 2012).  
This dissertation presents a series of observational studies of attitudes 
toward immigration in the European Union. A substantial portion of the European 
public seems to prefer a more exclusionary form of democracy. How large, how 
vocal, and how organized that portion of the public is, however, varies considerably 
throughout the EU. To that end, I investigate exclusionism.  
In situating exclusionism, I present analyses that shed light on three puzzles: 
Which of an individual’s concerns are the strongest determinants of opposition to 
immigration? Which national developments are the strongest determinants of an 
individual’s opposition to immigration? How are the effects of individual concerns 
shaped by national context?  
Across the European continent, radical right wing parties have capitalized on 
immigration as an issue. Though sometimes flashes in the pan, these parties 
nonetheless started a fire. This dissertation analyzes the fire more than it does the 
flash. The rise of anti-immigrant parties cannot be attributed to charismatic leaders 
like the National Front’s Jean-Marie Le Pen any more than the more or less 
contemporaneous rise of the green parties can be. Instead, I analyze the role played 
by underlying beliefs, that is, the ways that Europeans today understand belonging. 
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I analyze exclusionism, a dimension of individual belief about how extensive 
political membership should be, by drawing on normative political theories 
developed by Walzer (1994) and Gregg (2003a). Each person is concerned with 
some set of other people that ranges from the null set to all of humanity, with most 
people falling somewhere in between. I consider the restrictiveness of that set and 
its political implications. To separate principle from prejudice, I develop an 
empirical strategy for assessing how exclusionary a person’s beliefs about political 
belonging are along a dimension that runs from an inclusionary, cosmopolitan end 
to an exclusionary, localist end.  
I investigate how exclusionism guides people’s opinions about immigration 
and how it compares and contrasts with the effects of identities (e.g., religious), 
interests (e.g., class), and other political beliefs (e.g., support for democracy). 
Exclusionism predicts opposition to immigration in more countries in the EU than 
does ideology or religion. The findings shed light on the extent to which public 
opposition to immigration should be interpreted negatively as xenophobia (e.g., fear 
that foreigners will cause street crime) or positively as homophily (caring for fellow 
nationals and their traditions). 
Do Whites oppose immigration out of support for local political tradition 
(e.g., secularism or the welfare state) or out of (some combination of) racism, 
xenophobia, and Islamophobia? Just as a person may believe in socialism for 
multiple reasons, some of which might be affective (such as feelings of working class 
solidarity) and others cognitive (such as macroeconomic expectations), a person 
may defend positions along the exclusionism dimension in a variety of contexts and 
for a variety of reasons. Where people fall along this dimension in advanced 
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democracies tends to reflect the salience of political vis-à-vis cultural 
understandings of belonging.  
Exclusionism (or, better, the extent to which majorities embrace 
exclusionism) has an intimate, troubled relationship with democracy. Democracy is 
based on three interlocking principles—egalitarianism, competitiveness, and 
sovereignty—that are in constant tension (Dahl 1971, Schmitter and Karl 1996). 
Immigration consistently challenges democracy by exacerbating tensions between 
egalitarianism and sovereignty: are all adults, regardless of origin, politically equal 
or can majorities restrict membership with the force of law? When egalitarianism 
and current forms of democratic sovereignty cannot be fostered at the same time, 
people tend to prioritize national sovereignty to the extent that they are exclusionist 
(to preserve tradition) and to prioritize egalitarianism (and new institutions to 
protect equality) to the extent that they are not exclusionist. 
 Immigration’s challenge to democracy is particularly acute in the EU both 
historically and institutionally. Institutionally, European integration fosters 
egalitarianism across borders through (oft unpopular) rearrangements of 
sovereignty.  European integration enables migration between member states with 
markedly different levels of economic development, facilitates “passport free” travel 
between most EU member states and a handful of neighboring countries, and 
requires that aspects of migration policy be made at the EU level, including towards 
external frontiers (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011, Maas 2013, Geddes, Guiraudon 
and Boswell 2011). Historically, both postwar political movements against 
immigration and policy responses to such movements are deeply tied to questions 
about race (Givens 2005, Givens and Evans Case 2014, Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten 
2013). If Europeans exclude mostly non-white immigrants, does that thereby 
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preclude Vergangenheitsbewältigung, that is, coming to grips with Europe’s 
totalitarian, eugenicist past?  
Opposition to immigration may be triggered by a variety of national 
developments: macroeconomic, cultural, public safety, and demographic. I analyze 
novel measures of cultural and security threats that immigration may pose in the EU 
(such as the number of immigrant languages) and assess how they compare with 
developments like the unemployment trend and the rate of influx of immigration. 
The evidence provides little support for the notion that opposition to immigration is 
driven primarily by economic considerations (at either the individual or the 
national level). Post-9/11 conflicts (war and terrorism) increase opposition to 
immigration but not as dramatically as do increases in the Muslim population 
(suggesting perhaps that Islamophobia outpaces security risks). 
There is reason to suspect that attitudes toward immigration are polarized in 
the European Union today. In general, the winners of globalization are more 
welcoming towards immigration. “Eurostars”—those are more educated, affluent, 
and geographically mobile—are well situated to take advantage of the new 
circumstances (Norris and Inglehart 2009, Risse 2010, Lahav 2004). Conversely, 
xenophobic populist movements appeal to natives largely left out of the new, 
globalized political economy (Holmes 2009). The variety of economic positions that 
European xenophobic populist parties have taken during the past several decades 
suggests, however, that the relationship between class and inclusivity remains a 
puzzle. That exclusionism is distinct from how Europeans identify in terms of right 
and left offers one clue, but differences of belief and sociodemographic profile are 
insufficient (on their own) for explaining polarization.  
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I investigate which national developments best explain polarization of 
attitudes toward immigration. The concerns of denizens may be such that society is 
bifurcated into factions: strongly opposed to or strongly in favor of immigration. 
In what national contexts are beliefs about belonging unusually polarized? 
Malta and Cyprus exhibit the highest opposition to immigration but the lowest 
polarization (i.e., the mean national level of opposition to immigration is high but 
the variance of national opinion on the subject is low). Polarization is found in older 
countries of immigration where ongoing national developments have created 
unusually large generational gaps, religious differences, and disagreements on the 
exclusionism dimension. The evidence of that analysis also suggests that large 
differences in opinion do not just depend on denizens’ concerns and national 
developments (or the polarization that their intersection engenders).  
Political motivation plays an integral role, too. As people become interested 
in politics, several transformations are likely to occur that should lead us to expect 
larger, sharper differences of opinion: they describe their views using political 
discourse that is not only consistent with their fellow nationals but commensurate 
with discourse used throughout the EU. Whether from amenable news sources or 
discussion with likeminded friends, family, and coworkers, as people become 
interested in politics they also tend to seek one-sided information. They also 
discover that they have strong policy preferences in accord with their underlying 
beliefs and interests (Luskin and Mohanty 2014). And they focus on salient issues. 
But if the salience of immigration as an issue of political is even loosely proportional 
to the size of the immigrant population, we should expect that issue salience to vary 
considerably throughout the EU. 
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I investigate the extent to which the effects of denizens’ concerns are jointly 
conditioned by their political interest and national developments. Holding other 
explanatory factors constant, there are several interesting findings of this analysis. 
Exclusionism increases opposition to immigration even at low levels of political 
interest in low immigration countries but only slightly. At high levels of interest and 
immigration, the effects are substantial. A similar pattern holds for differences 
between those on the right and those on the left. Troublingly, there is near complete 
disagreement on immigration policy between Muslims and Christians in high 
immigration countries among those with high levels of interest in politics. In 
general, immigrants (and those with a migrant background) are less opposed to 
immigration than natives. Interestingly, that gap shrinks when denizens have high 
levels of political interest. But my findings suggest a major challenge to integration 
policy: migrants and natives are unlikely to see eye-to-eye in high immigration 
countries (at any plausible level of political interest).  
Methodologically, in this analysis I make three contributions. Two are 
implications for best practices. First, my results make it clear that, in cross-national 
research (at least in Europe), both slopes and intercepts need to be allowed to vary 
by country. That is, not only are there different baseline levels of opposition to 
immigration in each country, each explanatory factor has a different effect in each 
country. Second, my results show that (with proper attention to the heterogeneity 
that is introduced) it is fruitful to analyze nationally representative samples (i.e., 
representative of all denizens, not just all citizens or another subset thereof) and 
similarly fruitful to analyze the EU ensemble (rather than to make potentially 
arbitrary decisions about what constitutes a “country of immigration”). Beyond that, 
I develop an empirical strategy for assessing polarization in the cross-national 
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context. Finally, bringing these three strands together, I show how hierarchical 
models can be used as an excellent benchmark for assessing the extent to which 
modeling the interaction of denizens’ concerns, their level of political interest, and 
their national context can suffice in lieu of relying on country as a variable of 
ignorance (i.e., a “black box” that does not point to a specific causal mechanism). 
Chapter 1 introduces exclusionism in the context of European politics. 
Chapter 2 introduces the outcomes of interest (opposition to immigration and 
polarization) as well as a schematic overview of how concerns and motivation at the 
individual level may combine with national developments so as to generate both 
outcomes. Chapter 2 also introduces the main hypotheses to be tested. Since I 
discuss them throughout, I refer to opposition to immigration as “OI” and 
polarization of opposition to immigration as “POI” (both for brevity and to accent 
the fact that I am referring to stylized definitions.) Chapter 3 presents the models 
that I use (which are a mix of Bayesian hierarchical models and classical linear 
regression models) and lays out what I expect of their parameters. Chapter 4 
introduces the data I use, which comes from the 2008 European Values Study (EVS) 
for individual-level variables and primarily from Eurostat for country-level 
variables. Chapter 4 also details the ways in which I operationalize key variables 
and presents descriptive statistics.  
Chapters 5-8 describe and highlight various aspects of the results. Chapter 5 
presents an analysis of exclusionism, how its effects vary in the EU, and how those 
effects compare to   ’s other determinants. Chapter 6 analyzes which national 
developments best explain the heterogeneity of the effects of individuals’ concerns 
and whether that heterogeneity coincides with    . In Chapter 7, I regress    on 
national developments (demographic, public safety, cultural, and macroeconomic). 
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Chapter 8 assesses the interaction of concerns, motivation, and context. The 
conclusion takes stock, considers broader implications, and points to useful 
directions for future research.           
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Chapter 1:  Denizen Politics in the European Union  
Faced with a decision about whether or not to welcome a newcomer, people 
may reasonably disagree about the importance of, for example, fostering 
opportunity for the newcomer versus preserving local traditions that may, however 
inadvertently, be threatened by the newcomer’s success.  In the democratic context, 
granting a person citizenship entails sharing power with that person. The decision 
involves a series of potential risks—economic, public safety, demographic, and 
cultural—and rewards on the same dimensions. What a person values about 
belonging should guide her in forming a belief about how exclusionist to be. In turn, 
her exclusionism should guide her in forming opinions on a variety of questions as 
she translates her more basic commitments into political priorities and policy 
preferences. 
My understanding of political belonging is based upon the theory of thick and 
thin moralities developed by Walzer (1994) and Gregg (2003a). “Thick moralities” 
reflect a community’s way of life; “thin moralities” reflect basic claims to decency 
that can be recognized across diverse moral communities. Proponents of the former 
are “committed to particular ways of life, worldviews, identities, or cultural values” 
(Gregg 2003a:67). Normatively thick social integration “renders individuals’ 
orientations and worldviews coeval with the communities they inhabit” (Gregg 
2003a:48).1 By contrast, thin norms bespeak a “generalized community” which 
“eschews particularistic identities, conceiving citizenship as formal identity, 
                                                 
1 Though Walzer and Gregg are not describing methodologies, the framework echoes Geertz’s discussion 
of the “thick description” of the fully immersed ethnographer (Geertz 1973). Geertz considers immersion a 
virtue for anthropology because the value of certain cultural practices can be extremely difficult to 
communicate to outsiders. My empirical approach to exclusionism can be thought of as an attempt to 
measure the salience of such “je ne sais quoi” concerns in the public mind.  
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whereas concrete community is guided by the identities and normative 
commitments of these particular men and women” (Gregg 2003a:67–68).2 Everyone 
and every community, however, hold some combination of thick and thin norms; to 
describe persons as bound solely by thick norms, for example, would reduce them to 
the “communities from which they spring” (Gregg 2003a:47). 
This approach meshes well with immigration scholarship, which has 
generally moved away from dichotomies and toward continuums in the last two 
decades. In an early landmark work, Rogers Brubaker classified national narratives 
about citizenship as being primarily ethnic (whereby Germany is taken as 
archetypal) or civic (à la France) (Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood In France 
and Germany 1992). Few immigration scholars today think that national political 
traditions can be categorized so cleanly. Cross-national scholars of public opinion 
find both ethnic and civic conceptions of nationalism at work at the individual level 
(Ariely 2012, Reeskens and Hooghe 2010). 
What constitutes local political traditions varies considerably in the 
European Union. Perhaps it entails a strict form of secularism; perhaps not 
(Laurence 2012). For others, the main concern may be about who should have 
access to the benefits and protection of the welfare state. Socioeconomic concerns 
are not only policy questions; they are central to postwar understandings of what 
citizenship entails in Europe (Marshall 1965). Pym Fortuyn, the openly homosexual 
Dutch populist who was assassinated in 2002, believed Muslim immigration needed 
                                                 
2 I consider “thick moralities,” “exclusionism,” and “localism” to be roughly interchangeable; this 
means that I also take their opposites—“thin moralities,” “inclusionism,” and “cosmopolitanism”—to 
be roughly interchangeable. Gregg’s proposal of “enlightened localism,” which is intended to be a 
constructive mean between the extremes of localism and cosmopolitanism (Gregg 2003b), is not under 
investigation here since my project is not primarily normative but rather positive. For interesting discussion 
of practical political challenges along these lines, see Gregg, Ypi, et al. (2010) and Maas (2013).  
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limits in order to protect women’s rights, gay rights, and, more broadly, Europe’s 
commitment to multiculturalism.    
I do not conflate exclusionism with nationalism because the meaning of 
nationalism is publically contested along the exclusionist dimension. Both 
historically and recently, Mediterranean member states tend to favor deeper 
European integration than their northern European counterparts. That means, at 
least in terms of cross-national comparisons, it is possible to evaluate 
nationalism(s) as being more or less exclusionist. To take public debate in France as 
an example, one person may see nationalism primarily in terms of the ethnic 
heritage of a distinct group while another may see a proud tradition of protecting 
human rights. The (populist, xenophobic) Lega Nord provides another example of 
how exclusionism may or may not coincide with nationalism. As its name suggests, 
the Lega Nord draws its support not nationally but regionally in a way that reflects 
longstanding historical divides within Italy (McDonnell 2006). Exclusionism may, of 
course, empower new nationalist movements, as is arguably the case today with 
Basque and Scottish separatism. Alternatively, and perhaps more typically, 
exclusionism may reinforce existing nationalisms vis-à-vis inclusionary, 
cosmopolitan understandings of nationalism.   
I expect the connection between    and exclusionism to be more consistent 
than that between ideology and left and right; the discourse of left and right may or 
may not capture exclusionism in any given member state. As some of the above 
examples suggest, what people value about political belonging is not the same as 
how they identify in terms of left and right. Ideological self-identification might be 
thought of as a summary of concerns on a variety of dimensions (socialism, 
environmentalism, feminism, pacifism, and so on). Which concerns are most 
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important for the meaning of left and right vary in time and place.3 And while some 
of these concerns are confined largely to the history books, others are deeply rooted 
in lived experience. The connection between the authoritarian personality profile 
and ideological self-identification on the right, which is usually relatively consistent 
across borders, is reversed in former Warsaw Pact countries (Thorisdottir, et al. 
2007, Hinckley 2010). 
Similarly, exclusionism is not necessarily the same as nativism – the latter 
might be thought of an instance of the former. Exclusionists may or not focus on 
birth as the defining attribute of belonging. Language, for example, may be much 
more important. 
Historically, in Europe, many of the political actors that have opposed 
immigration have espoused authoritarianism (Betz 2006, Holmes 2000) and in 
some other cases even been extremist, that is, engaged in violence and other types 
of hate crimes against immigrants (Givens and Evans Case 2014). It would be a 
mistake, however, to assume that exclusionism necessarily entails either. 
Exclusionists (as with adherents of any of belief) may or may not be willing to use 
violence (either directly or via the state). Extraordinary measures to restore law 
and order may reinforce the border or they may defend the cosmopolitan project of 
monetary union from popular protest.  
Migration moves the goalposts on democracy. What critics see as latent 
authoritarianism in populism is understood by populists as a legitimate defense 
                                                 
3 Originally, “right” meant monarchism and “left” meant support for the French revolution. As early 
as the 1830s, however, most indigenous political elites around the world took “right” to mean 
“collaborationist” and “left” to connote “anti-colonialist” (Bayly 2004). Elsewhere, I’ve argued that, at 
a conceptual level, exclusionism defines the conservative end of one such dimension but that 
exclusionism’s empirical relationship with rightism in the EU is variable (Mohanty 2012).  
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against overly cosmopolitan bureaucracies and against business interests that 
enable unsustainable levels of immigration (Simmons 1996). For this reason, the 
politics of immigration are often studied in terms of tension between liberalism and 
democracy (Freeman 2010). The tension between individual rights and the right of 
majorities to shape the direction of immigration policy is perhaps on display 
nowhere more strongly than in Switzerland, where, in many areas, whether or not 
individual immigrants acquire citizenship is determined by popular referendum 
(Hainmueller and Hargartner 2013).   
Ironically, both sides perceive the other to be authoritarian: the question is 
whether the rights of minorities or the rights of majorities are more important for 
democracy. Measuring where people fall on the exclusionism spectrum helps 
capture this dynamic.4 
One of the major ongoing debates in political science is about the extent to 
which    is fueled by realistic considerations (such as job scarcity) vis-à-vis 
symbolic ones (like language or tradition) (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 
2004). There are a number of limitations to this dichotomy, not least of which is the 
implication that cultural considerations are not “real” or (contrary to a long line of 
economic anthropology dating to Karl Polyani) that the economy and culture are 
distinct (Polyani 2001). A recent survey experiment in France suggests that concern 
over job competition between natives and migrants is most intense for jobs 
generally considered to be important to national heritage (Mawell 2013). 
                                                 
4 This is not to suggest that authoritarianism and extremism are only in the eye of the beholder but 
rather that, at least at an abstract level, they are less about what people want than about what they 
are willing to do to accomplish their goals; authoritarianism and extremism are discussed in context 
further below. 
 14 
Defining the securitization of immigration policy is easier said than done 
(Messina 2014). In the post-9/11 context in Europe, immigration policy is not easily 
disentangled from security policy (Givens, Freeman and Leal 2008). That, however, 
does not mean that physical security questions are easily linked with job security 
questions under the header of “realistic threat.” 
I consider crime and terror under the broad header of “public safety.”  Trade, 
monetary, and fiscal policies are distinct but nonetheless linked in a myriad of ways; 
describing them under the umbrella of economic policy does not preclude them 
from having other types of consequences or imply that attempts to synchronize such 
policies are necessarily successful. I describe the public safety implications of 
immigration in this sense: not by actual policy achievement but by the broad area of 
public concern. 
Over the last decade or so, there have been a number of dramatic Islamic 
extremist attacks in the EU, including the Madrid train bombing, the London 7/7 
attacks, Mohammed Merah (the “shooter on the scooter”) in Paris, and the dramatic 
murder of Lee Rigby. These attacks have not only raised national alarm they have 
galvanized anti-immigrant groups (Walker, Taylor and Siddique 2013). More 
recently, reports of European-born Muslims volunteering to fight in the Syrian civil 
war have raised the specter that youth with a passport from an EU member state 
may become extremists abroad and return home to carry out an attack (Sherlock 
2014). 
Though exclusionism clearly involves group conflict, it is important not to 
take groups as completely fixed or given. At a psychological level, collective 
identities are often formed in response to traumatic events (rather than pre-dating 
them). Collective political identities—which offer reassurance through promises of 
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belonging while relegating others to the status of enemy—often function by denying 
the nature or existence of past connections between those who are in and those who 
are out (Murer 2009).5 This dynamic of denial is often at play in anti-immigrant 
discourses that present immigrants as invaders rather than as, for example, 
recruited guest workers, fellow subjects of a former colonial system, or second- or 
third-generation denizens of a shared space.  
Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian who was recently convicted of killing 
77 people in July 2011 (Lewis and Lyall 2012), defended his extremist actions in 
court, even claiming he would do them again, in order to stop the “Muslim invasion” 
of Norway6 and Europe (BBC 2012). Breivik argued that his actions were also 
designed to stop the “multicultural experiment” of the ruling labor party (BBC 
2012). Richard Millet, a noted French author, created further controversy by 
describing the killings as “formal perfection . . . in their literary dimension,” adding 
that they were “without doubt what Norway deserved” (Crumley 2012). Millet 
argues that “multiculturalism, as it has been imported from the United States, is the 
worst thing possible for Europe . . . and creates a mosaic of ghettoes in which the 
[host] nation no longer exists” and that “European nations are dissolving socially at 
the same time as they’re losing their Christian essence in favor of general relativism” 
(Crumley 2012). In this perspective, the enemy of the nation is depicted as twofold: 
the external enemy (immigrants) and the internal enemy (anti-traditionalists). The 
debate is thus not limited to conflict over who belongs to the body politic but also 
encompasses disagreement about the proper direction of the nation. 
                                                 
5 For example, Serbian narratives about the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 may have served to reinforce Serb 
arguments against Croats in the late 1980s, but the narratives belied the fact Serbs and Croats were not at 
odds when Yugoslavia was created at the end of World War I. 
6 Norway is not in the EU but shares open borders with most of it by way of the Schengen agreement. 
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In this sense, Millet’s arguments are consistent with arguments that the 
French National Front has long made: the Front describes cities experiencing high 
levels of immigration as “occupied cities,” and the Front blames this alleged 
occupation on the moral decline that has happened at the hands of postwar French 
intellectual leadership (Simmons 1996). Similarly, in his analysis of the attitudes 
towards violence of the British National Party, Douglas Holmes concludes that “they 
understand . . . how and why the seething subjectivities of nationalism coalesce as 
violence.  What appears as mindless rage is in fact consummate hostility to elite 
portrayals of reality” (Holmes 2000, 131).  
Political violence—and sympathy for it—comes from the exasperation of 
feeling that nothing is being done in exigent circumstances. The violence of Islamist 
and European extremists polarizes society by reinforcing the realist logic that 
politics at its core is about friends and enemies.7 Put differently, public safety 
concerns polarize denizens into migrants and natives (wherein the factions are not 
defined solely by legality or ethnicity but also by a series of concerns). 
It is this populist frustration that mainstream conservative European 
politicians—most notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister David Cameron—attempt to 
harness when they declare that multiculturalism has failed (BBC 2010). These 
statements mark a turning point, if not a crisis, within European conservatism that 
is not entirely dissimilar to the challenge faced by social democratic parties who saw 
members reject calls to embrace immigrants (Freeman 1978, Betz 2006). Many of 
the key founders of the European Union—Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and 
                                                 
7 Here I mean friends and public enemies in the realist sense meant by Schmitt (2007). 
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Alcide de Gaspari—embraced a vision of social Catholicism that was committed to 
ideological pluralism and the belief that solidarity was more likely to emerge if each 
person was free to live as he pleased.8 This particular view of social Catholicism, 
however, remains largely an elite phenomenon (Holmes 2009, 62ff). Put differently, 
as leading conservatives reject multiculturalism and (at least implicitly) suggest that 
European identity is grounded in an ethnicity that is white and Christian, European 
conservatism moves away from the inclusive values that founded the European 
Community.    
Each identity is continually constructed, challenged, and reconstructed 
partially in response to political violence from both sides as different groups vie for 
leadership. Though concepts such as moral decline may be amorphous, the fluidity 
of political friends and enemies is not unlimited, as each country brings its own 
values, conflicts, projects, hopes, and burdens from the past to the table when it 
deliberates its future. As Gary Jacobsohn writes, 
. . . a constitution acquires identity through experience . . .  [and] this identity 
exists neither as a discrete object of invention nor as a heavily encrusted 
essence embedded in society’s culture, requiring only to be discovered. 
Rather, identity emerges dialogically and represents a mix of political 
aspirations and commitments that are expressive of a nation’s past, as well as 
the determination of those within society who seek in some ways to 
transcend that past. It is changeable but resistant to its own destruction . . .  
(Jacobsohn 2010, 7) 
It is in this sense that Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the French National 
Front, insists that France, like all other nations, has the “right to be different,” that is, 
the right of a people to be unmolested by Europeanization, globalization, and 
                                                 
8 For example, the EU’s commitment to the principle of subsidiarity—the idea that decisions should be 
made as locally as possible—reflects this tradition. These beliefs have been drawn upon to build support for 
ongoing EU expansion into Central and Eastern Europe among the conservative politicians of the European 
People’s Party bloc. 
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immigration (Simmons 1996, 237). Precisely because sympathy for such views does 
not necessarily entail support for extremism, “radical right” parties have 
proliferated across the EU. Just as third parties in the US are not known for winning 
so much as for putting issues on the table, many of these parties have not won large 
numbers of votes but instead have used their relatively small number of seats to 
transform debate and to pressure (and sometimes also to join) governing coalitions. 
However, such parties are only able to maintain pressure because there is a deep 
current of public opinion behind them. At the same time, their low vote shares belie 
lack of public approval (let alone consensus).  
Political membership serves a variety of social and political purposes 
(Brubaker 1992, Anderson 1991). The right to have rights in the first place is the 
Achilles’ heel of the promise of liberal democracies to protect individuals (Arendt 
1994), as ongoing problems with statelessness and the asylum system attest. 
Denizens do not agree on the salience of the unique, socially consequential, 
exclusive aspects of belonging vis-à-vis the inclusive, egalitarian protection afforded 
by the rights of citizenship (Mohanty 2012). Despite the EU’s moves towards 
postnationalism (and protections at multiple levels of governance), the nation-state 
remains the single most important political actor in the daily lives of denizens. 
Understanding exclusionism and its connection to    sheds light on what denizens 
expect of member states. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and Hypotheses 
This chapter introduces two outcomes of interest: opposition to immigration 
(  ) and polarization of opposition to immigration (   ).    is an individual level 
variable; of course, it may be investigated at aggregate levels, too.    , since it 
captures how much difference of opinion there is, is necessarily an aggregate 
variable. It takes two to tango. Investigating these outcomes’ determinants leads to a 
puzzle: how does the individual level relate to national context?   
Let   , 
    (  , ,   
 ) where   , 
   is individual   in country  ’s observed   ,   ,  
is the mean of that distribution, and   
  is the national variance.   
  is the level of     
in country  . Trends in     manifest as trends in   
 : why is    , to foreshadow, 
apparently more than twice as high in France, Austria, and Sweden as it is in Malta 
and Cyprus? Can those differences in     be traced to systemic differences? 
To analyze    , I investigate three paths, the latter two of which overlap with 
the regression I perform to explain   . The first path is        . Does 
polarization of opposition to immigration reflect particular national developments? 
Statistics about this path set the stage but are a complete black box. How do national 
developments polarize attitudes? The second path to investigate is:         
   . The first link captures the extent to which those same national developments 
explain    , the heterogeneity of national effects at the individual level (i.e., the 
variation of explanatory variables’ slopes across borders). The second link captures 
the extent to which     ultimately manifests as    . This chapter provides stylized 
examples that highlights why     may (or may not) be a determinant of     
(depending on the relationship of     to the underlying distribution of exogenous 
variables). Chapter 6 investigates both links of the second path with a post-
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estimation analysis of Chapter 5’s partial pooling model. Chapter 6 also juxtaposes 
those findings with the first path. In this chapter, I theorize that each denizen’s 
concerns (  ) are conditioned by both political interest (PI) and national 
developments and that understanding the interaction of the three will shed light on 
both    and    : (        )    ,    . Chapter 8 presents results about the 
third path. Finally, this chapter introduces individual and national level hypotheses 
about   and    . 
OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION 
The dependent variable is opposition to immigration,   . This attitude is a 
summary of the extent to which an individual opposes (or, at the other end, 
supports) immigration on economic, public safety, cultural, and/or demographic 
grounds.  
Economic opposition captures the extent to which denizens believe that 
immigrants take jobs or burden the welfare state. Immigration may help modernize 
an entire economy, or it may create a zero-sum game for jobs for those least able to 
compete.  
Public safety opposition is the extent to which denizens believe that 
immigrants cause crime or threaten society. A generous asylum policy may protect 
human rights and even facilitate cooperation with friendly groups in a warzone but, 
at the same time, may undermine public safety. Immigration may carry risks in 
terms of terrorism, but a welcoming stance may dampen those threats.  
Culturally, immigration may signal decline or herald renaissance. Cultural 
opposition is the extent to which denizens believe that immigration undermines the 
national way of life.  
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Demographic opposition is the extent to which denizens feel that there are 
simply too many immigrants. Increases in population (which typically translate into 
some combination of increases in population density and expansions of 
metropolitan areas) may bring any number of changes to daily life. Perhaps it is for 
this reason that (in the sample of the EU analyzed here)    is highest on the small 
island countries of Malta and Cyprus. Supporting immigration has demographic 
grounds as well: policymakers in Europe often promote immigration as a potential 
solution to economic imbalances generated by aging societies.      
These types of    are conceptually distinct, but there are reasons for 
considering them together as a single index. It makes sense to ask how someone’s 
health is even though the state of the constituent components of their health 
(cardiovascular, digestive, ocular, etc.) may vary quite a bit from one another; the 
body is a system. Immigration may begin for one reason (e.g., economic) but have 
lasting consequences on a number of dimensions.  
Family reunification is the most common type of immigration in the EU today 
(Geddes, Guiraudon and Boswell 2011). As such, many of today’s immigration 
streams reflect socioeconomic conditions of decades past (and, in some places, even 
colonial history of centuries past) more clearly than they do today’s policy 
priorities. (That may be one explanation of why many Europeans view immigration 
as a “take it or leave it” proposition despite its complexity.) 
In Europe today, Islamophobia reflects the “sum of all fears.” In the postwar 
era, many Muslim immigrants are working poor (by contrast to the predominantly 
middle-class Muslim immigrants in the US). Muslims have come in large numbers 
and are often believed by both the public and policymakers to pose the largest 
 22 
security risk and to have brought the most dramatic cultural change. Thus the 
overlap of these broad areas of concern is hardly semantic. 
Empirically, Europeans tend to be concerned about the different kinds of 
problems that immigration may pose to very similar extents. Put differently, some 
Europeans have very high   , others very low, and most somewhere in the middle, 
but relatively few think that immigration threatens the economy but not national 
culture, demographics but not public safety, and so on. 
To explain  , I evaluate both individual and national level variables that may 
increase or decrease one or more of its constituent components.  
 
POLARIZATION 
 
I investigate polarization, which I define as the extent to which different 
factions of a political society come to have fundamentally different aims on an issue. 
These factions may or may not correspond to political parties (it is less likely that 
they would in multiparty systems than in two party systems), and members of each 
faction need not agree on exact stances. Polarization is an aggregate phenomenon 
that can be analyzed at any level of interest (locality, nation, region, etc.). When 
investigating    , I compare     in different member states in the EU and also in 
different regions (e.g., EU-15 vs. the new member states).     
Polarization is about attitudes (policy preferences) and may or may not be 
connected to overt forms of political behavior. I do not consider polarization to be 
the same as authoritarianism or extremism. Polarization, insofar as it is a process 
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that differentiates people into factions, may well be a precursor to such anti-system 
political behavior. Polarization is probably better thought of in terms of 
radicalization.9 
Since polarization is about disagreement, it is most directly captured by a 
distribution’s variance (though, depending on the data’s distribution, kurtosis may 
also be of interest). Variance is, of course, unsigned, but I still refer to the level of 
polarization of    (which is signed) because polarization need not be symmetrical. 
(See Figure 2.1.) 
  
                                                 
9 Radicalism and extremism are not the same. Though radicalism may certainly be the basis of extremism, 
they are nonetheless distinct. The latter connotes action (willingness to go to extremes); the former refers to 
ideas (“radical” means “root”). For example, early utilitarian philosophers were known as radical 
philosophers because they believed that pleasure and pain lay at the root of all ethics, but such a belief does 
not entail extremist political behavior. (For further discussion, see Mohanty [2012].)  
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Figure 2.1: Hypothetical Distributions of Opposition to Immigration. 
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Figure 2.1 shows five scenarios; Scenarios 2-5 exhibit    . In the baseline 
Scenario 1, which is not polarized, half the public is opposed to immigration and half 
supports it. Consider four ways in which an event could change public opinion on 
the topic:  
The most straightforward way is for the event to affect everyone 
homogenously; in Scenario 2 everyone becomes more opposed to immigration than 
they were. There is still disagreement as to how opposed to immigration people 
should be (which can be seen from the variation around   ’s new mean,      ) but 
nearly everyone agrees that immigration is something to oppose.   
By contrast, in Scenario 3, the public becomes polarized. Half the public 
opposes immigration; half supports it. Both factions debate immigration internally, 
which can be seen from the variation around   ’s modes,      and      . The overall 
mean is 0, just as in Scenario 1, but that similarity belies a very different political 
landscape. The difference between Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 is better grasped by 
the attitudes’ increase in variance. Scenario 3 depicts the archetypal case of 
polarization (bimodal, symmetrical distribution, with one group clearly for and the 
other clearly against). 
Scenario 4 is bimodal, too. Scenario 4 differs, however, in that in Scenario 4 
the polarization is asymmetrical: three-quarters of the public opposes immigration 
while only one-quarter supports it; three-fourths of the respondents have attitudes 
that vary around      , and one-fourth have attitudes that vary around     . 
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Scenario 5 depicts a moderate increase in    . Polarization is a variable of 
extent. How polarized a distribution is depends on the extent to which it 
differentiates people into factions. Even if the distribution remains unimodal, it may 
still be more polarized to some degree (Fiorina and Abrams 2008, Baldassarri and 
Gelman 2008). The distribution with a dotted line is more polarized because the 
attitude’s variance is higher: a higher proportion of the public has an attitude near 
one of the extremes.  
WHAT EXPLAINS POLARIZATION? 
 
Asking what explains polarization is akin to asking which metals are 
magnetic. I investigate national developments to see whether demographics, public 
safety, culture, or macroeconomics has the strongest “magnetic pull.” Which type of 
change at the national level is associated with the most notable change in dynamics 
at the individual level and, ultimately,     in the aggregate? 
In ordinary circumstances, a handful of key considerations explain whether a 
person supports a given political proposition. Many dimensions are deemed not 
relevant; they haven’t been “politicized.” Conversely, at the totalitarian extreme, 
every aspect of a person’s identity and beliefs is readily evaluated by the logic of 
“with us or against us.” 
   is not polarized in the EU as a whole, but that does not preclude the 
possibility that     is high in some countries. I perform hypothesis tests to establish 
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whether     is related to macro variables (like rising unemployment or rapid 
growth of immigrant populations). I also test to see whether     is asymmetric. 
Finally, to establish links between individuals and their national context, I analyze 
estimated cross-national differences in effects to see whether particular concerns 
are driving     (e.g., religious or ideological differences).  
National developments (whether long term or short term) that trigger     
are most likely to trigger asymmetric polarization (Scenario 4) because immigrants 
comprise a small minority in most member states. Even with a sizeable number of 
supporters and sympathizers from the native population, it is unlikely that there 
would be an even split.10  
There are several substantive reasons to be concerned with    . Knowing 
what the public wants has implications for whether or not parties should be 
expected to offer moderate platforms on immigration. 
    may be important politically even if it is asymmetric. A faction may be 
most tempted by extremism when its numbers are low. Asymmetric polarization 
may yield insight into majority-minority dynamics and the extent to which those 
dynamics reflect not just ethnicity but also more varied constellations of beliefs and 
interests.  
More specifically, there is reason to suspect that the attitudinal minority 
(those who are pro-immigration) are disproportionately influential in terms of 
                                                 
10 Symmetric polarization (Scenario 3) is, by contrast, most likely the type of polarization that 
American politics exhibits (since there are comparable numbers of liberals and conservatives). 
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immigration policy. Immigration scholars have long noted gaps between the limits 
on immigration that majorities of the public want and the ongoing increases in 
immigration levels in liberal democracies. From the standpoint of political economy, 
beneficiaries of immigration are concentrated (for particular business interests) 
while public opposition is diffuse, giving the former the edge in terms of lobbying 
(Freeman 2010). Others argue that illegal immigration is endemic to liberal 
democracies for legal reasons. Liberal democracies allow short-term entry for a 
variety of reasons and afford legal rights to those who overstay their visas. The 
former is the most typical source of illegal immigration and the latter makes 
deportation difficult (more so in Europe than in the US) (Messina and Lahav 2004). 
Both the political economy and the public law theories are accounts that elites have 
disproportionate influence over immigration policy. 
One possibility worth investigating is whether the majority opposes 
immigration but elites support it. It seems plausible that a non-trivial portion of the 
public is markedly pro-immigration. Many reasons for short-term entry—such as 
family reunification and asylum seeking—invoke humanitarian norms that many 
sympathize with. Investigating asymmetric polarization sheds light on the accuracy 
of populist narratives against elites and immigration. 
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OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION AND ITS POLARIZATION  
 
 
Figure 2.2: An Individual’s Opposition to Immigration in Context. 
Figure 2.2 diagrams determinants of    and how national context may 
influence it.  
Variables at the individual level determine    (Path A). Which concerns 
matter? Which don’t? Abstracting away from national idiosyncrasy, which concerns 
matter throughout the EU? 
Country enters in in two ways: Each country has a unique history that comes 
to bear on immigration politics. Many European countries have immigration 
patterns that reflect their colonial pasts, but only France has fought a war in a 
country (Algeria) so close to home since World War II. Many European countries 
have extreme right parties that oppose immigration, but only Germany 
constitutionally bans those parties because of its totalitarian past. Such differences 
 30 
are not captured by the data I investigate. At any point in time, it is reasonable to 
expect different national baseline levels of    (Path B).  
Opinions depend not only on people’s attributes but also on the national 
context. The effects of being black versus white, of being (first- or second-
generation) immigrant versus native, of being on the left versus on the right, etc., 
should not be expected to be the same in the UK as in Italy. To take another example, 
in most of the EU, the Muslim community is also an immigrant community. That 
community arrived over different periods of time, and each community is connected 
to different diasporas, sects of Islam, and sending countries. In Bulgaria, the Muslim 
community predates modern mass migration. Thus it is reasonable to expect the 
effects of religious difference to be heterogeneous by country. I expect the effect of 
individual concerns to be conditioned by national context (Path C). 
In Chapter 5, I present estimates of a partial pooling (hierarchical) model 
that allows both intercepts (Path B) and slopes (Path C) to vary by country. These 
estimates provide a wealth of information about Paths A-C, particularly about how 
Path A compares and contrasts to Path B. 
To illustrate how the heterogeneity of national effects (conditioning along 
Path C) may ultimately increase    , consider Country Q and Country R. In both 
countries, the level of exclusionism of individual   is an independently and 
identically distributed standard normal variable:   , 
     .  .   (0, 1) and 
  , 
     .  .   (0, 1). Suppose that    in each country has a similar data generating 
process that: both have the same intercept, the same conditional variance, and 
exclusionism as the only individual level variable that systematically explains   . 
But the data generating process differs in one key respect: exclusionism’s effect. 
  
 31 
   , 
     , 
     .  .   (1   2    , 
  , 1)  
  , 
     , 
     .  .   (1   3    , 
  , 1) 
Figure 2.3: Data Generating Processes Illustrating Micro-Macro Polarization Link 
Country R’s     is higher Country Q’s. As Figure 2.4 shows, Country Q (solid 
line) exhibits moderate polarization when compared with Country R (dotted line). 
(Mean    is the same in both countries.) Based on a simulation, the (unconditional) 
standard deviation of   
   is about 2.235 but is about 3.161 for   
  .11 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Simulated Densities in Countries Q (solid line) and R (dotted line) 
 
                                                 
11 I generated each random variable involved in the data generating process 10,000 times, stored  ̂  and 
 ̂ , and then repeated that process 1,000 times. The simulation error is about 0.02 for each country and so 
 ̂  >  ̂  at each iteration (and clearly so). 
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Since    has multiple determinants, each of which has a potentially different 
distributions at the national level, the existence of     does not necessarily entail 
   . Notice that     depends on the distribution of the explanatory variables, too. I 
repeat the simulation and that if exclusionism’s standard deviation in Country   
falls below 2 3, then     is the same in Countries   and   (despite the   ).  
Though exclusionism’s effect may differ for idiosyncratic reasons, it may 
differ systematically, too. Suppose the effect of exclusionism is really (0.5    ) 
where   is gross domestic product expressed as a z-score and   1.5 in Country   
and 2.5 in Country   (meaning both countries have above average wealth but   is 
among the wealthiest). The data generating process can now be written for any 
country j as   , 
     , 
     .  .   (1   (0.5     )    , 
  , 1). Each individual’s    
reflects an interaction between her exclusionism and her national context. But the 
national wealth leads to higher     in Country   since each individual’s 
exclusionism is multiplied by a larger amount: those with unusually exclusionist 
beliefs have even higher    in Country R than Country Q, but so too do those with 
unusually anti-exclusionist beliefs have unusually low    in Country   than in 
Country  . Put differently, since the national variable is just a constant within that 
country, if it interacts with an individual level variable, it likely to have implications 
for     (in addition to whatever conditioning effect it has on  ). 
Chapter 6 analyzes Path C: Which national developments best explain    ? 
Do those national developments have a “magnetic pull” associated with 
polarization? Symmetric or asymmetric?  
Country is a variable of ignorance or a black box. The partial pooling 
estimates of Paths B and C give a sense of how much is yet to be explained, which I 
turn to in the next two chapters. 
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Figure 2.5: Concerns, Motivation, and Context 
 
Figure 2.5 provides an alternate diagram of   . It differs in two key respects:  
First, the causal paths do not depend on country (as a dummy variable); 
country is replaced by variables meant to capture key national developments that 
may influence   . In Chapter 7, I present analyses of Path B. Which national 
developments have the strongest influence on   ? By juxtaposing linear regression 
and partial pooling models, Chapter 7 also provides evidence about how 
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homogenous the effects of national developments are (i.e., whether or not they 
function in manner consistent with Scenario 2 in Figure 2.1). 
A second major difference of Figure 2.5 is that motivation enters differently 
than the other individual-level variables. Political interest may or may not increase 
   (Path D) but I don’t expect it to: if merely becoming interested in politics were 
sufficient to generate consensus, immigration wouldn’t be a contentious issue 
among the politically engaged. I expect political interest more typically to condition 
individual concerns’ effects (Path E). I expect political interest to magnify the effects 
of individual concerns. 
Chapter 8 provides estimates of a model that allows the effects of individual 
concerns to be conditioned by both motivation and national context. The model 
allows for the possibility that all paths (A-E) are relevant. I expect paths A, C, and E 
to be the most important. 
 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
This section presents explanatory factors, first at the individual level and 
then at the national level, and why they should be expected to either increase or 
decrease   . For the national level, there are two rounds of hypotheses: one for the 
main effects on   and another about    . Since my hypotheses about     are along 
the path from           , my polarization hypotheses imply hypotheses 
about micro-macro interaction (i.e., the conditional effects of national developments 
on  ). 
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I introduce all hypotheses to be tested. Note that I enumerate hypotheses in 
the same fashion throughout the entire dissertation, too (“H1” for Hypothesis 1, 
“H2” for Hypothesis 2, and so on). The individual-level hypotheses are summarized 
in Table 2.1, the hypotheses about the national level in Table 2.2, and the     
hypotheses in Table 2.3. I explain how my hypotheses translate into specific 
parameter expectations in Chapter 3. 
Note that, with the exception of a handful of categorical variables (religion, 
gender, and EU-15), each variable is either a continuum or a count variable. Each 
variable is named for the end of the spectrum that takes the high values in the 
quantitative analyses to follow. For example,   , exclusionism, and rightism are so 
named because those beliefs correspond to positive values while support for 
immigration, inclusionism, and leftism correspond to negative values (on the 
respective dimensions). I explain operationalization details concerning data and 
measurement in Chapter 4.  
 
 
The Individual Level 
This section introduces starts with potentially overlapping but nonetheless 
distinct beliefs (exclusionism, authoritarianism, socialism, and rightism).    can be 
reduced neither to sociodemographic features like education, class, religion, or 
native status nor to more familiar ideational variables like authoritarianism or 
ideological identification as “left” or “right.” Those beliefs are relevant but not the 
whole story. 
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Exclusionism. Who belongs? How is that set defined? How should (or even can) lines 
between who’s in and who’s out be drawn? What does belonging entail legally? Such 
boundary problems lie at the heart of many thorny issues today. Do animals have 
rights? The very question suggests potential equality with humans and that animals 
have been excluded from the dignity that they deserve. Plant life (say, the 
rainforest) can be protected without asserting that plants must be protected 
because they have rights. The abortion debate is about when belonging begins; the 
euthanasia debate is about when it ends. The corporate personhood debate is about 
is about whether corporate (collective, artificial) persons should be included in the 
set of those who have political (free speech) rights. 
 The community’s conceptual boundary problems, whatever their ethical 
dimensions, are political; a state is a “human community that (successfully) claims 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a territory” (Weber 1958). If 
animals, fetuses, and corporations are understood to be members of that 
community, they may be entitled to protections carrying the force of law. 
 Exclusionism is the belief that the set of those who belong to a political 
community must be delimited. People use different criteria to define that set 
depending on the issue. The extent to which people are exclusionist depends on the 
issue, some of which are hotly contested and others not.  
 People disagree as to how exclusionist to be because both inclusion and 
exclusion pose risks and offers rewards. In offering rights, inclusion may threaten 
existing ways of life or institutional arrangements; inclusion may generate a zero-
sum game with existing members. Exclusion promises an avenue to defend both 
democracy (as it currently empowers majorities) and cultural understandings of 
membership to some but offers only pyrrhic victories to others. To those who 
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prioritize inclusion, defending society via exclusion involves delaying, or even 
denying, the rights of others.  
 
H1: Exclusionism increases   .  
 
(Note that I intend all hypotheses to be ceteris paribus, that is, “other things being 
equal”). 
 
Authoritarianism. A large body of research shows that those with authoritarian 
personality profiles tend to be intolerant of out-groups, including immigrants (Jost, 
Federico and Napier 2009, Hatemi, et al. 2013). Most irregular migrants enter the 
EU legally and then overstay their visas. Therefore, even though (the data 
investigated here on) authoritarianism primarily captures beliefs about what kinds 
of political processes are warranted, I expect people to oppose immigration to the 
extent that they are (politically) authoritarian because of law and order concerns 
and possible indirect links to that psychological profile. 
 
H2: Authoritarianism increases   . 
 
Socialism. Socialism is a variable that captures the extent to which people believe 
that the economy should be regulated for egalitarian ends. I include it in addition to 
rightism because of the multivalence of the latter and specifically because of the 
possibility that many Europeans are socialist (typically leftist) but opposed to 
immigration (typically rightist) and vice-versa (capitalist but open to immigration). 
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Including socialism may help capture ambiguity that results when people describe 
themselves as “center-right,” “center-left,” or “liberal” on the left-right scale. 
Aspects of socialism tend towards cosmopolitanism while others towards 
welfare chauvinism, making it somewhat unclear whether socialism should be 
expected to increase OI or not. Economic arguments in favor of immigration tend to 
be liberal (laissez-faire). Additionally, immigration may pose more practical 
challenges for coordinated market economies (CMEs) than for liberal market 
economies (LMEs) because governments in CMEs are involved in more aspects of 
the political economy. I expect socialism to increase  .  
I do not expect socialism to increase    because of illiberalism. In Europe 
illiberal politics are often associated with working class authoritarianism (Spengler 
1991, Sternhell 1995, Betz 2006, Lipset 1959). Nonetheless it is not clear why—
holding exclusionism and authoritarianism constant—socialists should be expected 
to embrace a chauvinistic version of social democracy. Indeed, today center-left 
social democratic parties tend to be more pro-immigrant and pro-EU, and 
immigrants themselves prefer such parties (Messina 2007, Mohanty 2013).  
 
H3: Socialism increases  . 
 
Rightism. Though some reasons for ideological self-identification are captured by 
exclusionism and socialism, I still expect people to oppose immigration to the extent 
that they identify on the right. How a person describes her ideology may capture 
additional reasons she may have for opposing or embracing immigration (such as 
her beliefs about the competence of parties on one side or the other of the political 
spectrum or available policy options in her country).  
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H4: Rightism increases   . 
 
Migrant Background. I expect those with a migrant background to have lower    
because denizens are likely to have a variety of social and economic ties to the 
immigrant community to they extent that they themselves have an immigrant 
background. Those with a migrant background are also less likely to find anti-
immigrant narratives in the media persuasive. 
 
H5: Migrant Background decreases   . 
  
Religion. In this study, religion is also an indicator of ethnic background. I include 
Muslims as a category separate from other religious minorities because of the extent 
to which Muslim presence in the EU has been politicized by Europeans and Islamic 
leaders alike; this politicization includes efforts on the part of sending states to 
foster Islamic diasporas (Laurence 2012). Since many immigrants (particularly 
Muslims) came to fill labor shortages in the years following World War II, it is quite 
possible that young (potentially third generation migrant) Muslims surveyed today 
would not (and should not) register as immigrants. I expect religious minorities to 
be more open to immigration than Christians; I also expect Muslims to be more open 
to immigration than other religious minorities. Since they are likely less 
traditionalist, I also expect those without a religious affiliation to be less opposed to 
immigration than Christians are. 
 
H6: Christians will have the highest    and Muslims the lowest. 
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Education and Income. I expect education and income to be associated with greater 
openness to immigration (H7 and H8). Culturally speaking, studies of public opinion 
find that people tend to become more tolerant as their socioeconomic status rises; 
this finding is also demonstrated in studies of attitudes of immigration in the EU 
(Risse 2010, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Economically, the “winners” of 
globalization tend to be disproportionately able to take advantage of liberalization 
and flexible labor markets, while those little education are most likely to have to 
compete with unskilled migrants.12 In terms of public safety, those with higher 
income are probably least likely to live in areas where immigration has introduced 
crime concerns. 
 
H7: Education decreases   . 
H8: Income decreases  . 
 
Age. Political behavioral research often finds that attitudes bear the imprint of 
conditions present when people came of age. As in the United States, crime rates 
have generally fallen in Europe over the last several decades; older generations 
should still be expected to have heightened security concerns. As both political and 
economic conditions have steadily improved since World War II, Europeans have 
become progressively less survivalist and, so, more likely to have culturally tolerant 
                                                 
12 If anything, one would expect this relationship to be stronger in Europe than in the US. In Europe, the 
relationship between the educational system and the labor market tends to be much more structured. This is 
not to say that upper and middle class workers in Europe are not threatened by highly skilled migration, but 
to date many European countries have struggled to meet their elite migration recruitment goals.  
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attitudes, particularly those who are young (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). I expect    
to be higher among older respondents. 
 
H9: Age increases  . 
 
Gender. Immigration is consistently politicized along gender lines in Europe. 
Divisive issues like the headscarf debate cut across usual fault lines since pro-
immigrant voices on the left are often concerned that young Muslim women have 
been denied equality, while anti-immigrant voices may fear the secularist zeal to 
dismiss traditional religious values. Feminists not only debate whether Muslim 
women really choose to wear headscarves but also the salience of that choice 
against the (perceived) oppressiveness of the culture it represents. Choice or not, 
conservatives often point to the headscarf as evidence of the limits of 
multiculturalism.  
Perhaps more subtly, politicians appear to be gendering cabinet 
appointments throughout the EU so as to suggest that men are better at “getting 
tough” on the border and that women are better at integrating immigrants who 
have already entered (Crage, et al. 2013). Typically, and in some European countries 
more than others, men and women also have different interests in the labor market. 
This is not to suggest that immigration should be thought of as primarily a women’s 
issue but rather that it is reasonable to expect a gender gap in public opinion on 
immigration.13 I expect men to be more opposed than women to immigration. 
                                                 
13 Recent cross-national research suggests that there are differences in personality profile between 
men and women that are somewhat magnified in the developed world (perhaps because there are 
fewer constraints on an individual’s development), but those differences do not correspond cleanly 
with the authoritarian personality profile. Most notably, one of the key components of the 
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H10: Women will have lower    than men. 
 
Political Interest. Most people do not have extensive knowledge about politics, but 
how much they know is an important variable; political interest is an important 
variable because it is related to political knowledge (Converse 1964, Luskin 1987, 
Nylan and Reifler 2010). The strength of the connection between respondents 
stated policy preferences and their party choice is conditioned by the amount of 
political information they have at their disposal in both the United Sates (Bartels 
1996, Jessee 2010, Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk 2008) and Europe (Andersen, 
Tilley and Heath 2005, Hansen 2009, Oscarsson 2007). I expect political interest to 
condition the strength of the connection between denizens’ concerns and  . 
Suppose national developments really did affect everyone homogenously but 
only to the extent that individuals paid attention to the news. If merely becoming 
interested in politics were sufficient to engender support or opposition to 
immigration, then it would not be a contested issue among the politically engaged; 
everyone would simply come to one or the other position. If attitudes really were 
just about whether a person paid attention to politics, then the direction and 
magnitude of the effect of political interest would closely track national 
developments. 
 
H11: Political interest will not have a main effect on  . 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
authoritarian personality profile—lack of openness to new experiences—does not appear to be 
dependent upon sex differences (Schmitt, et al. 2008). 
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Political interest should reinforce the effects of denizens’ other concerns. If 
denizens are largely indifferent to politics, they are less likely to take extreme 
positions either for or against immigration. If denizens are passionate about politics, 
they are more likely to. 
 
H12: Political interest will have conditioning effects that increase the magnitude of 
(other) individual level effects. 
  
 Immigration is a much more salient issue in some countries than others. In 
the cross-national context, there is reason to suspect that the effects of denizens’ 
concerns will be conditioned not just by political interest but also by national 
developments. 
 
H13: The effects of denizens’ concerns will be jointly conditioned by political 
interest and national developments.   
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H1 Exclusionism will increase Opposition to Immigration (OI). 
H2 Authoritarianism will increase OI. 
H3 Socialism will increase OI.  
H4 Rightism will increase OI. 
H5 Migrant Background will decrease OI.   
H6 Of the religious groups, Christians will have the highest OI; Muslims will 
have the lowest. 
H7 Education will decrease OI.  
H8 Income will decrease OI. 
H9 Age will increase OI. 
H10 Women will have lower OI than Men will. 
H11 Political Interest will not have a main effect on OI. 
H12 Political interest will have conditioning effects that increase the magnitude 
of denizens’ concerns’ effects. 
H13 The effects of denizens’ concerns will be jointly conditioned by political 
interest and national developments. 
Table 2.1: Individual Level Hypotheses 
  
The National Level 
I group macro concerns about immigration into four rough and potentially 
overlapping categories that I expect to matter at the national level: public safety 
considerations, culture, macroeconomics, and demographics. 
I investigate two types of public safety concerns: crime and conflict.  
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Conflict. I expect security concerns to undermine beliefs in the possibility that 
immigrant integration will be successful. Survey experiments in the United States 
have shown that    is closely linked to feelings of anxiety (Brader, Valentino and 
Suhay 2008). I expect security concerns to cement the notion that immigrants are 
public enemies of state sovereignty.   
 
H12: Conflict (war and terrorism) increases  . 
 
Crime. Street crime can easily generate the impression that a group has failed to 
integrate (and, perhaps more importantly, is unworthy of a welcoming stance). 
 
H13: Crime increases   . 
 
I assess two types of cultural macro variables: religious and linguistic.  
National Religious Composition. Immigration has brought a number of new religions 
to the European Union. The Muslim population is worth considering separately 
because of the extent to which Muslim presence in the EU has been politicized by 
Europeans and Islamic leaders alike (Laurence 2012).  
 
H14: Large or growing Muslim populations increase   . 
 
National Linguistic Composition. One would expect immigration to be less 
contentious in countries where immigrants often speak the same language as their 
 46 
host country. For example, many (but certainly not all) immigrants in Spain come 
from Spanish-speaking parts of Latin America. Conversely, the more immigrant 
languages there are, the higher one’s concern about cultural Balkanization might be. 
 
H15: Linguistic heterogeneity (introduced by immigration) increases   . 
Unemployment. I focus on two economic variables: unemployment and GDP.  Since 
unemployment signifies scarcity of jobs, it suggests an environment where there is 
heightened competition. 
 
H16: Unemployment increases   . 
 
There is additional reason to think that the trend in employment matters: 
two otherwise comparably situated people in different countries, one where 
unemployment is rising and the other where it is falling, might have very different 
reactions to immigration. In a country with low but rising unemployment there may 
be sociotropic reasons to want to limit immigration in advance.  
 
H17: The higher the rate at which national unemployment is rising, the higher    
will be. 
 
Hypothesizing the effect of national wealth is somewhat more complex. On 
the one hand, cross-national studies of public opinion generally show that tolerance 
increases with wealth. Immigration provides economic opportunity (both directly 
and indirectly to those who remain in sending countries via remittances). Therefore, 
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those in wealthier countries may be more welcoming of immigrants on 
redistributive grounds. On the other hand, wealthier countries have larger migrant 
stocks. International migration flows can be predicted according to a simple 
“gravity” model (wherein the economic gap between sending and receiving 
countries explains the amount of migration). Diasporas greatly reduce the startup 
costs associated with migration, and it is perfectly possible for migration levels to 
exceed what is economically optimal (Collier 2013, Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets 
2009). Natives of wealthy countries may therefore have additional, long-term 
reasons to oppose migration.   
 
H18: The wealthier the country, the higher    will be. 
 
New Countries of Immigration. Immigration may raise carrying capacity concerns for 
any system (as to whether there are enough jobs, room in schools, etc.) that are 
neither cultural nor necessarily captured by basic macroeconomic indicators. Rapid 
change may also aggravate identity questions (as to whether a country is really 
quintessentially defined by a particular language, religion, or ethnicity) even if those 
identities are fairly similar. The effect of rapid change may be most acute in where 
there were few immigrants a generation ago (Newman 2013).  
 
H19: The larger the proportion of immigrants is in a country, the higher    will be. 
 
That said, I expect   to be highest in new countries of immigration.  
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H20: Countries that have experienced rapid growth of the immigrant population 
from previously low levels will have higher   . 
  
H12 National Security threats increases Opposition to Immigration (  ). 
H13 Crime increases  . 
H14 Large or growing Muslim populations increases   . 
H15 Linguistic Diversification stemming from immigration increases   . 
H16 High unemployment increases   . 
H17 Rising Unemployment increases  . 
H18 National wealth increases   . 
H19 Immigration increases   . 
H20    will be higher in new countries of immigration than in older ones 
Table 2.2: Country Level Hypotheses 
 
WHAT DRIVES POLARIZATION? 
 This section describes my substantive expectations about what increases 
    in the EU today. I expect that the macro variables discussed to this point 
increase opposition via asymmetric polarization. That is, rather than affecting the 
public homogenously, increases in various concerns at the national level will 
separate denizens, but more denizens will fall into the anti-immigrant faction than 
into the pro-immigrant one. One would not expect, for example, immigrants to 
blame crime on immigration.  
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Demographics & Polarization 
Limited carrying capacity pits long standing residents against newcomers in 
a competition for resources (even if the competition only turns out to be 
temporary). Some segments of society benefit, however, and, as such, I expect 
limited carrying capacity to engender    . Though some of the worst fears about 
massive influxes do not, at this point, seem to be materializing, recent rounds of EU 
enlargement to include countries with much weaker economies raised the specter in 
the public mind in many receiving countries that immigration is not sustainable. 
New member state emigrants face economic incentives similar to those of 
developing world emigrants but with the legal rights to access benefits of EU 
citizenship. The British public’s fear of the “Polish plumber” and, more recently, 
Bulgarians and Romanians (who had immigration restrictions lifted January 2014), 
exemplifies this concern (Witte 2014). Most immigration in the EU to date has 
occurred in the older member states, which are still arguably the largest magnets for 
migration.  
 
H21:     will be higher in EU-15 member states. 
H22:     will be higher in high immigration countries. 
H23:     will be higher in new immigration countries. 
Macroeconomic Polarization 
I expect macroeconomic variables to be polarizing because the winners and 
losers of globalization have very different interests when it comes to immigration.  
In the relatively short term, while unemployment may lead one person to see 
immigration as job competition, another may see immigration as a means (cheap 
labor) to keep prices stable in a sluggish economy (that is, to avoid stagflation). 
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H24:     will be higher in countries with high or rising unemployment. 
  
In the long term, the wealthier the country is, the more likely immigration is 
to increase. Of EU countries, Luxembourg is both by far the wealthiest and has 
(again by far) the largest proportion of immigrants. Long term factors like old age 
dependency in wealthy countries reinforces the notion that migration is permanent 
because in such countries there is not only supply but also demand for immigrants 
to work in a variety of professions.  
 
H25:     will be higher in wealthier countries. 
 
Public Safety & Polarization 
 Suppose a terror attack which either was associated with immigration 
occurred and that it had a main effect such that all denizens came to have higher   . 
Even recent immigrants came to be have higher    (whether out of genuine policy 
considerations or fear of scapegoating). But suppose that the effect was particularly 
pronounced on Christian natives, who were also a sizeable majority. Even if there 
were some homogenous effect, the attack would likely induce asymmetric 
polarization. 
 
H26:     will be higher in countries with high public safety concerns. 
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Cultural Change & Polarization 
 Suppose that immigration creates cultural conflict – which languages should 
be officially recognized? Which religions (and religious schools) should receive 
public support? Who should represent the nation in sporting events? Suppose 
denizens disagree considerably regarding such policies. Rather than simply 
triggering a reaction against immigration, cultural change may trigger    . 
 
H27:     stems from cultural change. 
 
Polarization as Micro-Macro Interaction 
 
By convention, the dependent variable is found on the left-hand side of 
equations; data and parameters that may explain why the dependent variable 
behaves as it does are found on the right-hand side. For short, the former is dubbed 
the “LHS” and the latter the “RHS.” So far, all of the polarization hypotheses (H21-
H29) are about the LHS. This section closes with two hypotheses about the RHS; the 
RHS hypotheses are about how national developments interact with an individual’s 
concerns so as to produce    . 
Polarization should be traceable to dynamics at the individual level. The 
intensity of the effect of the concerns that determine an individual’s level of    
should depend on national context. For example, why should exclusionists be 
equally opposed to immigration in countries with vastly different numbers of 
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immigrants? I expect national developments that are hypothesized to trigger 
increases in   to do so because they increase HNE. 
   
H28: ND increases HNE which increase   . 
 
Quality over Quantity 
  
In the foregoing sections, I have outlined a number of potential triggers of 
   : rapid demographic shifts, public safety threats, cultural change, and 
macroeconomic challenges. I would not expect immigrant populations that do not 
raise any of these concerns to trigger    . I do expect the immigration rate, in a 
general sense, to proxy to some degree the extent to which these concerns are 
present. That said, I expect particular national concerns to explain more     than 
the immigration rate itself. 
 
H29: Qualitative threats (which ostensibly stem from immigration) will explain 
greater levels of HNE and, as a consequence,     than the quantity of immigrants. 
Asymmetric Polarization & Net Attitudes  
 
Whether or not polarization entails net change at the national level depends 
on the underlying distribution of the data. Suppose attitudes towards immigration 
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were only a battle of the sexes. No matter how much polarization occurs, the mean 
opinion at the national level would be very close to the midpoint. To take another 
example, over 40% of the population in Luxembourg is immigrant, so     there may 
not imply much change in mean national   .     should be asymmetric and 
translate into higher mean levels of    since the majority of Europeans have 
characteristics that are clearly associated with   . 
 
H30: Net    will be higher in countries with unusually high    . 
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H21 POI will be higher in EU-15 (than in new member states). 
H22 POI will be higher in high immigration countries (than in low immigration 
countries). 
H23 POI will be higher in new immigration countries (than in old immigration 
countries). 
H24 POI will be higher in countries with high or increasing unemployment 
(than in countries with no such problems). 
H25 POI will be higher in wealthy countries (than in poor countries). 
H26 POI will be higher in countries where immigration may have introduced 
public safety concerns (than in countries where it has not). 
H27 POI will be higher in countries that have experienced high levels of cultural 
change because of immigration (when compared with those that haven’t).   
H28 ND increases HNE which increase OI. 
H29 Qualitative threats (which ostensibly stem from immigration) will explain 
greater levels of HNE and, as a consequence, POI than the quantity of 
immigrants. 
H30 Polarization will be asymmetric; OI will be higher in line with POI. 
Table 2.3: POI (Polarization of Opposition to Immigration) Hypotheses   
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Chapter 3: Models 
This chapter introduces a set of models of    in the European Union. 
Although it is possible to distinguish   ’s different aspects, which may or may not 
prove empirically distinct, here I analyze opposition as a whole, leaving the 
possibility of disaggregation for future research. I present a series of complete and 
partial pooling (hierarchical) models capturing the effects of a variety of individual- 
and national-level variables. 
This chapter describes these models as well and some of their implications 
about the extent to which attitudinal differences in the EU are idiosyncratic or 
systematic. 
 
FROM MULTINATIONAL SAMPLE TO MULTILEVEL MODEL 
When confronted with the heterogeneity of a multinational sample, there are 
three basic alternatives to model design: “no pooling” (estimate a model for each 
country separately), “complete pooling” (estimate a model for the entire sample that 
adds no special emphasis to country), or “partial pooling” (model parameters to 
reflect a mean between complete and no pooling estimates that is weighted by the 
degree of similarity between countries) (Gelman and Hill 2009, 247; Jackman 2009, 
25). For further detail, see Appendix A.  
I begin with a partial pooling strategy on the assumption that observations 
from the European Union’s different member states are neither completely 
interchangeable nor totally incommensurate. The partial pooling models that I 
adopt are hierarchical models wherein both slopes and intercepts are allowed to 
vary by country. Pooling slope parameters can be thought of as an interaction 
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between each explanatory variable and the background (national) context. Though 
country remains a variable of ignorance, allowing slopes to vary provides an 
extremely important safeguard against mistakenly concluding that the effect of a 
variable that is typical in the EU also occurs throughout it. Individuals with very 
similar profiles are exposed to a variety of national contexts; I assume that 
observations are at least conditionally exchangeable. 
Analyzing the EU ensemble is methodologically appealing as well as 
substantively interesting. Including all EU countries avoids any selection biases, 
such as those from “selecting on the dependent variable” (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994), that stem from focusing on just a few countries.  
This approach comes with pitfalls of its own, however, so I allow for maximal 
country-to-country heterogeneity. I also compare my results to those from complete 
and (much more briefly) from no pooling models. 
I model    hierarchically with individual level characteristics as the micro 
level of the model and national level variables as the macro (group) level. For 
illustration’s purposes, consider a simplified model where exclusionism (EX) is a 
micro variable. As with the intercepts, exclusionism’s effects vary by country; 
income’s (I’s) effect does not. GDP (G) and immigrant languages (IL) are macro 
predictors.  
Let   index the member states:   1, 2,  .  , where J is the number of 
member states (here 27). Let   index individuals:   1, 2,     , where    is the 
number of respondents in country   (here typically about 1,500). Then the     
observation in country   is defined by Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Sample Hierarchical Model 
   is the European (sometimes called grand or overall) intercept;   ,  is the 
offset away from the European intercept for country  .    is the European slope for 
exclusionism;   ,  is the offset from the European slope for country j (  , 
     , 
   but 
       ,  ).    is the European slope for income.   ,  and   ,  are the coefficients 
relating the macro data to   , . I write the equation in terms of   
  (rather than   , 
 ) 
since GDP is repeated across observations within the country   (and the same goes 
for  
  ).  
Let   index the macro variables:   0, 1, 2,   , where   is the number of 
macro variables (in this example, 2);   index the coefficients of explanatory micro 
variables that vary by country:   0, 1, 2,    1 where   is the  number of 
varying slopes (and K +1 includes the intercepts; in the above example, K = 1); 
and   index the coefficients of the micro variables that do not vary by country: 
  0, 1, 2,    (in the above example,   1). Since there is a European coefficient 
whether or not a coefficient varies by country, there are (    1)  European 
coefficients. There are (    1)    national coefficients.  
When coefficients are allowed to vary by country, the effect of the     
variable in the     member state is defined in Figure 4.2. 
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  ,       ,  
Figure 4.2. Definition of National Effects. 
If, as in the partial pooling models I investigate here, there are no interactions 
specified (beyond the variation in coefficients),   ,  is also the total effect of the  
   
variable in that country since 
   
   
   , .  
  “European” here (used as a noun or an adjective) refers to the European 
Union and its denizens. A “European authoritarianism effect,” for example, refers to 
an EU-wide slope,    . “National authoritarianism effect” refers to the 
corresponding effect,   ,  , in the  
   member state. 
Both   and the   variables should be in standard deviation form (with 
respect to each variables’ European mean and standard deviation) in order to be 
consistent with best practices for partial pooling models (Gelman and Hill 2009, 
415). Elsewhere, I estimated several highly similar models (using EVS) where the 
none of the variables are operationalized as a z-score and do not find that the 
transformation affects the thrust of the results (Mohanty 2012). 
Having the dependent variable as a z-score implies that the effect is largest 
on respondents at the midpoint. Fortunately, this is substantively plausible, too: just 
as one would expect the effect of a campaign ad to be larger on swing voters than on 
strong partisans, one might expect any given variable to have its largest effect on 
those not otherwise disposed to lean strongly one way or the other on immigration. 
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(Details for converting from estimates of the effect to first percentile differences can 
be found in Appendix G.)  
My hypotheses assert that   
   0   j  J: exclusionism increases    in all 
member states in the sample, though not necessarily to the same extent. That all of 
exclusionism’s national effects are positive implies that its European effect is also 
positive:    
  0   j  J      0. Note that my hypotheses about the partial pooling 
models’ individual level also hold for the linear regression models described below. 
Since   represents the European slope, it may be modeled by either complete or 
partial pooling models. 
MODELS OF OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION 
 
I denote partial pooling models “M.P1,” “M.P2,” and so on; I denote complete 
pooling models “M.C1,” “M.C2,” and so on. The numbers indicate that the models 
contain similar macro variables.  
M.P1 is a partial pooling model that allows all individual-level effects to vary 
by country and that contains no macro predictors; see Figure 3.3. Table 3.1 gives the 
variable abbreviations (which I use from here on) and the parameter expectations. 
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Figure 3.3: Model M.P1 Specification 
For all member states (  j  J): 
H1   
   0 Exclusionism increases Opposition to Immigration 
(OI). 
H2   
   0 Authoritarianism increases OI. 
H3   
  0 Socialism increases OI. 
H4   
  0 Rightism increases OI. 
H5   
   0 Migrant Background decreases OI. 
H6 
  
    
       
      
  
Note that this implies: 
  
  0     
  
 
Christians have the highest OI, Muslims have the 
lowest. No Religion (NR) and Other Religious 
Minorities (ORM) are open to immigration, but, 
since comparisons are made with respect to the 
latter, the sign of the estimates for NR is unclear.  
H7   
   0 Education decreases OI. 
H8   
  0 Income decreases OI. 
H9   
  0 Age increases OI. 
H10   
  0 Women have lower OI than Men. 
H11   
   0 Political Interest does not have a main effect on OI. 
Table 3.1: Parameter Expectations for M.P1 
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 I designed a reduced version of M.P1.14 I drop income and socialism and 
constrain female and age to have an invariant effect across the EU. My hypotheses 
that    < 0 and    > 0 remain the same (as do my hypotheses about the other 
slopes). The     observation in the     country of    of the M.P2 is given by Figure 
3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Model M.P2 Specification 
 
Since this model will be used as the basis of the subsequent partial pooling macro 
models, it is convenient to define the structural part of the right hand side of 
equation with a shorthand,   ,     , 
     , 
 .  , such that the equation in Figure 3.5 
holds.  
  
                                                 
14 Initially, I had simply added macro parameters to Model P1. Finding none of the macro effects to be 
significant, I became concerned that the findings were pointing too easily in the direction of my 
polarization hypotheses, and so I designed and estimated the models presented in this work, only to find 
that the macro effects were not significant either. Not only did the reduced model offer parsimony and a 
robustness check, it is considerably faster to estimate. These factors inform my decision to use the reduced 
model as a baseline for comparison for subsequent models.  
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Figure 3.5:   ,  definition 
To test each of the macro variables, I estimate both a complete pooling model 
(to understand the effect of each national explanatory variable) and a partial 
pooling (to assess whether that variable explains the national intercept, i.e., the 
national baseline level of   ). I expect macro triggers to do the former but not the 
latter; those parameter expectations are consistent with my theory about the 
heterogeneity of national effects (   ) and    . 
M.C3 is a complete pooling model that is similar (but differs slightly in that it 
includes a measure of the contemporaneous immigrant population,   
  ). 
 
  
              
        
       
       
        
       
      
   
     
       
      
       
        
      
Figure 3.6: Model M.C3 Specification 
M.C3 is a useful model for comparison since it allows for a test of whether macro 
variables explain more than the immigration rate. As such, it is convenient to define 
      
      
 .   so that the equation given by Figure 3.7 holds. 
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Figure 3.7:   definition 
Let     (  ,   ). (Since   simply contains offsets from the sample-wide 
mean,    is not necessarily ordinal with respect to  ;    captures whether a linear 
relationship exists between the data and national coefficients.) Notice that if a 
variable affected the public homogenously,    would have the same sign as    (as 
estimated from the complete pooling model). Under asymmetric polarization, by 
contrast,    may be positive or negative, but    0: a macro variable may affect the 
population but not necessarily homogenously. Along with the abbreviations in Table 
3.2, the remaining models and parameter expectations can be summarized 
succinctly. (See Tables 3.3 and 3.4.) 
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Theme Abbreviation Macro Variable 
Public Safety CR Crime Rate 
 CF Conflict Fatalities 
Culture MP Muslim Population 
  MP Muslim Growth Rate 
 LD Linguistic Diversity 
 IL Immigrant Languages 
Macroeconomic U Unemployment 
  U Unemployment Trend 
 G GDP 
Demographic IP Immigrant Population 
 T0 Initial Immigrant Population 
  IP Immigrant Population Growth Rate 
Table 3.2: Macro Variable Abbreviations 
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Complete Pooling Partial Pooling 
  
         (M.C3)   , 
     ,    
    
     ,  (M.P3) 
  
       
    
      (M.C4)   , 
     ,    
    
     ,  (M.P4) 
  
       
    
      (M.C5)   , 
     ,    
    
     ,  (M.P5) 
  
       
    
      (M.C6)   , 
     ,    
    
     ,  (M.P6) 
  
       
     
       (M.C7)   , 
     ,    
     
      ,  (M.P7) 
  
       
    
      (M.C8)   , 
     ,    
    
     ,  (M.P8) 
  
       
    
      (M.C9)   , 
     ,    
    
     ,  (M.P9) 
  
       
   
     (M.C10)   , 
     ,    
   
    ,  (M.P10) 
  
       
    
       
     (M.C11)   , 
     ,    
    
     
   
    ,  (M.P11) 
  
       
     
         
             
    
        
(M.C12) 
  , 
     ,   
  
    
     
     
      
        
    
      ,  
(M.P12) 
Table 3.3: Macro Model Specifications 
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Theme Parameter Expectations Involved Hypotheses 
Public 
Safety 
    > 0 but      0 H12, H26 
    > 0 but      0 H13, H26 
Culture     0 but      0 H14, H27 
        0 but      0 H15, H27 
    0 but      0 H16, H27 
    0 but      0 H17, H27 
Macro-
economic 
   0 but     0 H16, H24 
    0 but      0 
   0 but     0 
H17, H18, H24, H25 
Demo-
graphic 
  
    > 0 but   
   and   
       < 0 
but                   0 
H20, H23 
Table 3.4: Macro Parameter Expectations 
 
M.C12 is the model that allows for interaction between concerns, motivation, 
and context. Figure 3.8 presents the general form of the structural portion of the 
complete pooling model, M.C12.  
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    (                  )  (          )  (                )   
           +         
        
Figure 3.8: M.C12 (General Form). 
 
Here “Denizen’s Concerns” refers to the same set of individual-level concerns 
included in the other complete pooling models (except for political interest, which is 
treated separately as the motivation variable). I take the immigrant population as 
the national context variable (leaving for future research the possibility of 
disaggregating it using some of the above macro variables). Note that M.C12 does 
not include country as a dummy variable. 
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 Figure 3.9: M.C12 Model Specification 
 Despite its complexity, the effects of the exogenous variables simplify 
considerably because of the fact that most of explanatory variables are z-scores. As I 
detail in Chapter 8, I transform the two variables that are bounded continuums 
(immigrant population and migrant background) so that they are unbounded. Doing 
so has little effect on the estimates but allows those variables to become z-scores, 
too (which has no effect on the estimates), but allows further simplification. Figure 
3.10 illustrates how the effect of exclusionism simplifies to     and Table 3.5 lists 
the effects (which differ slightly for effects involving the means of religion and 
gender since they are categorical). 
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Figure 3.10: Exclusionism’s effect in M.C12. 
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 Effect in M.C12 
Exclusionism     
Authoritarianism     
Rightism    
Education     
Migrant Background     
Christian    
Muslim    
No Religion     
Female    
Age    
Political Interest       ,   ̅    ,   ̅     ,   ̅     ,   ̅  
Immigrant Population       ,   ̅    ,   ̅     ,   ̅     ,   ̅  
Table 3.5: Effects in M.C10 
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Chapter 4:  Data and Measurements 
This chapter provides an overview of the data and measurements that I use. 
Individual level data comes from the 2008 European Values Study (European Values 
Study 2014). Micro (individual) level data is complemented by macro level data at 
the member state level. The macro data comes primarily from Eurostat, which is the 
official statistical arm of the European Commission (Eurostat 2014). The macro data 
is complemented by other sources described below. 
The first section of this chapter describes data sources and operational 
definitions; the second offers descriptive statistics. 
DATA SOURCES 
  
 This section describes data sources at the individual level and then moves to 
the national level.  
The Individual Level: The European Values Study 
I construct several indexes (  ; exclusionism; socialism; authoritarianism; 
migrant background; and political interest); unless noted, the indices are sample 
means of the items. The other individual-level variables are based on a single item. 
Exact question wording and response options are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Opposition to Immigration (OI). The dependent variable,   , combines seven items 
that capture the extent to which the respondent believes that: immigrants take jobs 
(v268), immigrants are undermine a country’s cultural life (v269), immigrants 
make crime problems worse (v270), immigrants strain the welfare system (v271), 
immigration will threaten society (v272), immigration makes the respondent feels 
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like a stranger in her own country (v274), and feels that there are too many 
immigrants (v275).  
Exclusionism. I operationalize exclusionism as a continuum which reflects the 
salience of community vis-à-vis more diffuse notions of belonging. The exclusive end 
of the spectrum is based on concern for the living conditions of neighbors (v285); of 
those of the same region (v286); and of countrymen (v287). At the inclusive end of 
the spectrum, defined as the importance of others who may be very distant 
culturally or geographically, lies concern for Europeans (v288) and for humanity 
(v289). All five responses are on a five point Likert scale that asks respondents to 
rate regions by level of concern (“very much,” “much,” “to a certain extent,” “not so 
much,” and “not at all”).  
The exclusionism of respondent   in country   is defined in Figure 5.1.  
   , 
    (  , 
       , 
       , 
       , 
       , 
    ) 
Figure 4.1: Operational definition of exclusionism 
I describe an alternative measure of exclusionism based on Principal 
Components Analysis in Appendix C. (The alternative measure’s appeal is that it 
arguably captures exclusionism more directly. That measure yields is less 
interpretable, however, and yields highly similar regression results to those based 
on the operational definition in Figure 4.1, so I present estimates based on Figure 
4.1’s definition.)    
Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a continuum where the opposite pole is belief 
in democracy. The respondent’s authoritarianism is defined as his or her sample 
mean of seven responses. Those responses follow a prompt to listen to descriptions 
about political systems and what the respondent “think[s] about each as a way of 
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governing this country.” The index includes prompt such as “Having a strong leader 
who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” (v225), “Democracy 
may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government, (v229; scored 
negatively), and “Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order” (v232).  
Socialism. Socialism combines three items: attitudes towards economic competition 
(v196), state control over firms (v197), and government ownership (v199). 
Migrant Background. I operationalize migrant background as a continuum that is 
intended to capture how the integration of immigrants into the host society may 
occur to a matter of degree or in phases (rather than treating natives and migrants 
as a binary alternative). Migrant background runs from 0 to 1 and is based on the 
average of the following: citizenship status of the respondent (v304); the proportion 
of his or her life that the respondent has spent in the country in which he or she was 
interviewed (from v303 and v308); whether the respondent’s mother was born in-
country (v311); whether the respondent’s father was born in-country (v309). The 
latter provides a rough measure of how integrated a respondent with a migrant 
background may be.  
Migrant background does not distinguish between intra- and extra-EU 
migrants (in part, but not only because of, sample size considerations). Since the EU 
expanded so recently before the survey (in 2004 and 2007), it is not clear not clear 
that the public distinguishes between migrant streams in that fashion.   
Religion. Religion is treated as a variable with four categories: Christian, no religious 
affiliation, Muslim, and other religious minorities based on (v106), which is a 
question that asks respondents which religious denomination they belong if they 
have first acknowledged belonging to one. 
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Political Interest. Political interest is the operationalized as the respondent’s sample 
mean of four questions such as “when you get together with friends, would say you 
discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never” (V5). (Political 
knowledge items are not available in EVS.)  
 
Macro Data 
This section describes macro data relating to key demographic, public safety, 
cultural, and macroeconomic concerns. Since it is relevant for the analysis of    , I 
note whether the macro variables are above the mean level or not. 
Demographics 
I use Eurostat immigration rates from the decade leading up to the European 
Values Study (1998 – 2008). Eurostat does not provide figures on population or 
citizenship from prior to 1998. Measuring by citizenship, as opposed to birth, 
introduces the over-time ambiguity that stems from the fact that some countries – 
such as Germany – liberalized their citizenship policy during the time period, while 
many did not. Using figures by birth introduces the slippage that those born in-
country may appear to be nationals but still not be citizens and, to that extent, are 
politically excluded. For the hypotheses I investigate related to rate of change, the 
question as to which measure is better is moot: Eurostat estimates on immigration 
status by birth do not go back nearly as far the citizenship figures. (The non-citizens 
figures do contain missing data in some of the new member states, however there 
are always enough data points to estimate a trend line.)  
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Public Safety 
I operationalize security concerns in two fashions in terms of crime rate and 
conflict fatalities. Conflict fatalities are defined as the sum of fatalities from wars in 
the Middle East and Islamist terrorism between 9/11 and the date of the survey 
(Iraq Coalition Casualty Count 2014). I use Eurostat estimates of the crime rate (per 
capita).  
Culture 
I use Pew estimate of the size of national Muslim populations as well as their 
growth (Pew Research: Religion and Public Life 2011). I assess two measures of 
linguistic heterogeneity: linguistic diversity and the number of immigrant languages 
(Harmon and Loh 2010).  
Macroeconomics 
GDP comes from Eurostat estimates and is purchasing power adjusted such 
that the EU-27 mean is 100 (though it is a z-score in the models presented here). 
Unemployment figures come from Eurostat as well.  
Missingness  
Missing data can introduce bias to estimates, which is frequently a problem 
in survey research. Following Gelman and Hill (2009, 529ff), I address this problem 
using multiple imputation; multiple imputation estimates a regression model 
(similar to those described in Chapter 3) that estimates the parameters of the 
distribution which would have likely generated the missingness before replacing the 
missing item with a random draw (from a plausibly-parameterized distribution). 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section provides descriptive statistics in the same order as above 
(individual followed by national level).  
Individual Level Descriptive Statistics 
EVS interviewed 40,465 denizens of the (then) 27 member states of the EU in 
2008.    is the number of observations per country;   ̅  1,500. 
The Dependent Variable: Opposition to Immigration 
Though some questions clearly emphasize economic, cultural, or security 
aspects of immigration more than others, all of these items are strongly 
intercorrelated ( ̅̂  0.497; Cronbach’s   0.86). This may reflect the fact that 
immigration may begin for one reason (usually economic) but have ongoing cultural 
and security ramifications.  
   is highest in Cyprus and Malta and well above the EU-27 average in 
Austria, Germany, Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (see Figure 4.2). France 
stands out as an immigrant-rich country where    is below the EU average. These, 
however, are relative measures: the dependent variable and (most of the) 
independent variables are in standard deviation form. Italy, the country predicted to 
have almost exactly average   , is known for having particularly contentious politics 
of belonging and has recently included xenophobic parties in governing coalition. 
Underscoring the need for a hierarchical model, the 95% confidence intervals of 23 
of 27 member states for the dependent variable do not include zero. The sample 
means and variances of OI are also provided in Appendix D. 
Notice that I use the following member state abbreviations throughout the 
dissertation: AT = Austria; BE = Belgium; BG = Bulgaria; CY = Cyprus; CZ = Czech 
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Republic; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; FI = Finland; FR = France; DE = Germany; 
GR = Greece; HU = Hungary; IE = Ireland; IT = Italy; LV = Latvia; LT = Lithuania; 
LU = Luxembourg; MT = Malta; NL = Netherlands; PL = Poland; PT = Portugal; RO 
= Romania; SK = Slovak Republic; SI = Slovenia; ES = Spain; SE = Sweden; UK = 
United Kingdom. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Opposition to Immigration (  ), sample means by country 
 
Individual Level Explanatory Variables 
As Figure 4.3 below shows, most respondents have fairly balanced concerns 
along the exclusionism dimension. Interestingly, exclusionism are all but 
uncorrelated with rightist ideology ( ̂  0.015), socialism ( ̂  0.018), and 
authoritarianism ( ̂  0.066); the latter variables are detailed below. 
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of exclusionism 
For authoritarianism, Cronbach’s   0.861. 
Religion is treated as a variable with four categories: Christian (54.8% of the 
sample), no religious affiliation (28.4%), Muslim (1.2%), and other religious 
minorities (15.5%). Note that the sample correlation between Muslim and Migrant 
Background is only 0.181. Estimating the number of Muslims in the EU is a 
challenge, but according to my own calculations based on the Pew Research 
Foundation figures, made up 3.8% of the population (roughly 1.9 out of 501 million 
people) in 2010 (the nearest available year)  (Pew Research: Religion and Public 
Life 2011). The Pew figures do not include a breakdown by residency status and 
EVS does provide respondents the option to state no religious affiliation (whatever 
their heritage) so it is hard to say from this figure exactly how (or even if) 
underrepresented Muslims are in EVS. That said, Muslims do appear to be at least 
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somewhat underrepresented. Though the country-by-country sample means of 
Muslims in EVS correlate with Pew estimates, they do so only at  ̂  0.51. 
The sample mean of migrant background is 0.078. Non-citizens are slightly 
under-represented in the sample (v255̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  0.053 as opposed to official estimates of 
0.062). However, taken on a country-by-country basis, the mean of migrant 
background correlates very strongly with Eurostat’s official estimates of the 
proportion of denizens who are not citizens:  ̂  0.924. This correlation is 
important because it provides external validation of the representativeness of a key 
minority population in the sample. 
National Level Descriptive Statistics 
Demographics 
The substantial increases in the immigrant population are primarily found in 
the Mediterranean countries of Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and Spain; Ireland also had a 
noteworthy increase (see Figure 4.4). Immigration growth was appreciable but still 
quite modest in Austria and the United Kingdom. The change in the proportion of 
non-citizens was low – or even slightly negative – in classic immigrant receiving 
countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
Incidentally, these data provide evidence against a major theory which holds 
that liberal democracies cannot stop unwanted immigration; see (Cornelius 2004). 
The theory is that the combination of the needs of business for cheap labor with 
humanitarian legal norms makes deportation difficult (in the US) if not impossible 
(in the EU). These data suggest that it is at least possible to stabilize the size of the 
immigrant population in liberal democracies with strong economies (even if the 
stabilization is achieved in part through regularization.)  
 80 
] 
 
Figure 4.4: Immigrant Population in EU-27, 1998 (or earliest available) and 2008; 
source: Eurostat 
 The unit of measure is the annual rate of change of the proportion of non-
citizens. The variable ranges from -0.008 (Latvia) to 0.011 (Spain). Countries with 
stable immigrant populations like Finland, France, and Denmark are very near the 
mean (which is 0.001).  
 Such rates of change may seem unexciting but are often actually quite 
dramatic. For example, in Italy, the number of immigrants increased from one to 
three million between 1998 and 2008. The influx thereby accounted for two thirds 
of the net population growth from 56 to 59 million during those years. According to 
ISTAT, by 2010, more than half a million of the 4.2 million foreigners had actually 
been born in Italy, but naturalization rates lagged behind both demographic changes 
and that of Italy’s Western European peers (Fella 2008, Watson 2010).  
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 There are several strong intercorrelations among the immigrant 
demographic variables. Notably, the noncitizen proportion in 1998 is strongly 
indicative of the noncitizen proportion in 2008 ( ̂  0.918). As the Table 4.1 also 
shows, the rate of growth is negatively correlated with the 1998 immigrant 
proportion ( ̂   0.368) and is almost uncorrelated ( ̂  0.025) with the 2008 
immigrant proportion, which provides confirmation of the above observation that 
immigration flows shifted away from the countries that had received so much in the 
decades following the Second World War. The strong correlations between the 
variables needed to test Newman’s theory suggest that the data are not well-suited 
for the acculturation hypotheses. In particular, the data needed for the interaction 
term are closely related to both of its constituent components since growth tended 
to occur mainly in places that had had low immigration previously. The data, 
however, at least appear to be able to distinguish broadly between newer and older 
countries of immigration. 
 
IP 1998 IP 2008 IG IG * IP 1998 
Immigrant Proportion 1998 1 0.918 -0.368 -0.467 
Immigrant Proportion 2008 0.918 1 0.025 -0.178 
Immigrant Growth -0.368 0.025 1 0.727 
Growth * IP 1998 -0.467 -0.178 0.727 1 
Table 4.1: Correlation Matrix of Macro Demographics 
Public Safety 
Regarding conflict fatalities, two things are worth noting: (1) at the time of 
the survey (and to date), no Islamist terror attacks have occurred in EU countries 
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that did not participate in the wars in Afghanistan and / or Iraq and (2) because of 
the idiosyncrasies involved alliance formation leading up to the wars, conflict 
fatalities is all but uncorrelated with most of the macro variables discussed in this 
chapter. 19 of 27 member states experienced at least one conflict fatality; the mean 
count in those countries is 43.8 and the overall mean is 30.8 (Iraq Coalition Casualty 
Count 2014). Due to their uneven distribution, only Italy, Poland, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom have above average conflict fatalities. 
The crime rate ranges from 9 incidents per thousand people (Austria) to 150 
per thousand (Sweden). The EU-27 average is 50 crimes per thousand people; 
Spain, France, and Italy are quite near the norm.15 
There are two major problems with the crime rate data. First and most 
importantly, it is a measure of the national crime rate – not crime that has actually 
been committed immigrants (whether first or second generation.) This makes it 
very difficult to say whether the reaction (to the extent that the public does indeed 
react) represents a form of discrimination or reasonably realistic attribution of 
responsibility.16  
Next, comparing crime rates across borders is easier said than done. Faced 
with comparable crimes, different countries may systematically choose to prosecute 
                                                 
15 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and 
the UK have above average crime rates. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia do not. 
16 The models do shed some light on this, however. In the complete pooling models, the slope 
coefficient does represent the effect of crime. In terms of the partial pooling models, if crime tends to 
reduce gaps between Christians and Muslims, natives and migrants, and so on, it may be taken as 
evidence that there is societal consensus that crime and immigration are a related problem. If the 
national effects of other variables are simply reinforced along existing lines when crime is high, the 
interpretation is somewhat more ambiguous. It may reflect a form a form of discrimination whereby 
those who already oppose immigration blame immigration for all crime, regardless of what 
proportion was proportion committed by natives. But, the results would be the same if immigrants 
really were disproportionately (legally) responsible for crime, but the public disagree as to where 
“true” responsibility lies.  
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a different number of offenses.17 To that extent, differences in crime rates may 
reflect policy priorities or litigiousness; those differences may explain why crime 
rates in the EU are positively correlated with national wealth in addition to the size 
of the immigrant population.18  
Culture 
Muslim growth is included so as to differentiate between countries where the 
Muslim population pre-exists contemporary mass migration. 19 20  
Cyprus experienced—by far—the most dramatic growth: its Muslim 
population grew from 0.3% to 22.7% in that time period. France is a distant second 
(+6.5%) and Austria third (+3.6%). One concern with Muslim growth is that in that 
in many countries the Muslim population started growing well before 1990. 
Between 1990 and 2010, however, the Muslim population in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, and the Benelux countries all experience positive growth, as 
                                                 
17 The BBC recently explained a dramatic of example of this. Sweden apparently has one of the highest 
rape rates in the world, however, according to Klara Selin, a sociologist at the National Council for Crime 
Prevention in Stockholm, “In Sweden there has been this ambition explicitly to record every case of sexual 
violence separately, to make it visible in the statistics… for instance, when a woman comes to the police 
and she says my husband or my fiancé raped me almost every day during the last year, the police have to 
record each of these events, which might be more than 300 events. In many other countries it would just be 
one record - one victim, one type of crime, one record.” As quoted (Alexander 2012). 
18 I considered using Eurostat’s figures for the size of the police force (per capita) as an instrument 
since it is negatively correlated with crime but uncorrelated with GDP. However, the relationship 
between size of police force and the crime rate is clearly heteroskedastic: large police forces are 
associated with low crime rates, but (perhaps unsurprisingly) small police forces are associated with 
the entire spectrum of crime rates. 
19 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK have above average Muslim Populations. Czech, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain do not. 
20 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK experienced above average 
Muslim Growth. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain did 
not. 
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Figure 4.5 shows. France stands out as having an unusually large Muslim population 
in 2010 with respect to its 1990 Muslim population.  
In Figure 4.5 below, Cyprus (which had dramatic increases that are described 
above) and Bulgaria (which remained relatively stable, moving from 13.1% to 
13.4%) do not appear so as to increase legibility. Notice that the scale on x-axis still 
differs from the y-axis. All countries that had at least 1% Muslim population as of 
1990 experienced at least some growth of the Muslim population. 
 
Figure 4.5: Muslim Population, 1990 vs. 2010. Source: Pew Research 
The number of immigrant languages is intended to capture qualitative 
concerns about cultural balkanization—as Table 4.2 shows, the number of 
immigrant languages is relatively uncorrelated with measures of the size of the 
immigrant population and only weakly correlated with the size of the Muslim 
population ( ̂  0.12). The sample mean is approximately 12 immigrant languages 
per country; the sample max is found in the United Kingdom at 44. 
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Macroeconomics 
Unemployment in the sample ranges 3.1% (Netherlands) to 11.4% (Spain) 
and has mean 6.3% (making Finland, Ireland, and Sweden fairly typical). The 
unemployment trend is based on monthly Eurostat data from 2004 through 2008. It 
ranges from -3.12% per year (Poland) to + 0.78% per year (Ireland). The mean rate 
of change was -0.625% per year; Finland and, interestingly, Greece are near the 
sample mean. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation at the National Level of Cultural Considerations 
The Linguistic Diversity Index (LDI) estimates the odds that any two people 
in a country have a different mother tongue.21 Unlike the number of immigrant 
languages, LDI closely tracks the proportion of non-citizens ( ̂  0.51); see Figure 
4.6. The limitation of the LDI, for this purpose, is that it includes linguistic diversity 
not owing to immigration. Belgium tops the LDI at 0.734 but most of this diversity 
does not owe to immigration, but pre-existing French, Dutch, and German speaking 
communities. Italy and Austria stand out as immigrant-receiving countries with 
relatively high LDIs (given the size of their non-citizen population). The United 
                                                 
21 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania., Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia, and 
Spain have above average linguistic diversity. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK do 
not.         
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Kingdom and Germany are noteworthy immigrant-receiving countries with below 
average LDIs and France is quite typical.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Immigration by Citizenship vs. Linguistic Diversity 
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Chapter 5: Exclusionism vis-à-vis Other Individual Concerns 
This chapter presents model estimates of M.P1, which shows the typical 
effect of exclusionism in the EU, how the strength of that effect varies by country, 
and how the impact of exclusionism compares and contrasts with other individual 
level determinants of    in the same terms. Though not the focus of this chapter, I 
also discuss some implications of the model estimates for    . 
I start with a description of the estimation procedure. Next, I present the an 
overview of the results, discuss model fit, and then turn the substantive results. I 
start with the European effects and move on to the national effects.  
I analyze fit and show that it fits well in both absolute and relative terms. 
With a brief comparison to other pooling strategies, I show that M.P1 clearly 
outperforms the complete pooling approach and that fit happens to be identical to a 
no pooling strategy. My partial pooling approach, however, is clearly preferable to 
the no pooling approach since it makes clear which components of the findings are 
EU-wide and which are member state specific. I present the substantive results next 
and in that order.  
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ESTIMATION 
 
Bayes’ Rule,  (   )  
 (   ) ( )
 ( )
, follows from the definition of the 
conditional probability.22  (   ) is the posterior distribution of A, that is, the 
probability distribution that has been updated by some condition B (here, data). 
Bayes’ Rule can be generalized to multiple outcomes (Casella and Berger 2002, 23). 
If the sample space is partitioned into   ,   ,    and B is any set, then for each k = 
1, 2  the posterior can be defined by the equation given in Figure 5.1. 
 (    )  
 (    ) (  )
∑  ( |  ) (  )
 
   
 
Figure 5.1: Bayes’ Rule 
This framework adapts easily to regression since the likelihood function is, 
by definition, a conditional probability function: the likelihood  (   )  ∏  (    )
 
    
is the joint probability of the data given that the unknown vector of k unknown 
parameters,  , is fixed (Casella and Berger 2002, 290). By letting    , the 
likelihood function replaces  (    ). The posterior distribution of   is equal to  ’s 
prior distribution multiplied by the likelihood divided by the probability of the data; 
see Figure 5.2. 
 
 
                                                 
22 For two events, A and B, the conditional probability is equal to the joint occurrence of the two events 
divided by the probability of the condition:  (   )  
 (   )
 ( )
. But, since  (   )  
 (   )
 ( )
, cross-
multiplying the second expression and substituting into the first yields the posterior distribution. 
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 (   )  
 (   ) ( )
 ( )
 
Figure 5.2: Bayesian Regression (definition) 
 
 (   ) is the joint distribution of the quantities of interest (like slopes and 
intercepts) and any other unknowns in the model (such as variance parameters).23 
 Here we are interested in national and European coefficients. Recall that   ,  
(for the     explanatory variable) is the sum of the European coefficient,   , and a 
national offset,   ,  .   ,       , . M.P1, the model estimated in this chapter is 
defined in Figure 5.3. See Chapter 3 for further model details. 
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Figure 5.3: Model M.P1 Specification 
 The appeal of Bayesian analysis is the ability to be make inferences directly 
about the parameters of interest (after conditioning on the available data). The 
major practical challenge is that it is often difficult, or even impossible, to derive the 
posterior distribution, which is where Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) comes in. 
MCMC is a strategy for taking the available information in the data and the 
likelihood and transitioning to the posterior distribution. 
                                                 
23 Since ( ), the marginal distribution of  , is just a constant which ensures that the posterior is a 
valid distribution (integrates to 1), statisticians often stress that      multivariate distribution can be 
characterized by the proportion  (   )   (  ,  ,      )    (   ) ( ) (Jackman 2009, 22). 
 ( )  ∫ ( ) (   )   when k = 1. See also (Casella and Berger 2002, 324). 
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Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is extremely useful for estimating 
unknowns that cannot be calculated directly. The Monte Carlo principle is that 
“anything we want to know about a random variable   can be learned from 
sampling many times from  ( ), the density of  ” (Jackman 2009, 133). For 
example, if one wishes to know the odds that a particular hand will win in a card 
game it may be easier to let the computer draw ten thousand hands to see how often 
the hand wins than it would be to figure out the probability analytically (by 
assessing all relevant combinations.) If d indexes each of        random draws 
(denoted   ) and  (  )     and g(  )    
 , then 
lim       
 
 
∑  (  )
     
    (
 
 
∑  (  )
     
   )
 
     (  )         
where       is not a sample quantity but the second central population moment. 
But the rules of the game are not always known (and that is where Markov chains 
supplement Monte Carlo or, perhaps better, enable it).  
 Markov chains transition away from known distributions to  (   ). Markov 
Chains are a sequential probability structure in which the distribution of the present 
value depends, at most, on the random variable which immediately precedes it.24 
                                                 
24 For the sequence of random variables   ,   ,  . to be a Markov chain, 
 (           ,  ,   )    (           )  
These distributions are sometimes called “memoryless” because   ,  ,      contain no additional 
information about the distribution of     .  
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Under certain regularity conditions, as       becomes infinitely large, posterior 
inferences can be made as if analytic solutions were known.25  
I use a Block Gibbs sampler to estimate the model (Chib and Carlin 1999) 
using MCMCpack in R  (Martin, Quinn and Park 2013). 
I use the mean of the MCMC draws as point estimates since the mean 
minimizes squared error loss (Casella and Berger 2002). For example, the point 
estimate of the European effect of migrant background is  ̂   
 
     
∑    , 
     
   . 
I calculate all summary statistics (point estimates, credible intervals, etc.) of the 
Bayesian regression in this fashion.  
Suppose the point estimate of the effect of exclusionism in France is positive 
( ̂  
   0) but I want a p-value to indicate how much certainty I should have about 
the point estimate. If the point estimate is misleading, a non-trivial proportion of the 
posterior distribution will be negative.       = 
 
     
∑  (  , )(   , 
  )
     
   . For each 
of        simulations (usually about 10,000; each indexed by s), I apply the 
indicator function  (  , )(   ), which returns 1 if that     is negative and 0 
otherwise. Averaging over those 0’s and 1’s yields        (the posterior probability 
that the parameter does not share the sign of the point estimate), which should be 
                                                 
25 Ergodic theorem (a generalization of the Law of Large Numbers) holds that for such a sequence  
lim
   
1
 
∑  (  )
 
    
   ( )  
provided the expectation exists (Casella and Berger 2002, 270). 
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low if the estimate is precise. Since this is a one-sided test, I take 0.05 as a 
benchmark.  
Since conditional distributions are usually much easier to derive than 
posteriors, Gibbs samplers are popular choice of MCMC because they sample from 
the conditional distributions of each of the model’s unknown parameters and are 
able to thereby completely characterize  (   ) (Jackman 2009, 214). 
In practice,       needs to be at least several thousand non-autocorrelated, 
post burn-in, draw for each parameter (or a larger number that contains equivalent 
information). I present the minimum number of such draws along with each set of 
regression results; all Bayesian MCMC results that I present converge nicely 
according to standard diagnostics. See Appendix E or Mohanty (2013) for details. 
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RESULTS    
 
Table 5.1: M.P1 estimates of European Coefficients 
I start with a brief discussion of it. In addition to the effects (Table 5.1), I 
present predicted probabilities, both first percentile differences and maximal 
differences. By the former, I mean a one unit increase from the midpoint, but 
converted to a percentage using the cumulative normal distribution. By the latter I 
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mean, for example, the predicted difference between otherwise-typical individuals 
on the left and on the right. The majority of the explanatory variables have no 
theoretical maximum; for those, by “maximal” I mean  2  on the explanatory 
variable of interest. Calculation details for these, and other, statistics of interest 
from this chapter can be found in Appendix G. For estimates of all of the model’s 
coefficients, see Appendix F. 
 
M.P1Fit 
 
The model fits well, with predicted values correlating with observations on 
the dependent variable at 0.540 (implying the pseudo-R2 of 0.292). Deviance 
Information Criteria (DIC) is an analogue of Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) that is used to evaluate multilevel models 
(Gelman & Hill, 2009, pp. 525-7) and, as such, it can be used to compare the fit of the 
partial pooling models presented throughout the dissertation. For the partial 
pooling estimates I present, DIC closely tracks pseudo-R2. I use pseudo-R2 (Luskin 
1984) to assess fit throughout and also compute it on a national basis.   
In order to see how M.P1 fits in relative terms, I compare the predictions of 
the partial pooling model to analogous complete and no pooling linear regression 
models. For the former, that means one model for the entire EU, for the latter, that 
means 27 separate models, one for each member state. I estimate (but do not 
present) all models used for this comparison via Ordinary Least Squares. M.P1 
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compares favorably with complete pooling:                  
  = 0.117. Next, I 
compute pseudo-  
  and find that M.P1’s predictions converge almost exactly with 
those obtained from a no pooling strategy: 
| ( ̂ , 
 .  ,   , )
 
  ( ̂ , 
          ,   , )
 
|  0.01                                   
The strong resemblance of the M.P1 to the no pooling estimates likely owes 
to the large sample size. This outcome suggests that no national idiosyncrasy was 
lost by the partial pooling approach. A decomposition of effects, however, into 
European and national dynamics was gained.  
M.P1 fits best in France, followed closely by Austria and Italy. One major 
limitation is that, as Figure 5.4 shows, M.P1 fits substantially better in the original 
15 EU member states than in those that joined in 2004 or 2007:  
 
Figure 5.4: M.P1 Fit by Country  
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As another measure of fit, I report the Mean Absolute Collinearity, which is 
based on the correlation matrix that corresponds to the posterior variance 
covariance matrix of the national and European coefficients, V.26 MAC should be low 
(that is, much closer to its minimum of 0 than its maximum of 1) so as to confirm 
that each coefficient contains unique information. Reassuringly, it is 0.042 for M.P1. 
 
European Dynamics 
The estimates confirm the expectations about the direction of the effect for 9 
of 13 slope parameters at the statistically significant level of        < 0.05 including 
for exclusionism. Religion and authoritarianism stand out as the most important 
determinants of    at the European level. Table 5.2 provides first percentile 
differences and credible intervals for all explanatory variables alongside respective 
hypotheses. 
 Holding other influences constant, increases in exclusionism are predicted to 
increase    in the EU (       0.028); this finding supports H1. A one unit (one 
standard deviation) increase in a respondent’s exclusionism translates into a 0.077 
increase in   . The European effect is, however, relatively modest: such an increase 
translates into a 2.8% increase in   . This effect corresponds to a maximal 
difference of 11.4% on this ideational dimension. Exclusionism’s European effect is 
comparable in magnitude to that of ideology but considerably less than that of 
authoritarianism, which has the largest effect of the ideational variables at the 
European level (7.8%). That means that there is a maximal difference between 
                                                 
26 Let  ̂ be the estimated posterior variance covariance matrix of the European and national 
coefficients and let  ( ̂) be the corresponding correlation matrix. I report the mean absolute value of 
the unique off-diagonal elements of  ( ̂). 
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authoritarians and democrats of 30.5%. For reference, such a maximal difference is 
larger than that of education (-19.1%). 
 The other major European effects are socio-demographic. M.P1 predicts that 
natives are 20.4% more opposed to immigration than migrants and that Christians 
are 19.4% more opposed to immigration than Muslims. Thus, together, the model 
predicts a sizeable 39.5% gap between native Christians and Muslims who are 
recent immigrants. Put differently, this gap does not appear to be limited to 
countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom that have long struggled to 
integrate Muslim immigrants but rather to be a more general European phenomena.  
 Additionally, the hypothesis that European women are less opposed to 
immigration comes close to that benchmark (       = 0.056). The hypotheses about 
socialism and income unambiguously do not hold. Though it is somewhat more 
likely than not that    increases with age, the posterior distribution of age’s slope 
clearly intersects zero: (       = 0.191).  
Though not hypothesized to have a main effect, there is a suggestion that 
Europeans become less opposed to immigration to the extent that they become 
interested in politics.  
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EU-wide Hypothesis about Opposition to Immigration: Effect  
H1     0 Exclusionism increases 2.8% (-0.4%, 5.8%) 
H2     0 Authoritarianism increases 7.4% (4.2%, 10.7%) 
H3    0 Socialism increases -0.4% (-3.5%, 2.7%) 
H4    0 Rightist increases 3.4% (0.1%, 6.5%) 
H5     0 
Migrant Background 
decreases 
-20.4% (-25.0%, -15.9%) 
H6 
                 
    0      
Christians have highest, 
Muslims have lowest. 
C: 4.9% (0.4%, 9.5%) 
NR: 3.4% (-1.2%, 7.8%) 
M: -14.1% (-20.6%, -7.2%) 
H7     0 Education decreases -5.1% (-8.3%, -2.1%) 
H8    0 Income decreases -0.1% (-3.1%, 2.8%) 
H9    0 Age increases 1.1% (-2.1%, 4.3%) 
H10    0 Females have lower -2.9% (-6.2%, 0.2%) 
H11     0 
Political Interest does not 
have a main effect 
-2.6% (-5.8%, 0.4%) 
Table 5.2: M.P1 Evidence about European Hypotheses 
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National Dynamics 
Just because the European coefficient is significant, the national coefficient 
need not be. And even if a variable is not statistically significant at the European 
level, it may still be significant in at least some of its member states (though, of 
course, it need not be). If the variable does seem to affect the public in some 
countries, it is worth noting (in anticipation of the chapters to follow) whether it 
appears to do so because of a particular macro variable.  
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Overview of National Coefficients (M.P1 Estimates)  
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Looking at the estimated effects country-by-country is extremely important 
because (a) the magnitude of many of the estimates differs tremendously and (b) no 
single explanatory variable is predicted to have a statistically significant effect in all 
countries. Despite European trends, Christians and Muslims see eye-to-eye in 
Bulgaria when it comes to immigration policy, anti-immigration sentiment is a left 
wing phenomena in Malta, and exclusionism does not predict    in Denmark.  
The intercepts stand out as differing considerably by country:  ̂         ,    
 ̂         ,   = 1.399. That national importance score translates into a 51.6% gap 
between the country with the lowest baseline    (Romania) and the highest 
(Cyprus). Taken ensemble, the effect of religion differs substantially at the national 
level, too. The national effect of migrant background ranges considerably (about 
25%), that is, about 12.5% above and below its European effect. The ideational 
variables do not differ as much at the national level as those socio-demographic 
ones. That said, the national effects of authoritarianism differ by as much as about 
16.7%, ideology about 13.0%, and exclusionism about 7.9%.  
Figure 5.5 provides point estimates of the national maximal differences and 
associated credible intervals for exclusionism. The dotted line is the European 
maximal difference of exclusionism. The figures that follow are constructed 
similarly. 
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Exclusionism 
 
Figure 5.5: Exclusionism (national maximal differences)27 
 
The hypothesis that exclusionism increases   , H1, holds in 21 of 27 member 
states at the        0.05 level.  The hypothesis about exclusionism does not hold 
in the Slovak Republic or Cyprus.  
At first blush, there appears to be something of North-South divide – the six 
countries where the effect is most intense are Finland, Germany, Sweden, Austria, 
Latvia, and Estonia. The national (total) effect is, however, not different from chance 
in Denmark, quite typical in the Netherlands and Ireland, and fairly strong in Spain. 
                                                 
27 The Member State abbreviations are: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: 
Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; GR: Greece; HU: 
Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta; NL: 
Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SK: Slovak Republic; SI: Slovenia; ES: Spain; SE: 
Sweden; UK: United Kingdom. 
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There does not appear to be a pattern in terms of new vs. old countries of 
immigration either. 
Socialism 
 
Figure 5.6: Socialism (national maximal differences) 
 
The effect of socialism still bears the imprint of the Cold War such that in 
older member states socialists are more cosmopolitan whereas in newer member 
states socialists tend towards welfare chauvinism (see Figure 5.6). Though the 
magnitudes of the predicted effects are smaller than with the other ideational 
variables, in Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom socialism is 
predicted to decrease  , while in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, 
and Slovenia socialism increases opposition (to mention only the member states 
where the 95% HPD does not include zero). 
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Authoritarianism 
 
Figure 5.7: Authoritarianism (national maximal differences) 
 
The authoritarianism hypothesis (H2) holds strongly in 25 of 27 member 
states (       0.01). Cyprus is the only member state where the hypothesis 
unambiguously does not hold. Perhaps the questions upon which the 
authoritarianism index is based regarding the appropriateness of police and 
military rule are interpreted in the context of the conflict over the island with 
Turkey. However, as for Lithuania, the other country with very weak significance, 
the estimates may simply reflect the fact that the model fits somewhat poorly for 
these countries as a whole (see Figure 5.7). 
 There are some parallels between the national effects of exclusionism and 
authoritarianism: Germany, Finland, and Sweden are clearly above average in terms 
of both. However several countries with below average effects of exclusionism have 
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above average effects of authoritarianism: Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
and Slovenia. And Austria, Spain, and the United Kingdom, all above average for 
exclusionism, are at or below the EU mean for authoritarianism. 
Rightism.  
 
Figure 5.8: Rightism (maximal national differences) 
 
The evidence in favor of H4 (rightists oppose immigration) is strong but 
mixed. As Figure 5.8 shows, the reverse is true in Malta, where the national effect is 
clearly negative (meaning that the public opposes immigration to the extent that 
they are leftists). In Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia,    appears to be 
neither left nor right. With the exception of Greece and Portugal, the national effect 
of ideology is above average in EU-15 member states and predicted to be the largest 
in France.    
 105 
Religion 
 
Figure 5.9: The Gap between Christians and Muslims by country 
 
In line with H6, despite the small numbers of Muslims in the survey, there is 
a clear difference between Muslims and not only Christians but also between 
Muslims and other religious minorities. The religious divide in Spain and the United 
Kingdom is estimated to be typical for the EU (about 20%). There is no gap between 
Christians and Muslims on immigration in Bulgaria.28 The gap is only clearly above 
average in Austria and Belgium, where it is about 30% (Figure 5.9). 
 
 
                                                 
28 In Bulgaria, the Muslim population is substantial but pre-dates modern mass 
migration; according to Pew, the Muslim population has remained stable at about 
13% of the population since 1990. 
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Migrant Background 
 
Figure 5.10: Difference in opposition to immigration between Migrants and Natives 
 
The estimates of the effects of migrant background are much noisier than 
they are for the other effects owing to the relatively small number of respondents 
with a migrant background (see Figure 5.10).29 In line with expectation, to the 
extent people have a migrant background, they are less opposed to immigration 
(H5); this hypothesis holds for the sample as a whole and in 21 out of 27 member 
states at the 0.05 level. 
                                                 
29 The variances are smaller for countries with more immigrants; the variance is 
particularly low for Luxembourg, the member state with by far the highest percent 
immigrants (  42%). 
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Education 
 
Figure 5.11: Education (national maximal differences) 
 
The effects of education (Figure 5.11) are quite substantial – the national 
effects of education are comparable in magnitude to having a migrant background. 
In line with H7, the national effects of education are statistically significant in 24 of 
27 member states at the 0.05 level and for the sample as a whole. 
Gender 
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Gender 
 
Figure 5.12: the Gender Gap on Immigration by country 
Men are more opposed to immigration than women in most countries, but 
not by much: the predicted gender gap between is less than 10% in all member 
states where the national effect is statistically significant (see Figure 5.12). The 
gender gap is largest in Sweden, Finland, and Slovenia, but otherwise does not 
follow a general pattern (like new vs. old member states). 
  
Income 
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Figure 5.13: Income (national maximal differences) 
The hypothesis that income decreases    holds in France and the 
Netherlands. The reverse holds, however, in Austria, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia. 
Age 
 
Figure 5.14: Age (national maximal differences) 
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In 11 member states, it quite clear that older respondents are more opposed 
to immigration than younger ones (       0.01), but the reverse appears to be 
the case in several member states with external frontiers: Finland, Italy, Malta, 
Romania, and Slovenia are all predicted to have youth who are more opposed to 
immigration than their elders (though this is not true of Greece or Poland). In most 
countries there are statistically significant generational gaps, but they appear to 
depend on an omitted macro variable (likely how long ago the immigrant 
community formed). 
Political Interest 
 
 
Figure 5.15: Political Interest (national maximal differences) 
 
In a dozen or so countries, political interest has a substantively and 
statistically significant effect (in a similar pattern to education, though not as 
pronounced). The national effects of PI are negative and are stronger in immigrant 
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rich countries. So, the effect of PI may be conditioned by an omitted macro variable 
but, on its own, it appears at least relatively neutral. 
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Regarding OI, I hypothesize that in each country  
M.P1 Evidence: 
       < 0.05 
H1   
   0 Exclusionism increases 21 
(of 27 countries) 
H2   
   0 Authoritarianism increases 25 
H3   
  0 Socialism increases 7 
H4   
  0 Rightism increases 18 
H5   
   0 Migrant Background decreases 21 
H6   
  0     
  
Christians have the highest OI, 
Muslims will have the lowest. 
19 
H7   
   0 Education decreases 24 
H8   
  0 Income decreases 3 
H9   
  0 Age increases 11 
H10   
  0 Females have lower 11 
H11   
   0 Political Interest won’t have a 
main effect 
10 
Table 5.4: M.P1 National Evidence 
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DISCUSSION 
Exclusionism is distinct from the other ideational variables investigated in 
this chapter. The model identifies Germany, a country that has long struggled with 
the cultural integration of its immigrants, as having unusually intense total effects of 
exclusionism. Exclusionism predicts    in more countries in the EU than either 
ideology or religion. 
The model suggests that three ideational concerns are most important for 
understanding   : exclusionism, authoritarianism, and rightism. However, it also 
suggests that the importance of each of these concerns varies considerably country-
to-country. 
The model fits well, and not only in statistical terms – on a variety of 
variables, the model suggests that the national effects are particularly intense where 
immigration has been long known to be a contentious issue. For example, the model 
predicts ideological differences to be most intense in France, where the Front 
National has long campaigned for a hard line on immigration. In Belgium, the 
country that recently passed a constitutional amendment banning headscarves, the 
model predicts the gap between Christians and Muslims to be largest. In Austria, a 
country that which allowed Neo-Nazi Jörg Haider into government, setting of a 
storm of racial controversy, the estimates suggest that a host of variables to have 
unusually intense effects: all but authoritarianism and female have national effects 
with a greater magnitude than the (respective) EU average (in statistically 
significant fashion). This is not the same as saying that    is unusually high in 
Austria (though the sample mean of the dependent variable suggest that it is, too). 
Rather, the Austria findings suggest the country is unusually polarized: small 
differences in the ideational and sociodemographic variables translate into 
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unusually large gaps in attitudes towards immigration. The plausibility of the 
model’s general findings lends additional credence to the findings about 
exclusionism. 
Interestingly, despite the existence of clear European trends, no explanatory 
variable has a statistically significant effect in all member states (authoritarianism 
and education come the closest, followed by exclusionism). In general, socio-
demographic variables stand out more clearly at the EU level (particularly, migrant 
background and religion) while ideational concerns are paramount for 
understanding national dynamics. 
A major concern of the literature on right wing populism is at what point 
parties ought to be considered “anti-system.” This question is often studied from the 
supply side (of the positions parties are taking). Viewed from the demand side, M.P1 
suggests that authoritarian opponents of immigration might do quite well 
electorally in most EU-15 countries. 
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Chapter 6: Polarization & the Heterogeneity of National Effects 
This chapter presents the statistics that I use to assess polarization and its 
relationship to heterogeneity of national effects; results follow the definitions.  
POLARIZATION IN AGGREGATE OPINION 
I define polarization of opposition to immigration,    , by   ’s variance, 
   , 
 .  ̂  , 
  is the sample variance of    in member state  . I use descriptive statistics 
to assess the extent to which hypothesized national developments are associated 
with higher levels of   (       ). 
I assess the sample correlation between the national variance of opinion and 
the macro data about national developments:  ̂  ,      ̂(  , ,  ̂  , 
 ). I perform an F-
test to establish whether attitudes are more polarized in some countries than in 
others (details below). 
 Next, to capture micro-macro interaction, I insert the heterogeneity of 
national effects,   , into the chain of evidence:           . 
 M.P1 turns out to do an excellent job predicting    . To show this, I take 
fitted values from M.P1 and compute the variance (not the error, just the variance of 
the predictions) on a country-by-country variance. That they correspond closely 
with the observed values of     is not surprising considering the partial pooling 
model allows different countries to have different variances. It is less clear, 
however, whether M.P1 predicts     because of the variation in M.P1’s effects.  
 To make sure that polarization is traceable to the effects’ variation, I analyze 
        . I take the absolute value of the point estimates of all national effects 
(see Appendix H) and then take the mean of those by country: | ̅̂(   )|. Next, I 
evaluate the sample correlation of that vector with    :  ̂     ,     ̂(| ̅̂(   )|,  ̂  , 
2 ). 
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To examine       , I analyze the relationship between the macro 
variables and the posterior distribution of slope parameters. This analysis consists 
of two broad steps: (a) fitting trend lines to see whether unusually intense national 
effects are explained by given national developments and then (b) analyzing the 
joint posterior distribution of coefficients.  
The first step is to assess non-additivities. This step ensures that the national 
variables magnify existing individual-level determinants of anti-immigrant 
sentiment. The second set confirms that the entire set of an individual’s concerns 
function so as to increase    (and, by extension, increase    ).  
Below I describe how I translate my theoretical expectations into parameter 
expectations and test statistics. Note that M.P1 is the model that I use to assess 
polarization. (See Chapter 3 for definition and 5 for results.) That it contains 
superfluous coefficients is not a flaw but a feature since a major piece of the 
polarization puzzle is about the national contexts in which the explanatory factors 
matter (and in which they do not). 
 
Linking Polarization to Individual Concerns 
This section introduces test statistics for assessing the chain of evidence: 
           .  
Intensification 
 
 By “intensification” I mean a particular kind of micro-macro interaction. A 
macro variable intensifies the national effects of a micro variable if, as the macro 
variable increases, the national effects’ magnitude (absolute value) increase as well. 
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Provided each national variable    is oriented such that higher values represent 
larger national immigration threats, in the likelihood function, 
   , 
   
 
   
      
 
(        ,  
   
   
). Because   is, by construction, a z-score (and hence distributed 
mean zero), extreme values of   (alternatively, large values of    ) are also polarized 
attitudes, that is, unusually for or against immigration. The cross-partial derivative 
can be interpreted as capturing the extent to which extreme values of   can be 
explained by the joint occurrence of the micro and macro variables hypothesized to 
explain anti-immigrant sentiment.  
The posterior odds that   intensifies    are given in Figure 6.1. 
 (                        , )   (
   , 
   
 0  , )        0 
and 
 (                        , )   (
   , 
   
 0  , )        0 
Figure 6.1: Intensification Definition 
To estimate the cross-partial derivatives of interest, I adapt Ordinary Least 
Squares to this post-estimation context.30 I treat the estimated total effects  ̂  as a 
dependent variable and estimate the linear relationship between select macro 
variables and the total effects of the micro variables for each of the       
simulations (in the MCMC sample). For example, suppose one wants to know 
                                                 
30 Initially, I simply calculated the posterior correlation between macro data and the total effects but 
found that this was clearly not discriminating enough of a test. 
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whether the total effects of ideology are higher in countries that have high linguistic 
diversity. Let     1      . As usual, the calculation is performed at each 
iteration of the MCMC sample and the coefficient point estimates is the mean of 
those calculations:  ̂  
 
     
∑  ̂ , 
     
   . Here,  ̂ ,   ( 
    )      ̂ 
 .  ̂  is a 
vector (here, of length two) containing the (posterior mean) fitted values of the 
equation where the unit of observation is (simulation s of) the fitted value of the 
national effect of ideology in country j:  ̂ , 
    , 
    , 
 ,    
     , . 
Typically there are 10,000 MCMC draws, so 10,000 regressions are 
performed with 27 observations of the dependent variable (and hence 25 degrees of 
freedom) each. So, a very large number of very small sample regressions are 
performed.  
Hypothesizing that the linguistic diversity intensifies ideology means 
hypothesizing that   
 ,   0. Since the expected sign of  ̂ 
 ,  depends on the sign of 
  , it is convenient to define a related statistic which is positive if it signed so as to 
be consistent with the hypothesized intensification. Let  ̂ ,    ̂ 
 ,  ( 1)   where 
   is a dummy variable that indicates the sign of the hypothesis about the 
coefficient of explanatory variable   such that    1 if    is hypothesized to be 
negative and 0 if    is hypothesized to be positive. Hypothesizing that    intensifies 
all of an individual’s concerns about immigration is equivalent to hypothesizing that 
 ̂ 
 ,  0          .  
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In this fashion, I also calculate Adjusted R2 (denoted  ̅ , 
  for the model of 
macro data h that explains the     national effect) over the entire posterior as a 
measure of fit. For this design, the possibility that the credible interval of  ̅ , 
  
includes zero turns out to be non-trivial, making it particularly useful for 
interpreting whether  ̂ 
 ,  actually explains whether or not there is a linear 
relationship between the macro variable and the magnitude of given total effects.  
Determinants of Polarization 
 
It is unlikely that any sole individual concern could single-handedly induce 
polarization. It is more likely that multiple—perhaps even all—of an individual’s 
concerns would have to be intensified for attitudes to become polarized considering 
all of the variability inherent in individual’s attitudes. In polarized systems, many 
variables come to function as one. In a highly polarized system, knowing how one 
parameter works reveals quite a bit about how all of the others work. On the RHS, 
this phenomenon manifests as a reduction of the national effects’ statistical 
independence from one another (of their dimensionality).  
If a national development (macro variable) has intensified national effects 
(of individual concerns), then the higher the level of the macro variable, the more 
extreme the inter-effect correlations should be. I analyze those trends, which can be 
insightful, provided the correlations don’t approach 1 (which implies a collinearity 
problem) (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).  
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Tracing polarization in the aggregate to individual level concerns means 
tracing differences in magnitude, direction, and coalescence of a set of slope 
parameters. Individual concerns are unusual strong determinants of polarization to 
the extent that their national effect is greater in magnitude than their European 
effect (         ). The European effect of education is negative; knowing that 
national effect is even more negative than that would mean that the slopes of 
rightism and migrant background are unusually positive.  
To provide evidence that a given macro variable is a determinant of 
polarization, the mean absolute correlation of the national effects should be higher 
in countries with above-average levels of the macro variable. 
 Since I compute these test statistics over the entire posterior distribution, I 
also calculate        to see if observed differences are likely to be due to chance or 
not. For example, I group countries as having above- or below-average crime rate 
and then see if high-crime countries have higher    .    
The first step is to define a test statistic in terms of a generic (   ) 
correlation matrix, R.    is the number of covariance terms, which is the number of 
unique off-diagonal elements in each of the matrices;    
    
 
.  See Table 6.1. In 
Table 6.1,   and    are used to index the rows and columns of the correlation matrix 
(for MANER);  (    )(. ) is an indicator function that ensures that operations are 
only performed on the unique, off-diagonal elements of that matrix. (And, |  ,  | is 
the absolute value of element [ ,   ] of , not its determinant).  
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Mean Absolute National Effects Correlation (MANER) 
1
  
 ∑ ∑  (    )(|  ,  |)
 
    
 
   
 
Table 6.1: Determinant of Polarization Test Statistics 
 
 The Mean Absolute National Effects Correlation captures the strength of the 
(absolute) linear relation between amongst the variables. MANER is an unsigned 
measure and, as such, is only intended to be used after the techniques described 
above (in the “Intensification” section) establish that macro variables have the 
correctly signed relationship with the dependent variable. 
 The next step is to partition the national effects. Let   be a       matrix that 
contains all national effects (slopes but not intercepts). In M.P1, there are 13 slopes 
* 27 countries = 351 parameters. The next step is to partition the set J according to 
a national criterion and to take the corresponding columns of  . Let   
  be the set 
that matches the criterion in terms of macro variable  , and let   
   be the set that 
does not. Put differently,   
  +   
    . Since   is odd,   
     
  . For example, suppose 
the criteria is belonging to EU-15 (as opposed to being one of the new members of 
EU-27).            is a 
(    15) matrix of national effects and            is a 
(    12) matrix of national effects. More typically, I partition   based upon 
whether the country has an above average value of the hth macro variable that is 
hypothesized to be a trigger of polarization (       ̅̅ ̅̅ ). For example, if the macro 
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variable of interest is the unemployment trend,   
  is all members states such that 
 U   U̅̅ ̅̅ , and   
   is the rest (all member states such that  U   U̅̅ ̅̅ ).  
My polarization test statistics are based upon the posterior distribution of      
and      . More specifically, I base the polarization statistics on their correlation 
matrices,  (    , ) and  (     , ).
31 Both matrices are (   ): they summarize the 
relationship of the individual explanatory variables (not the countries, as would be 
obtained from the transpose,  ).  
In order to perform hypotheses tests, I compare MANER for each set,   
  and 
  
  . I calculate         ,  using  (    , ) and          ,  using  (     , ). In order to 
provide evidence of polarization, the test statistics should be larger for   
  than for 
  
  . To continue the unemployment trend example, I assess both point and 
uncertainty estimates to assess whether MANER(       ̅)  MANER(        ̅).  
To foreshadow, MANER is stronger in high-immigration countries. That 
MANER is stronger in high-immigration countries is intuitive, and I use these 
findings as a practical benchmark for the other national developments. Many (but 
not all) of the macro variables analyzed below appear to polarize by some of the 
metrics, so it is useful to know whether such variables polarize more than the 
numbers of immigrants. In order to assess whether that is the case (and to evaluate 
                                                 
31  (. ) is the sample variance covariance and  (. ) is the sample correlation matrix; both are 
computed at each iteration s. 
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H29), in addition to above test statistics, I analyze whether the macro variable    
explains a greater swing toward polarization (in terms of     ). 
I hypothesize that     is higher in   
  than in   
   and assess this with an F-test. 
The test statistic, denoted   , has degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
respondents in   
  in the numerator and degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
respondents in    
   in the denominator. When the variances are equal in the two 
regions,    = 1.   
To assess asymmetry, I perform a t-test to see whether    is higher in   
  than 
in   
   to test H30; the test statistic is denoted   .    should be interpreted in tandem 
with other results about the central tendency of macro variable h since  ̅    could be 
higher than  ̅     because of an homogeneous effect of    (i.e., the slope,   , which is 
contained in the complete pooling models estimated in the next chapter).  
Suppose all of the polarization test statistics for the hth macro variable are 
stored in a vector   as they are in Figure 6.2. 
   
(
 
 
 
 
 
   1
 ̂ ,   
  
 ̂ 
   , 
                  
(                  )    ̅  )
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
 
 
 
 
   1
 ̂ ,   
  
 ̂ 
   , 
  ̅ 
  ̅    ̅  )
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Polarization Test Statistics (   Definition) 
The hypothesis about     and its determinants is that each of the quantities in   is 
positive. This can be expressed succinctly as the hypothesis that the smallest test 
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statistic is positive:   ,    0. Note, though, that the level of uncertainty is based 
on a classical statistical test (which is independent of the regression) for the first 
three items and that the other three are calculated via MCMC. Note also that all 
hypotheses about intensification are intended for       (which is implied by 
hypothesizing that  ̂ 
   ,  0)  and provided that  ̅ , 
  0. Table 6.2 summarizes 
my expectations about the polarization test statistics (which are stated in Table 2.3). 
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Test Statistic Expectations 
 
(Evidence for H28, H29, and H30  
as well as the hypothesis about the particular national 
development ) 
H21       ,    0 
H22    ,    0 
H23     ,    0 
H24 
  ,    0 
   ,    0 
H25   ,    0 
H26 
   ,    0 
   ,    0 
H27 
   ,    0 
    ,    0 
   ,    0 
   ,    0 
Table 6.2: Polarization Hypotheses.  
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RESULTS 
Recall that the statistics are all constructed such that positive values provide 
evidence of    . 
Table 6.3 provides an overview of the polarization findings (the     
descriptive statistics). The first column provides evidence regarding polarization; it 
contains the ratio of variances, and, so, values greater than 1 support the 
hypotheses.  
Evidence about H29 (particular national developments better explain 
polarization than IP, the proportion of immigrants) can be found by comparing 
values within the two columns. 
The third column contains evidence pertaining to asymmetry. H30:    will be 
higher in countries with above-average amounts of the national trigger variable.   
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 Polarization  
 
 F test  ̂  ,    Asymmetry 
EU15 
1.159 
(< 0.001) 
0.578 -0.4% 
(0.276) 
    
IP 
0.995 
(0.647) 
0.195 8.3% 
(< 0.001) 
    
    
1.001 
(0.267) 
-0.064 1.6% 
(< 0.001) 
    
CR 
1.208  
(<0.001) 
0.646 3% 
(< 0.001) 
    
CF 
0.986  
(0.763) 
0.087 5.97% 
(< 0.001) 
    
MP 
1.208  
(< 0.001) 
0.406 6.4% 
(< 0.001) 
    
    
1.241  
(<0.001) 
-0.080 0.9% 
(< 0.001) 
    
LDI 
0.897  
(1) 
0.173 9.4% 
(< 0.001) 
    
IL 
1.099  
(< 0.001) 
0.449 8.2% 
(< 0.001) 
    
U 
0.861  
(1) 
-0.080 1.2% 
(0.002) 
    
   
1.265 
(< 0.001) 
0.224 -1.2% 
(0.001) 
    
GDP 
1.207  
(< 0.001) 
0.425 1.8%  
(<0.001) 
Table 6.3: Overview of Polarization Results   
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Do the hypothesized national developments lead to the polarization of 
opposition to immigration (       )?     is higher for 7 of the 12 macro 
variables (EU-15, CR, MP,    ,   ,   , and    ) according to the F-test, and  ̂  ,    
is positive for 9 of 12 macro variables (all but    ,    , and ).  
In support of H29, these findings suggest that quality is more important than 
quantity.32 At 0.195,  ̂  ,    is much weaker than the corresponding correlation for 
several of the other macro variables.     is much stronger in EU-15 countries.     
tracks wealth.     also tracks the number of immigrant languages more closely than 
it does the size of the immigrant population, suggesting that cultural balkanization is 
a bigger concern than demographics. And the relationship between     and the 
crime rate is quite pronounced.   
According to the F-test, the most marked increase in polarization (increase in 
variance) is observed for     and   .     is 24.1% higher in countries that have 
experienced high Muslim growth (when compared to those that have not) and it is 
26.5% higher in countries that have above-average unemployment trends (when 
compared to those that do not). 
Does mean    increase with    ? Looking at the sample as a whole, the 
answer is no (contra H30). The sample correlation between    and     is -0.297. 
Does     increase when there are particular national developments? The 
hypothesized net increase holds for 10 of 12 national variables. The largest net 
difference is between countries with above- and below-average LDI (9.4%); that net 
difference is followed closely by that for IP (8.3%) and IL (8.2%). 
                                                 
32 Unlike for the other variables for which the variance ratio hypothesis does not hold (CF, LDI, and U), 
the F-tests for IP and     appear to be sensitive to outliers at the national level: if OI is partitioned by the 
(respective) national medians instead, the hypotheses for IP and     do hold (at p < 0.001). The variance 
ratio is then 1.086 for IP and 1.097 for    . 
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Asymmetric polarization necessitates both increased mean and variance; 
those net increases could stem from processes that do not induce    . The results 
suggest that mean and variance only increase for five variables: CR, MP,     ,
  , and     (in support of H30 for those variables). As Table 6.4 shows, the 
hypothesis about MANER holds for all five of those national variables. 
M.P1 does an excellent job predicting    :  ̂   ,   ̂  = 0.855. But are higher 
levels of heterogeneity of national effects associated with higher levels of 
polarization? Does         ? Yes:  ̂     ,    = 0.497 (       < 0.001).  
Table 6.4 provides evidence about determinants of the heterogeneity of 
national effects (      ). Since no macro variable intensifies all individual-level 
parameters, I instead present the name and number of variables for which the 
hypothesis holds. (By “hypothesis holds” I mean that there is at least a 95% 
posterior probability that the effect of the macro variable is in the hypothesized 
direction, and, in addition, there is at least a 95% posterior probability that the 
model explains the variance of the national effects.) Appendix H provides all 
estimates of intensification trends. 
The final column provides evidence about H29 (particular national 
developments are stronger determinants of    than    are). 
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 Determinants of Polarization  
 
 Intensification   ̅    ̅    ̅   
EU15 
4 
(AU, R, ED, PI) 
0.020 
(0.203) 
-0.092 
(0.007) 
    
IP 
4 
(R, I, MB, PI) 
0.122 
(0) 
Not 
Applicable 
    
    
1 
(ED) 
0.144 
(0) 
0.022  
(0.263) 
    
CR 
5 
(EX, AU, R, ED, PI) 
0.089 
(0.001) 
-0.032 
(0.208) 
    
CF 
1 
(S) 
0.268 
(0) 
0.146  
(0.002) 
    
MP 
3 
(R, ED, PI) 
0.109 
(< 0.001) 
-0.013 
(0.361) 
    
    
3 
(R, MB, PI) 
0.171 
(0) 
0.049 
(0.087) 
    
LDI 
1 
(R) 
0.061 
(0.016) 
-0.061 
(0.042) 
    
IL 
6 
(EX, S, AU, R, A, PI) 
0.146 
(0) 
0.024 
(0.301) 
    
U 0 
-0.014 
(0.311) 
-0.135 
(0.002) 
    
   
5 
(R, ED, I, MB, PI) 
0.004 
(0.439) 
-0.117 
(< 0.001) 
    
GDP 
2 
(S, R, PI) 
0.059 
(0.015) 
-0.062 
(0.053) 
Table 6.4: Determinants of the Heterogeneity of National Effects 
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In support of H28, each national development investigated here (except for 
the unemployment rate) intensifies at least one variable.33 Immigrant languages 
explain the intensification of the largest number (6) of individual concerns.  
Viewed from the related standpoint of particular concerns, rightism (R for 
Rightism) stands out as having a linear relationship with the largest number (9) of 
national variables (EU-15, IP, CR, MP,    ,    ,   ,   , and    ). Put differently, 
rightism’s relationship to    is quite sensitive to national context. Education is the 
second most sensitive to national context with 5 such relationships. 
Authoritarianism and migrant background are predicted by three each. The 
intensity of the effect of exclusionism is best predicted by the crime rate and the 
number of immigrant languages. Interestingly, the intensity of the national effects of 
religion at the individual level does not appear to be related to any of the national 
variables (including the Muslim population measures). 
Do the hypothesized national developments reduce the statistical 
independence of the national effects (in terms of MANER)? In support of H28, the 
slopes have a stronger relationship in countries with above-average amounts of the 
national trigger variables ( R̅   0 for 9 of 12 national variables at the        < 
0.05 level). Does the reduction happen more dramatically for particular national 
triggers with   ? In this regard, H29 is only clearly supported by conflict 
fatalities ( R̅    R̅    0.146;        0.002). Increases in the Muslim 
population, however, come quite close to clearing that benchmark:  R̅     R̅    
0.049 (       0.087).   
                                                 
33 I include PI because it is intensified in the direction of its effect (which, contra H11, is negative) by a 
number of national developments. For all other variables, intensification is in line with my hypotheses.  
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DISCUSSION 
Polarization is more about accumulation than the rate of change. Most of the 
national developments that have particularly strong with     (including EU-15, the 
size of the Muslim population, the linguistic variables, and GDP) are long term 
variables.  Neither the rate of change of the immigrant or the Muslim population has 
a noteworthy correlation with    . The unemployment trend stands out as an 
exception in this regard. 
The analysis suggests that most national developments that increase   do so 
by increasing asymmetric polarization. Though this polarization is moderate (the 
distribution of opposition remains unimodal in each member state), it is 
nonetheless discernible.  
Conflict fatalities appear to have little polarizing influence. As the next 
chapter shows, they do have a homogenous effect. 
The analysis suggests that it is possible to break down trends between 
national developments and polarization of aggregate opinion (       ) and to 
insert individual-level effects into the equation (           ). Those same 
national developments that have the clearest relationship with     stand out as 
intensifying the largest number of effects at the individual level. But, like a game of 
telephone, only a portion of the message makes all the way from   to    to    . 
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Chapter 7: Which National Developments best explain Opposition to 
Immigration? 
This chapter presents estimates of a series of models in order to investigate 
potential demographic, public safety, cultural, and macroeconomic triggers of   . 
Specifications of, and associated parameter expectations for, the models presented 
in this chapter can be found in Chapter 3. The metrics used in this chapter are quite 
similar to those used in the last chapter. I do not present the estimates of the 
(individual level) national or European effects in any detail in this chapter since 
they are largely unchanged by the introduction of the macro variables. 
I present Bayesian MCMC models of the partial pooling models and ordinary 
least squares estimates of the complete pooling models.  
All of the OLS estimates test positive for heteroskedasticity using a Breusch-
Pagan test at highly significant levels, which violates one of the method’s key 
assumptions (Kmenta 1971). These violations are not particularly surprising since I 
designed a partial pooling model in part on the assumption that the model is 
heteroskedastic by country (see Appendix A). Nor, as it turns out, do the violations 
have much impact. 
I re-estimated each model with Robust Standard Errors. More specifically, I 
used Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with heteroskedasticity-corrected variance-
covariance matrices that restore consistency to the estimates. I found that most of 
the corrected slope and intercept estimates were nearly indistinguishable from 
those produced by OLS in terms of sign, magnitude, significance, and model fit. The 
one substantively meaningful exception is for the effect of the crime rate; for the 
model that contains it, I present both sets of estimates.  
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DEMOGRAPHICS 
 Opposition to Immigration 
 
M.C3 M.C12 M.C13 
(Intercept) -0.042 (0.002) -0.131 (< 0.001) -0.132 (< 0.001) 
Exclusionism 0.085 (< 0.001) 0.093 (< 0.001) 0.093 (< 0.001) 
Authoritarianism 0.127 (< 0.001) 0.147 (< 0.001) 0.147 (< 0.001) 
Rightist 0.098 (< 0.001) 0.103 (< 0.001) 0.103 (< 0.001) 
Education -0.159 (< 0.001) -0.141 (< 0.001) -0.141 (< 0.001) 
Migrant Background -0.74 (< 0.001) -0.682 (< 0.001) -0.681 (< 0.001) 
Christian 0.072 (< 0.001) 0.113 (< 0.001) 0.114 (< 0.001) 
Muslim -0.371 (< 0.001) -0.34 (< 0.001) -0.339 (< 0.001) 
No Religion 0.038 (0.01) 0.111 (< 0.001) 0.111 (< 0.001) 
Female -0.059 (< 0.001) -0.052 (< 0.001) -0.052 (< 0.001) 
Age 0.046 (< 0.001) 0.052 (< 0.001) 0.052 (< 0.001) 
Political Interest -0.068 (< 0.001) -0.061 (< 0.001) -0.061 (< 0.001) 
Imm Pop 2008 1.133 (< 0.001) 
  Imm Pop 1998 
 
1.146 (< 0.001) 0 (0.873) 
Imm Pop Change 
 
42.719 (< 0.001) 43.213 (< 0.001) 
IP 1998 x IP Change 
  
-6.523 (0.696) 
    N 40,465 40,465 40,465 
RSE 0.937 0.931 0.931 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.133 0.133 
    
Table 6.1: Demographic Complete Pooling Model Estimates 
Other things being equal, the more immigrants, the higher    is.34 The 
incremental effect, however, is modest. M.C3 suggests that if a person, who would 
otherwise be neutral, lives in a country that has mean level of immigration (roughly 
7.7%) and the size of the immigrant population increases one point to 8.7%, her   
would only increase by 0.5%. If the country somehow moved between the two 
                                                 
34 Note that since the range of this variable is so small, its coefficients appear unusually large. (As I 
discuss in this section, the former and the latter tend to cancel out and so the typical effect of rate of 
change of the immigrant population is actually similar to that of the other explanatory variables.) 
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observed ends of the spectrum (Bulgaria and Luxembourg), the swing of such a 
hypothetical person’s opinion would be expected to be 18.5%. M.C12 suggests that 
the proportion of non-citizen denizens taken one decade prior to the survey has 
similar predictive power to the contemporaneous measure. 
  The models support hypothesis H20. Other things being equal, the higher 
the rate of change of the immigrant population, the higher the  . M.C12 and M.C13 
both find that the coefficient for rate of change is highly statistically significant. The 
two models which include rate of change outperform the model which only includes 
the current immigrant population (Adjusted R2 0.133 vs. 0.122). Substantively, the 
rate of change estimates imply that if there are two otherwise neutral people, one in 
a country with mean rate of change of the immigrant population and the other in a 
country with one standard deviation above average rate of change, then the latter 
will be expected to be 6.5% more opposed to immigration. There is an expected 
30.4% gap between otherwise neutral people in the country experiencing the 
highest rate of change of the immigrant population vis-à-vis those in the country 
with the lowest. 
Contrary to H20, the interaction between rate of change and prior levels of 
immigration is not statistically significant. The complete pooling models suggest 
that (of the variables introduced in this section) the rate of change is the most 
important predictor of   . The size of the immigrant stock – whether measured at 
the time of the survey or ten years prior – also predicts  . 
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 Opposition to Immigration 
 
M.P2 M.P3 M.P13 
 
European 
Coefficient ( ̂) 
National 
Importance 
(NI) 
  
 ̂ NI 
  
 ̂ NI 
(Intercept) -0.014 (0.421) 1.535 -0.015 (0.424) 1.517 -0.014 (0.425) 1.533 
Exclusionism 0.078 (0.012) 0.2 0.079 (0.013) 0.2 0.079 (0.022) 0.2 
Authoritarianism 0.199 (0) 0.418 0.198 (0) 0.418 0.199 (0) 0.419 
Rightist 0.096 (0.006) 0.347 0.096 (0.007) 0.347 0.096 (0.01) 0.347 
Education -0.12 (0.001) 0.242 -0.119 (0.001) 0.243 -0.12 (0.002) 0.244 
Migrant -0.533 (0) 0.834 -0.533 (0) 0.836 -0.532 (0) 0.845 
Christian 0.132 (0.01) 0.738 0.133 (0.012) 0.759 0.132 (0.015) 0.781 
Muslim -0.352 (0) 0.755 -0.354 (0) 0.762 -0.357 (0) 0.77 
No Religion 0.092 (0.045) 0.598 0.092 (0.049) 0.609 0.091 (0.055) 0.621 
Female -0.062 (0) 
 
-0.062 (0) 
 
-0.062 (0) 
 Age 0.04 (0) 
 
0.04 (0) 
 
0.04 (0) 
 PI -0.058 (0.049) 0.241 -0.058 (0.054) 0.241 -0.059 (0.06) 0.241 
       Macro Coefficients     ̂  NI   ̂  NI  
Imm Pop 2008 
  
0.037 (0.419) 0.15 
   IP 
    
0.001 (0.495) 0.013 
IP 1998 
    
-0.001 (0.496) 0.112 
IP 1998 x  IP  
    
0 (0.497) 0.024 
       Measures of Fit           
 ̂  0.721 (0.711, 0.731) 0.721 (0.711, 0.731) 0.721 (0.711, 0.731) 
DIC 
                
101,598.467  
 
                
101,597.881  
 
                
101,597.906  
 Pseudo-R2 0.283 
 
0.283 
 
0.283 
 Macro-
Collinearity 0.081 
 
0.065 
 
0.042 
 
       N             
Observations 
                          
40,465  
 
                          
40,465  
 
                          
40,465  
 Countries 27 
 
27 
 
27 
 Parameters 329 
 
366 
 
443 
 
MCMC 
                          
10,016  
 
                            
9,987  
 
                          
14,869  
  
Table 7.2: Demographic Hierarchical Model Estimates  
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The demographic partial pooling models have nearly identical absolute fit (as 
measured by pseudo-R2) and very similar relative fit (as measured by DIC). 
Deviance Information Criteria (DIC) is an analogue of Aikaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) that is used to evaluate multilevel 
models. Like AIC and BIC, DIC measures parsimony (in that it penalizes for 
superfluous parameters). AIC and BIC are inappropriate for multilevel models, 
however, since they are overly-sensitive to the amount of pooling (Gelman and Hill 
2009, 525-7).  
Unsurprisingly the inclusion of macro level variables in the partial pooling 
has no effect on the sign of the national coefficients. Except where noted, the 
inclusion of macro level variables has no effect on the magnitude of the estimates or 
their level of certainty either. The stability of the estimates holds not only for the 
models presented above but for all of the complete and partial pooling models 
presented in this chapter. The stability of the signs and magnitudes is reassuring 
since is suggests that the individual level estimates are robust to both minor 
variations in model specification and method of estimation. 
The extent to which macro variables explain the national baselines can be 
seen in two ways: the correlation coefficient and, perhaps also, the variance of the 
intercept. A macro variable might not seemingly improve fit much because it is 
offering a substantive explanation for variation that was previously explained by the 
intercept. Holding fit constant, the more that is explained by the macro variables, 
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the less should be explained by the intercepts, and so the smaller the gap between 
     and      should be for the intercepts (since the distribution of   constrains it 
to mean zero).  
Consistent with expectations, including the size of the immigrant population 
does not explain    once the micro parameter migrant background is allowed to 
vary by country. In line with H23, neither the 1998 immigrant population, the rate 
of change, nor their interaction increases the national intercepts of   . 
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PUBLIC SAFETY 
 
 
 
Opposition to Immigration 
 
M.C4 (OLS) M.C4 (GLS) M.C5 
(Intercept) -0.065 (< 0.001) -0.025 (0.143) -0.056 (< 0.001) 
Exclusionism 0.086 (< 0.001) 0.085 (< 0.001) 0.09 (< 0.001) 
Authoritarianism 0.132 (< 0.001) 0.127 (< 0.001) 0.129 (< 0.001) 
Rightist 0.098 (< 0.001) 0.098 (< 0.001) 0.099 (< 0.001) 
Education -0.161 (< 0.001) -0.159 (< 0.001) -0.157 (< 0.001) 
Migrant Background -0.748 (< 0.001) -0.742 (< 0.001) -0.74 (< 0.001) 
Christian 0.049 (< 0.001) 0.068 (< 0.001) 0.063 (< 0.001) 
Muslim -0.388 (< 0.001) -0.371 (< 0.001) -0.383 (< 0.001) 
No Religion 0.014 (0.382) 0.037 (0.017) 0.027 (0.067) 
Female -0.058 (< 0.001) -0.059 (< 0.001) -0.059 (< 0.001) 
Age 0.045 (< 0.001) 0.047 (< 0.001) 0.045 (< 0.001) 
Political Interest -0.069 (< 0.001) -0.068 (< 0.001) -0.064 (< 0.001) 
Immigrant Population 1.122 (< 0.001) 1.136 (< 0.001) 
 
Crime Rate 0.876 (< 0.001) -0.282 (0.062) 
 
Conflict Fatalities 
 
 0.001 (< 0.001) 
  
 
 
N 40,465 40,465 40,465 
Residual Standard Error 0.937 0.937 0.936 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.122* 0.124 
 
P-values from classical two-sided t-tests in parentheses. *Pseudo-R2. 
Table 7.3: Public Safety Complete Pooling Model Estimates. 
 
 The estimates provide mixed, ultimately unsupportive, evidence in favor of 
H12. The OLS estimates suggest that, other things being equal, higher crime rates 
are associated with higher levels of   . However, this finding is not corroborated by 
the GLS estimates that are consistent since they have Robust Standard Errors (the 
sign flips but is not quite significant in the negative direction).   
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The model estimates do support H13: other things being equal, more 
numerous conflict fatalities are associated with higher levels of   . The finding is 
highly statistically significant (p  < 0.001). A person in a country that experienced 
the average number of conflict fatalities (for countries that experienced any) would 
only be 1% more opposed to immigration. Conflict fatalities explains slightly more 
variance than the baseline complete pooling model (Adjusted   .  
  0.124 vs. 
Adjusted   .  
  = 0.122). 
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Table 7.4: Public Safety Partial Pooling Model Estimates 
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 The two security models have nearly identical absolute fit (as measured by 
pseudo-R2) and very similar relative fit (as measured by DIC).  
There is weak evidence against H26: there is an 83% posterior probability 
that    is higher in countries to the extent that they experience conflict fatalities. 
This is also evidence that conflict fatalities affect the population homogeneously 
(though this does not rule out the possibility that they also have a polarizing effect).  
By contrast, H26 is supported regarding the crime rate: as correlation 
between crime rates and the macro coefficients is very near zero. The gap between 
the largest and smallest intercept is no different for the crime model (M.C4) than for 
the reduced model (M.C3). For the conflict model (M.C5), the importance of the 
intercepts falls from 1.54 to 1.09.  
The correlation coefficient for conflict fatalities is faint at 0.08. The 
importance of 0.18 implies that two otherwise neutral respondents, one living in the 
country where the effect is estimated to maximal and the other minimal, would be 
about 7.1% for the first conflict fatality.  
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CULTURE 
 
 
Opposition to Immigration 
 
M.C6 M.C7 M.C8A M.C8B M.C9 
(Intercept) -0.228*** -0.2*** -0.031 (0.034) -0.041 (0.006) -0.094*** 
Exclusionism 0.08*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 
Authoritarianism 0.139*** 0.149*** 0.118*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 
Rightism 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.1*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 
Education -0.159*** -0.154*** -0.168*** -0.159*** -0.164*** 
Migrant Background -0.679*** -0.672*** -0.596*** -0.74*** -0.749*** 
Christian 0.201*** 0.196*** 0.079*** 0.072*** 0.053*** 
Muslim -0.423*** -0.316*** -0.425*** -0.371*** -0.41*** 
No Religion 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.046 (0.002) 0.038 (0.01) -0.013 (0.378) 
Female -0.058*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 
Age 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.04*** 
Political Interest -0.074*** -0.07*** -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.07*** 
Immigrant Population 0.989*** 0.776*** 
 
1.14*** 1.201*** 
Muslim Population 0.027*** 
    Muslim Growth 
 
0.041*** 
   Linguistic Diversity 
  
0.214*** -0.006 (0.828) 
 Immigrant Languages 
    
0.006*** 
      N 40,465 40,465 40,465 40,465 40,465 
RSE 0.931 0.927 0.941 0.937 0.937 
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.14 0.116 0.122 0.122 
 
P-values from classical two-sided t-tests in parentheses (in the interests of space, p-
values of less than 0.001 are noted “***”). 
 
Table 7.5: Cultural Complete Pooling Model Estimates 
 
 Each of the macro cultural variables has a highly statistically significant 
coefficient sloping in the hypothesized direction (in support of H14, H15, H16, and 
H17), with the qualification (of H17) that Linguistic Diversity is only statistically 
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significant when Immigrant Population is not included (that qualification holds too 
if Robust Standard Errors are used).  
Interestingly, the effect of the number of immigrant languages is statistically 
significant whether or not the size of the immigrant population is included. By these 
estimates, the substantive impact of the number of immigrant languages is usually 
small. Two otherwise neutral respondents, one in a country where there are no 
immigrant languages and the other in typical country (at the sample mean of 12 
immigrant languages) would differ in their evaluation by only 2.9%. However, if the 
former person were compared to an otherwise neutral person from the UK, the 
latter would be 10.4% more opposed to immigration. Taken together, the macro 
linguistic variables suggest that there is general concern about cultural 
Balkanization over and above concern about the number of immigrants. The UK, 
which is high on number of immigrant languages but low on linguistic diversity, is 
exemplary in this regard.  
Both variables operationalizing the Muslim population explain more variance 
than either macro security variable. With an Adjusted R2 of 0.14 for its model, 
Muslim population growth explains more variance (in the CP models) than any 
other macro variable discussed this chapter (including the macroeconomic 
variables to be discussed below). The findings suggest that an otherwise neutral 
person in a country that experienced mean Muslim population growth (+2.13%) 
would be 3.5% more opposed to immigration than a neutral person in a country that 
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experienced no such growth. At the high end, an otherwise neutral person in Cyprus 
is predicted to be 32.4% more opposed to immigration than the neutral person in 
the country that experienced no change in its Muslim population. 
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Table 7.6: Cultural Hierarchical Model Estimates 
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 There is no evidence that the linguistic variables affect the national baseline 
levels of   : in both cases, the correlation coefficient is indistinguishable from zero 
(in line with H27). The implications of the cultural polarization hypothesis (H27) 
are also supported by the two Muslim population variables. There is very faint 
evidence, however, that    is higher in countries in countries that have experienced 
growth in the population: there is a 69% posterior probability that Muslim growth 
is positively correlated with higher national baselines. In Greece, the country 
estimated to be the most sensitive to Muslim growth, the first percentage increase in 
the Muslim population is associated with an 8.4% increase in   . According to the 
estimates, (in descending order) Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
Austria have the next most intense reactions. 
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MACROECONOMICS 
 
 
Opposition to Immigration 
 
M.C10 M.C11 
(Intercept) 0.117 (< 0.001) 0.071 (< 0.001) 
Exclusionism 0.086 (< 0.001) 0.091 (< 0.001) 
Authoritarianism 0.129 (< 0.001) 0.137 (< 0.001) 
Rightism 0.095 (< 0.001) 0.1 (< 0.001) 
Education -0.162 (< 0.001) -0.144 (< 0.001) 
Migrant Background -0.739 (< 0.001) -0.719 (< 0.001) 
Christian 0.079 (< 0.001) 0.076 (< 0.001) 
Muslim -0.376 (< 0.001) -0.352 (< 0.001) 
No Religion 0.04 (0.008) 0.035 (0.024) 
Female -0.059 (< 0.001) -0.057 (< 0.001) 
Age 0.045 (< 0.001) 0.047 (< 0.001) 
Political Interest -0.07 (< 0.001) -0.062 (< 0.001) 
Immigrant Population 1.078 (< 0.001) 0.92 (< 0.001) 
Unemployment Rate -2.509 (< 0.001) 
 Unemployment Trend 
 
0.159 (< 0.001) 
GDP 
 
-0.025 (0.002) 
   N 40,465 40,465 
RSE 0.936 0.931 
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.134 
   
Table 7.7: Macroeconomic Complete Pooling Model Estimates 
 
 Contrary to expectations, according to M.C10, higher unemployment rates 
are associated with lower rates of   . The CP model suggests that the first point of 
unemployment would push an otherwise neutral person 9.9% in favor of 
immigration. However, if unemployment were increased one point in a country with 
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the mean level of unemployment an otherwise neutral person would only be 
expected to decrease their   by roughly one percent (0.987%).  
 The second macroeconomic complete pooling model (M.C11) explains the 
second most variance of the CP models and supports H17 but not H18. Other things 
being equal, people have higher levels of    to the extent that unemployment is 
rising. This suggests that if an otherwise neutral person were in a country with the 
mean rate of change of unemployment and the rate suddenly jumped a percentage 
point per year (which, in this case would flip the sign of the unemployment trend), 
she would be 6.3% more opposed to immigration. Other things being equal,    is 
lower to the extent that the countries respondents live are wealthy.  
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Table 7.8: Macroeconomic Hierarchical Model Estimates 
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 Interestingly, there is no evidence that either unemployment or 
unemployment trend affects the baseline national    (supporting H24). GDP does 
not explain national baselines in statistically significant fashion either (supporting 
H25). There is, however, as with the OLS estimates of the complete pooling model, 
the partial pooling model provides noisy evidence that GDP does not work as 
hypothesized: there is a 78% posterior probability that higher GDPs are correlated 
with lower oppositions. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Is    a reaction to the number of immigrants? Yes, but not a simple reflex. 
The complete pooling models show that as the proportion of denizens who are not 
citizens increases,    increases. The linear combination of the immigrant population 
a decade prior to the survey and the immigrant population’s rate of growth explain 
more of    than the contemporaneous measure. The analysis does not support the 
hypothesis that the effect of rapid growth is tempered in places where there were 
already large numbers of immigrants. However, as noted in Chapter 4, this may be 
more a limitation of the data than the theory: the general shift of immigration away 
from northwest Europe and towards the Mediterranean left few countries that 
experienced the combination of the variables. The rate of change of the immigrant 
population explains more variance the majority of macro variables investigated in 
this chapter. 
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 Of all of the macro variables investigated in this chapter, growth in the 
Muslim population between 1990 and 2010 stands out as the strongest predictor of 
  . Though public safety concerns – whether conceived in terms of crime or conflict 
– predict    in statistically significant fashion, neither explains more variance than 
change in the Muslim population. Nor does change in the unemployment rate. Other 
metrics of cultural change – the number of immigrant languages and the linguistic 
diversity index – also predict   . Unlike the Muslim population (and its rate of 
growth), these alternative cultural metrics do not explain appreciable amounts of 
variation above and beyond that which is explained by the size of the immigrant 
population itself. 
 The (non) findings of the partial pooling model are consistent with 
expectations about    . That is, macro variables which statistically (and, in some 
cases, also substantively) significant predictors in the complete pooling models do 
not explain why the intercepts are higher in some countries than in others in a way 
that is clearly different from chance. Conflict fatalities come the closest, however, 
suggesting perhaps that there is something of a “rally around the flag” effect (that is, 
of conflict fatalities, against immigration).  
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Chapter 8: Concerns, Motivation, Context 
 
 This chapter presents estimates of the interaction between an individual’s 
concerns, level of motivation (political interest), and national context.  
M.C12 is the model that allows for interaction between concerns, motivation, 
and context. Figure 8.1 presents the general form of the structural portion of the 
complete pooling model, M.C12 (for full model specification, see Chapter 3).  
 
    (                  )  (          )  (                )   
           +         
        
Figure 8.1: M.C12 (General Form) 
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Table 8.1: M.C12 Estimates   
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Table 8.1 presents Bayesian MCMC estimates of the Gaussian linear model 
M.C12. Neither fit nor point estimates differ noticeably from least squares estimates 
(either OLS or robust standard errors). I opt for MCMC simply because it enables 
convenient computation of the uncertainty intervals for the scenarios discussed 
below. Estimation details are similar to those presented in Chapter 5. 
I make operationalization changes that are minor but nonetheless worth 
noting. I use the z-score of the logit transformation of the immigrant population 
(IP); I apply the same transformations to migrant background (MB). Using 
   (
  
    
) and    (
  
    
) sharpens the precision of interaction term’s estimates 
slightly.35 The transformation to a z-score has no effect on the estimates but 
simplifies computation of the effects considerably.36 The latter also facilitate 
interpretation of the double interaction’s coefficient. For example, (       )’s 
coefficient is 0.015. If all three   variables are 1 (or take some combination of values 
that multiplies to 1), then the influence of that coefficient on the final opinion is just 
0.015. 
 
  
                                                 
35 The added precision likely stems from the fact that    (
  
    
) is symmetrical and has an unbounded 
support as do most of the other explanatory variables do. 
36 When there are interaction terms, computing the effect of any given variable involves holding the other 
explanatory variables at their means; since holding  (   (
  
    
)) at its mean value is holding it at 0, many 
terms drop out. 
 156 
M.C12 FIT 
 
For the sample as a whole, M.C12 fits better than any of the other complete 
pooling models (Pseudo-  .   
  = 0.184) but not as well as the partial pooling M.P1 
(Pseudo-  .  
  = 0.292).  
In many member states, M.C12 fits nearly (but never quite) as well as M.P1. 
M.C12’s fit is impressive considering it does not contain any geographic variables of 
ignorance (Figure 8.2). M.C12’s fit follows a highly similar pattern to M.P1: 
 ̂(Pseudo-  .   , 
 , Pseudo-  .  , 
 ) = 0.983. In the Central European countries 
where M.P1 fits poorly, M.C12 doesn’t fit at all (e.g., Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia).  
 
Figure 8.2: M.C12 and M.P1 Fit Compared 
 M.C12 predicts     (0.396) but not nearly as well as M.P1 (0.855).  
The estimates of the (European) effects are quite similar to those of the 
complete pooling models. The similarity can be seen from the point estimates of the 
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coefficients themselves for the x variables that are z-scores. When interpreting the 
categorical variables, note that the M.C12 intercept is estimated to be positive 
(unlike the other complete pooling estimates). Though Christian’s coefficient is now 
slightly negative, it has the same ordinal relation with the other religious variables 
as it does in the results presented in previous chapters (and, as Figure 8.8 shows, 
the same basic pattern of Muslims being less opposed to immigration than 
Christians holds). 
CONDITIONAL EUROPEAN DYNAMICS: CONCERNS, MOTIVATION, CONTEXT 
  
 The interactions are best interpreted graphically. For each explanatory 
variable, I compute maximal differences for four scenarios that compare and 
contrast different levels of motivation in their national contexts.  
The scenarios are combinations of high and low political interest and high 
and low immigrant population. Scenario 1 (which appears on the left of the figures 
below) plots the maximal difference for someone with low political interest (PI) in a 
low-immigration (IP) country. Scenario 2 (inner left) plots the maximal difference 
for someone with high PI in a low-IP country. Scenario 3 (inner right) plots the 
maximal difference for someone with low PI in a high-IP country. Scenario 4 (far 
right) plots the maximal difference for someone with high PI in a high-IP country.  
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The dotted line—which I refer to as the “baseline”—represents the maximal 
difference when PI and IP are held at their means of 0. Notice most baselines are 
highly consistent with estimates obtained from M.P1. (See Chapter 5.)   
As before, by maximal difference I mean the predicted difference between 
two individuals, one individual that is two standard deviations above and the other 
two standard deviations below average on the explanatory variable of interest (e.g., 
 2 ̂   for exclusionism.) High for motivation is defined as 2 ̂  ; low as  2 ̂  . For 
the contextual variable, high is 2 ̂   and low is  2 ̂  ; those values happen to 
correspond approximately to Luxembourg and Poland. 
   
Exclusionism   
 
Figure 8.3: Conditional Maximal Differences of Exclusionism 
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 Exclusionism is predicted to increase    for all four scenarios. The extent to 
which it does is predicted to vary considerably depending on motivation and 
context. In Scenario 1, exclusionists are only predicted to be 5% more opposed to 
immigration (than inclusionists in those circumstances). In Scenario 4, the 
difference jumps to 17%. Scenarios 2 and 3 both differ from the baseline but not in a 
way that is clearly different from chance. The findings suggest that both the 
immigrant population and an individual’s political interest are important 
conditioners of exclusionism.    
Authoritarianism 
 
Figure 8.4: Conditional Maximal Differences of Authoritarianism 
 Authoritarians have higher    than democrats in all four scenarios. The 
pattern differs from that of exclusionism however: the immigrant population does 
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not have a conditioning role. Only political interest does. With low PI, the maximally 
authoritarian have maximal differences of about 13%. With high PI, authoritarians 
have maximal differences of roughly 35%. All four scenarios (and their credible 
intervals) clearly differ from the baseline. This intersection may yield insight as to 
why there are often small, but vocal, authoritarian anti-immigrant groups in 
countries with low immigration. 
Rightism 
 
Figure 8.5: Conditional Maximal Differences of Rightism 
 Rightism follows a pattern similar to exclusionism but more pronounced. In 
Scenario 1, the maximal difference does not differ from chance. At the other end, in 
Scenario 4, there is a maximal difference of about 30%. Both those scenarios clearly 
differ from the baseline. Scenarios 2 and 3 do not. Rightism’s effect is jointly 
 161 
conditioned by IP and PI and both conditioning variables have roughly equal 
importance. 
Migrant Background 
 
Figure 8.6: Conditional Maximal Differences of Migrant Background 
 Migrant background’s scenarios show a different pattern altogether. The 
baseline is clearly negative: immigrants have 20% lower    than those at the native 
end. Surprisingly, in Scenario 2 the maximal difference is positive: highly politically 
interested migrants in low immigration countries are more opposed to immigration 
than their native counterparts. In Scenario 1, the maximal difference’s credible 
interval intersects zero. Immigrants in high IP countries have markedly lower   . 
Comparing Scenarios 1 and 2 and Scenarios 3 and 4, PI’s conditioning role is to 
make immigrants more skeptical of immigration or natives less skeptical (or some 
combination thereof). Put differently, migrants and natives converge on the 
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immigration question to the extent that they are interested in politics. This 
countervailing effect is not strong enough to overcome gaps between migrants and 
natives in high IP countries but perhaps could in countries with mid-range IP.  
 
Education 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Conditional Maximal Differences of Education 
 The pattern for education’s scenarios are like those of authoritarianism in 
reverse: the highly educated have lower    than those with low levels of education 
in all four scenarios and what differences there are around the baseline depend 
almost entirely on PI.   
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Religion 
 
Figure 8.8: Conditional Gaps between Christians and Muslims 
 Interestingly, the gaps between Christians and Muslims parallel exclusionism 
and rightism but not migrant background. In Scenario 1, Christians and Muslims do 
not have a difference of opinion. Scenarios 2 and 3 yield similar predictions: both 
are slightly lower than the notably high baseline (which is estimated to be near 
60%). The gap between Christians and Muslims who have high IP and high PI is 
predicted to be a troubling 75%.  
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Gender-
 
Figure 8.9: Conditional Maximal Differences of Gender 
 There is no gender gap regarding    among people with low PI. Among 
people with high PI, women have 12% lower   . That difference clearly differs from 
zero but not from the baseline. What gender differences there are do not depend on 
IP. 
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Age 
 
Figure 8.10: Conditional Maximal Differences of Age 
 
Moving from Scenario 1 to 4, the maximal differences associated with age 
follow an upward trajectory. Young Europeans with low PI have higher    than old 
Europeans in low IP countries.37 Scenarios 2 and 3 yield predictions slightly above 
the (positive) baseline. In Scenario 4, the maximal difference is 30%.  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
37 “Old” refers to 2 ̂    (about 85) and “young” to -2 ̂    (near 16, the minimum age of those 
surveyed).  
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DISCUSSION 
 
 M.C12 estimates stark gaps between Christians and Muslims if either the 
respondent’s political interest is high or if the respondent lives in a high 
immigration country. If both those conditions are met, attitudes are night and day, 
with Christians predicted to be almost completely in favor of immigration and 
Muslims almost completely against. 
Analyzing the intersection of context and motivation reveals two patterns of 
interaction between motivation, context, and concerns. The magnitudes of the effect 
of all individual concerns investigated here depend on PI and most depend on IP, 
too. Interestingly, no effect is conditioned solely by IP. 
The first pattern, like that observed between Christians and Muslims, is that 
IP and PI are jointly necessary and sufficient to increase the magnitude of the effect. 
The magnitude of the gap in    increases more or less monotonically to the extent 
that both conditioning variables are present. When both IP and PI are low, the 
magnitude of the gap is well below the baseline (maximal difference using the 
European effect). When both IP and PI are high, the magnitude of the gap is well 
above the baseline. Put differently, both IP and PI reinforce the effects of individual 
concerns and thereby exacerbate differences of opinion. This pattern holds for 
exclusionism, rightism, and age too. 
  The second pattern that emerges suggests that, for some individual 
concerns, PI is necessary and sufficient to increase the magnitude of the effect t of 
 167 
the concern, but IP is not relevant. Authoritarianism, education, and female follow 
this pattern.  
Migrant background does not fit either pattern (but follows one closer to the 
first). The effect of migrant background depends on both IP and PI. IP reinforces 
differences between migrants and natives, but PI mitigates them. IP’s centrifugal 
effect is stronger than the PI’s homogenizing one but for countries with mid-range 
immigrant populations politically interested migrants and natives may see eye-to-
eye. 
 The interaction of motivation (political interest), national context 
(immigrant population), and individual concerns (both ideational and 
sociodemographic) captures a large portion of what the partial pooling approach 
does (even without any pooling). M.C12 fits much better in EU-15 member states 
than in the new ones. M.C12 performs comparably to M.P1 in EU-15 but notably 
worse than M.P1 in the new member states. One might be tempted to infer that M.P1 
is simply overfitting to idiosyncrasies in the new member states. That may be true to 
some extent, but recall that M.P1 explains exactly as much a no pooling approach 
does structurally. To take an example where the sign of a national effect differs from 
that of the European effect, M.C12 performs notably worse in Malta, a country 
where M.P1 associates   with leftism.  
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Conclusion 
Exclusionism increases opposition to immigration. The finding that 
exclusionism increases opposition to immigration in the European Union is robust 
across a number of model specifications and methods of estimation. Chapter 5 
shows that this finding does not hold in all member states. In fact, Chapter 5 
suggests that no single individual concern increases opposition to immigration in all 
member states. Chapter 6 suggests that there are a number of relationships between 
national developments, the intensity of the effects of denizens’ concerns, and, 
ultimately, attitudinal polarization. Chapter 7 shows that many national 
developments increase opposition to immigration. Taken together, working from 
very different models, Chapters 6 and 7 show that most national developments do 
not have homogenous effects on denizens. Chapter 8 makes sense of this 
heterogeneity without relying on country as a variable of ignorance. Denizens’ 
concerns are moderated by both national developments and their (denizens’) level 
of political interest. In high-immigration countries, those with high levels of political 
interest have dramatic differences opinion about immigration along the lines of 
exclusionism, rightism, age, and religion.  
Viewing individual variables as conditioned by context and motivation 
changes their interpretation. Religion is not simply an ascriptive feature but a 
dynamic one. Immigration is not simply a point of contention for those on the right 
and those on the left, but an issue that becomes divisive. The higher the immigration 
level, the more clearly rightism parallels exclusionism and religious differences. Age 
(which the partial pooling model predicts to have opposite signs in some countries 
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and no clear European effect) is better interpreted as a generational gap. Stark 
differences along these lines do not translate into extreme levels of polarization.  
 One of the major challenges in cross-national research is deciding how 
sensitive to be to context. Rush to generalize, and findings are not parsimonious but 
simply wrong. Get too focused on local details and it becomes easy to reify 
idiosyncrasy when in fact there are trends to be discovered beneath the surface 
(Wallerstein 2000).  
Though still very much a work in progress, this dissertation has sketched out 
a strategy for letting context clarify the political concerns of individuals. Even in 
countries which, in the grand scheme of things, are quite similar in terms of their 
pasts, presents, and near futures, there are often considerably different political 
dynamics at work. Hierarchical models can capture a tremendous amount of that 
richness. Relying on country as a variable of ignorance is, however, never ideal and 
particularly pernicious in the context of denizen politics. The nation is not an 
explanation; its meaning is under investigation. Attention to functional form (the 
interaction between concerns, context, and motivation) offers a promising route to 
understanding why individuals believe what they do about politics. Hierarchical 
(and similar contextual) models provide an excellent means to making sure that 
other approaches do not become untethered from nuance. 
This project points to several others.  
I’ve shown that exclusionism is distinct from authoritarianism; this finding 
raises the question: do the two interact to generate support for anti-system parties? 
In the past few weeks, as I’ve finished writing, the French National Front did quite 
well in National Assembly elections, and Eurosceptic parties gained ground in the 
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European Parliament. Clarifying what denizens expect of them is important for 
understanding the future of “Europe without borders.”  
I’ve shown that exclusionism increases opposition to immigration. One 
question that stems from this finding is as to the psychological antecedents of 
exclusionism. Analyzing them would give a better sense of how malleable 
exclusionism is. Another way to get at this question would be to disaggregate 
opposition to immigration into its constituent components and to juxtapose (as a 
dependent variable) the varieties of opposition to immigration along with different 
ideals of citizenship. Language, tradition, belonging, political participation—what is 
truly important about belonging?        
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Appendices 
 This section contains all of the appendices (in order of appearance). 
 
APPENDIX A: BAYESIAN HIERARCHICAL MODELS 
 
The hierarchical models that I estimate assume that parameters are 
conditionally exchangeable. The maximum likelihood paradigm assumes that 
observations are iid: independently and identically distributed. Similarly, the 
Bayesian paradigm usually assumes that parameters are exchangeable in the sense 
that, absent other information (data), the probability assignment is invariant to 
labeling. If this were the case, it would be appropriate to adopt a “complete pooling” 
approach since, for example, the distribution of the effect of migrant background 
would be invariant to the respondent’s country of residence. This assumption is too 
strong: though I investigate some of the most likely suspects, the gap between 
natives and migrants may still depend on any number of unmodeled local 
conditions. Instead, my partial pooling models assume conditional exchangeability: 
conditioned on country, the parameters can be treated as if they are exchangeable. 
In this way “partially pooled” hierarchical models can account for casual 
heterogeneity (Jackman 2009, 45). 
How much multilevel estimates are pooled towards the population mean 
depends on the degree of between-group (here, between-country) covariance 
(Jackman 2009, p. 309; Gelman and Hill 2009, p. 253). To illustrate how, consider a 
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simple hierarchical regression model that has an intercept for each country,   , and 
known, finite variances but no other predictors: 
 ̂ 
             
  
  
  ̅  
1
  
  ̅   
  
  
  
1
  
 
. 
If the number of observations within a country,   , is small or the within-country 
variance,   
 , is high, the partial pooling estimate converges to (what happens to be 
the maximum likelihood estimate of) the overall mean: 
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The further the country intercepts are from one another, that is, the greater the 
between-country variance,   
 , or the larger    is, the closer the estimates will be to 
the within-country mean: 
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   is the number of observations per country. The unit of observation in this 
longitudinal mixed effects regression model is a vector of responses in country  :  
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   is a (1 x    ) vector of (immigration) attitudes. Micro data is stored in    
and macro data in   (and micro coefficients that vary by country are in both).     
is the inner product of a design matrix of observations and a vector of slope 
coefficients.      is the inner product of a country design matrix,   , and an 
associated vector of macro-coefficients for each member state,   .     is the 
corresponding error term, and     MVN(0,  
    ).    is also distributed 
multivariate normal with mean zero (Chib and Carlin 1999).  
 I assume conditional independence (as is standard in Bayesian regression): 
   and    contain no additional information about    beyond what is contained in    
and the parameters,     , for all     (Jackman 2009, 100). This assumption would 
be violated if the hierarchical nature of the data was not modeled. One way to 
illustrate this violation, following Gelman and Hill (2009, 265), is to note that  , the 
variance covariance matrix can be characterized:  
 
   ,   {
  
    
            (                            )       
  
                 (                                )
0          .
 
 
If no macro predictors are included and all slopes are constrained to be the 
same for the entire sample, as is the case in the most basic hierarchical model 
(wherein only intercepts vary),   simplifies to a single variance term,   
 . Otherwise 
  
  is the composite implied by the linear combination of (the normally distributed 
elements of)    and the data,  , which is treated as constant. If   
  0 (no country 
 174 
effect), the structural model simplifies to     with homoscedastic, non-
autocorrelated errors (provided   
  is constant for all observations). 
The longitudinal mixed-effects regression model is a system of equations. In 
this case, the within-country endogeneity is modeled by the set of variance-
covariance restrictions implied by assuming that knowing a respondent’s country of 
residence contains more information than would be otherwise captured by the 
structural equation. This additional covariance of responses may occur for one of 
two reasons: casual heterogeneity or measurement error.  
Suppose in country C older generations are much more opposed to 
immigration than younger generations are because forty years ago mass 
immigration was associated with major social dislocation, but in country D there is 
no generational gap because all immigration is quite recent. Whatever the mean 
(European) effect of age on    for the sample,     , one would expect 
    ,                 ,           . Expressed in terms of the national effects of age, 
one would expect that   
  (      ,  )  (      , )    
  0. 
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APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONS 
This appendix provides the original survey questions and responses 
(European Values Study 2014).  
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 178 
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 180 
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APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF EXCLUSIONISM 
All five response items that form the basis of the exclusionism index are 
positively intercorrelated ( ̅̂  0.608): respondents concerned about one group, 
whether near or far, are more likely to be concerned about all of the others. But the 
purpose of the index is not to capture absolute concern but (relative) priority.  
A principal components analysis reveals that the eigenvector that explains 
the largest amount of variance (43.4%) reflects that general concern for all.38 The 
second eigenvector (which explains 21.5% of the variance) places neighbors and 
region at one end and Europeans and humanity at the other.  
Substituting scores from the second dimension yields highly similar (but 
slightly stronger) regression results than those that I present in the following 
chapters (using the metric defined in Figure 4.1). Because of the potential loss of 
interpretability, I opt not to use the PCA scores. Note that, as with the adopted index, 
the correlation between the second eigenvector and the other belief variables 
(rightism, authoritarian, socialism) remains near zero. 
  
                                                 
38 For a description of PCA, see Johnston (1984). 
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APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRATION 
 
 
Sample 
Mean 
Sample 
Variance 
Austria 0.423 1.252 
Belgium 0.146 0.977 
Bulgaria -0.347 0.796 
Cyprus 0.815 0.566 
Czech 0.140 0.862 
Denmark -0.459 0.829 
Estonia -0.132 0.815 
Finland -0.289 1.086 
France -0.305 1.199 
Germany 0.245 0.904 
Greece 0.414 0.859 
Hungary 0.180 0.735 
Ireland 0.300 0.903 
Italy 0.004 1.009 
Latvia -0.054 0.687 
Lithuania -0.049 0.670 
Luxembourg -0.374 1.001 
Malta 0.899 0.520 
Netherlands -0.141 0.784 
Poland -0.455 0.704 
Portugal -0.133 0.662 
Romania -0.541 0.891 
Slovakia -0.129 0.735 
Slovenia -0.017 0.984 
Spain -0.116 0.808 
Sweden -0.437 1.378 
UK 0.383 1.006 
   
Table 4.3: Sample Means and Variances of OI 
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APPENDIX E: CONVERGENCE 
The greatest danger when using MCMC is that one might draw inferences 
from a chain that has not converged yet on its target (the posterior distribution) 
(Kass, et al. 1998).  
To assess convergence, I took several steps for each model presented here: 
min estimated three chains with (2) different, diffuse starting values; (3) discarded 
at least 100,000 samples as “burn in” (depending on model complexity); (4) 
confirmed that the beginning of the chains is no different than the end of the chains 
using Geweke’s diagnostic; (5) confirmed that residual autocorrelation had not 
reduced the effective sample size; and (6) used Gelman and Rubin’s Convergence 
Diagnostic,  ̂, which analyzes the coincidence of within- and between-chain 
variation in order to confirm convergence.  
The distribution of Geweke’s test statistics should resemble a standard 
normal. The number of effective samples should be at least several thousand per 
chain (Jackman 2009, 251ff).  ̂ should be less than 1.2 for all parameters and 
approaches 1 at convergence (A. Gelman, J. B. Carlin, et al. 2004, 294-8). In the 
subsequent chapters, I confirm that this is the case for all models estimated using 
diagnostic functions—gelman.diag(), geweke.diag() and n.effective()—found in the 
coda package in R (Plummer, et al. 2012). 
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APPENDIX F: M.P1 NATIONAL COEFFICIENT POINT ESTIMATES WITH ONE-SIDED BAYES’ P 
 Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus 
Czech 
Republic Denmark Estonia Finland 
(Intercept) 
0.271 
(0.011) 
0.033 
(0.404) 
-0.310 
(0) 
0.812 
(0) 
0.253 
(0.029) 
-0.28 
(0.03) 
-0.355 
(0) 
-0.096 
(0.236) 
Exclusionism 
0.119 
(0) 
0.04 
(0.048) 
0.064 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.397) 
0.052 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.252) 
0.109 
(0) 
0.190 
(0) 
Socialism 
-0.138 
(0) 
-0.037 
(0.084) 
0.100 
(0) 
0.035 
(0.086) 
0.06 
(0.002) 
-0.011 
(0.34) 
0.013 
(0.288) 
0.035 
(0.119) 
Authoritarianism 
0.192 
(0) 
0.311 
(0) 
0.075 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.476) 
0.161 
(0) 
0.216 
 (0) 
0.111 
(0) 
0.276 
(0) 
Rightism 
0.184 
(0) 
0.181 
(0) 
0.053 
(0.005) 
0.041 
(0.024) 
0.026 
(0.091) 
0.200 
 (0) 
-0.007 
(0.398) 
0.142 
(0) 
Education 
-0.241 
(0) 
-0.137 
(0) 
-0.081 
(0.003) 
-0.091 
(0.002) 
-0.105 
(0.001) 
-0.151 
(0) 
-0.033 
(0.094) 
-0.076 
(0.003) 
Income 
0.053 
(0.034) 
0.034 
(0.141) 
0.081 
(0.022) 
-0.047 
(0.099) 
-0.013 
(0.34) 
-0.006 
(0.422) 
-0.044 
(0.099) 
0.025 
(0.172) 
Migrant 
Background 
-0.896 
(0) 
-0.462 
(0) 
-0.125 
(0.268) 
-0.86 
(0) 
-0.466 
(0) 
-0.19 
(0.058) 
-0.529 
(0) 
-0.532 
(0.014) 
Christian 
0.391 
(0) 
0.207 
(0.058) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.009 
(0.477) 
-0.176 
(0.1) 
0.225 
(0.065) 
0.349 
(0) 
0.185 
(0.077) 
Muslim 
-0.435 
(0.006) 
-0.533 
(0.001) 
0.102 
(0.077) 
-0.606 
(0.003) 
-0.426 
(0.089) 
-0.295 
(0.12) 
-0.354 
(0.119) 
-0.403 
(0.086) 
No Religion 
0.360 
(0.001) 
0.156 
(0.119) 
0.05 
(0.161) 
-0.213 
(0.181) 
-0.039 
(0.387) 
0.148 
(0.165) 
0.324 
(0) 
0.136 
(0.154) 
Female 
-0.023 
(0.299) 
-0.023 
(0.299) 
-0.06 
(0.087) 
0.028 
(0.298) 
-0.08 
(0.021) 
-0.09 
(0.02) 
-0.004 
(0.469) 
-0.191 
(0) 
Age 0.17 (0) 
0.083 
(0) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.109) 
0.065 
(0.002) 
0.155 
 (0) 
0.066 
(0.003) 
-0.046 
(0.069) 
Political Interest 
-0.215 
(0) 
-0.073 
(0.002) 
-0.016 
(0.253) 
-0.039 
(0.071) 
-0.059 
(0.004) 
-0.139 
(0) 
0.058 
(0.014) 
-0.152 
(0) 
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 France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania 
(Intercept) 
-0.229 
(0.042) 
0.149 
(0.131) 
0.528 
(0) 
-0.101 
(0.255) 
0.08 
(0.29) 
-0.056 
(0.359) 
-0.201 
(0.002) 
-0.069 
(0.261) 
Exclusionism 
0.035 
(0.053) 
0.166 
 (0) 
0.05 
(0.013) 
0.092 
 (0) 
0.061 
(0.001) 
0.049 
(0.031) 
0.14 (0) 
0.036 
(0.08) 
Socialism 
-0.057 
(0.009) 
-0.101 
(0) 
0.017 
(0.204) 
0.054 
(0.006) 
-0.06 
(0.017) 
-0.036 
(0.055) 
0.007 
(0.399) 
0.103  
(0) 
Authoritarianism 
0.307 
(0) 
0.285 
 (0) 
0.12 (0) 
0.232 
 (0) 
0.163 
(0) 
0.287 
(0) 
0.195 
(0) 
0.025 
(0.172) 
Rightism 0.25 (0) 
0.181 
 (0) 
0.044 
(0.02) 
0.017 
(0.225) 
0.118 
(0) 
0.218 
(0) 
0.039 
(0.061) 
-0.004 
(0.42) 
Education 
-0.158 
(0) 
-0.187 
(0) 
-0.151 
(0) 
-0.199 
(0) 
-0.157 
(0) 
-0.157 
(0) 
0.004 
(0.432) 
-0.024 
(0.152) 
Income 
-0.063 
(0.017) 
0.018 
(0.246) 
0.01 
(0.374) 
0.01 
(0.401) 
-0.052 
(0.045) 
-0.029 
(0.15) 
-0.048 
(0.101) 
-0.048 
(0.106) 
Migrant 
Background 
-0.471 
(0) 
-0.725 
(0) 
-0.806 
(0) 
-0.629 
(0.001) 
-0.675 
(0) 
-0.528 
(0.007) 
-0.288 
(0) 
-0.168 
(0.115) 
Christian 
0.222 
(0.047) 
0.326 
(0.007) 
-0.272 
(0.085) 
0.237 
(0.052) 
0.246 
(0.049) 
0.24 
(0.058) 
0.176 
(0.001) 
0.063 
(0.265) 
Muslim 
-0.389 
(0.01) 
-0.099 
(0.296) 
-0.586 
(0) 
-0.315 
(0.158) 
-0.302 
(0.143) 
-0.424 
(0.078) 
-0.319 
(0.157) 
-0.34 
(0.144) 
No Religion 
0.105 
(0.217) 
0.399 
(0.001) 
-0.171 
(0.07) 
0.235 
(0.056) 
0.121 
(0.217) 
0.015 
(0.467) 
0.135 
(0.014) 
0.08 
(0.234) 
Female 
-0.103 
(0.008) 
-0.074 
(0.026) 
-0.014 
(0.367) 
-0.065 
(0.066) 
0.006 
(0.46) 
-0.028 
(0.262) 
-0.113 
(0.005) 
-0.137 
(0.001) 
Age 
0.07 
(0.003) 
0.102 
 (0) 
0.112 
(0) 
0.032 
(0.092) 
0.01 
(0.379) 
-0.056 
(0.012) 
0.069 
(0.002) 
0.034 
(0.095) 
Political Interest 
-0.126 
(0) 
-0.118 
(0) 
-0.085 
(0) 
-0.001 
(0.48) 
-0.087 
(0.001) 
-0.127 
(0) 
-0.038 
(0.077) 
0.003 
(0.456) 
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 Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia 
(Intercept) 
0.284 
(0.011) 
0.452 
(0.013) 
-0.037 
(0.36) 
-0.51 
(0) 
-0.39 
(0.001) 
-0.587 
(0) 
-0.08 
(0.29) 
Exclusionism 
0.049 
(0.016) 
0.09 (0) 
0.081 
(0.001) 
0.064 
(0.006) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.084  
(0) 
-0.01 
(0.363) 
Socialism 
0.001 
(0.48) 
-0.015 
(0.245) 
-0.026 
(0.168) 
0.042 
(0.028) 
-0.036 
(0.076) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.024 
(0.165) 
Authoritarianism 
0.192  
(0) 
0.086 
(0) 
0.274  
(0) 
0.257 
(0) 
0.169  
(0) 
0.142  
(0) 
0.187 
(0) 
Rightism 
0.116  
(0) 
-0.079 
(0) 
0.205  
(0) 
0.031 
(0.082) 
0.045 
(0.029) 
0.006 
(0.402) 
0.005 
(0.41) 
Education 
-0.118  
(0) 
-0.131 
(0) 
-0.156  
(0) 
-0.054 
(0.03) 
-0.092 
(0) 
-0.135 
(0) 
-0.143 
(0) 
Income 
-0.025 
(0.16) 
0 
(0.495) 
-0.058 
(0.018) 
0.164 
(0) 
0.019 
(0.228) 
0.073 
(0.005) 
0.068 
(0.029) 
Migrant 
Background 
-0.676  
(0) 
-0.365 
(0.006) 
-0.316 
(0.005) 
-0.356 
(0.057) 
-0.763 
(0) 
-0.292 
(0.139) 
-0.163 
(0.144) 
Christian 
-0.238 
(0.018) 
0.46 
(0.009) 
0.01  
(0.456) 
0.038 
(0.382) 
0.084 
(0.232) 
0.212 
(0.004) 
-0.043 
(0.39) 
Muslim 
-0.395 
(0.006) 
-0.17 
(0.286) 
-0.661 
(0.002) 
-0.397 
(0.105) 
-0.179 
(0.255) 
-0.339 
(0.14) 
-0.367 
(0.127) 
No Religion 
-0.188 
(0.055) 
-0.001 
(0.504) 
0.014 
(0.445) 
0.01 
(0.473) 
0.286 
(0.01) 
0.285 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.482) 
Female 
-0.03 
(0.236) 
-0.064 
(0.077) 
-0.09  
(0.02) 
-0.017 
(0.353) 
0.005 
(0.451) 
-0.093 
(0.015) 
-0.033 
(0.225) 
Age 
-0.011 
(0.316) 
-0.068 
(0.004) 
0.013  
(0.3) 
0.037 
(0.078) 
-0.027 
(0.14) 
-0.049 
(0.022) 
0.085 
(0.001) 
Political Interest 
-0.047 
(0.024) 
-0.024 
(0.141) 
-0.033 
(0.091) 
0.003 
(0.455) 
-0.09  
(0) 
0.015 
(0.271) 
0.054 
(0.019) 
 
  
 187 
 Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
(Intercept) -0.209 (0.042) 0.068 (0.138) -0.057 (0.314) 0.268 (0) 
Exclusionism 0.095 (0) 0.102 (0) 0.16 (0) 0.108 (0) 
Socialism 0.082 (0.001) -0.029 (0.13) -0.02 (0.225) -0.122 (0) 
Authoritarianism 0.274 (0) 0.138 (0) 0.43 (0) 0.188 (0) 
Rightism 0.065 (0.005) 0.152 (0) 0.128 (0) 0.143 (0) 
Education -0.125 (0) -0.1 (0) -0.148 (0) -0.164 (0) 
Income -0.039 (0.11) 0.026 (0.133) 0.009 (0.398) -0.003 (0.44) 
Migrant Background -0.861 (0) -0.749 (0) -0.61 (0) -0.764 (0) 
Christian 0.301 (0.005) -0.039 (0.26) 0.137 (0.127) 0.142 (0.034) 
Muslim -0.193 (0.151) -0.542 (0.001) -0.244 (0.155) -0.322 (0.015) 
No Religion 0.161 (0.087) -0.131 (0.031) 0.087 (0.232) 0.186 (0.01) 
Female -0.169 (0) -0.016 (0.359) -0.191 (0) -0.044 (0.125) 
Age -0.055 (0.014) -0.018 (0.235) 0.032 (0.143) 0.079 (0) 
Political Interest 0.007 (0.41) -0.039 (0.048) -0.127 (0) -0.057 (0.001) 
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APPENDIX G: QUANTITIES OF INTEREST 
This appendix provides operational definitions for statistics used to assess 
the estimates of the partial pooling models—national importance, first percentile 
differences, maximal differences, and credible intervals. 
National Importance 
As a measure of the importance of allowing each European coefficient to vary 
nationally, Table 5.3 reports the difference between the largest and the smallest 
coefficient for explanatory variable k, I define National Importance:  
    ̂ ,     ̂ ,    
Since   is a z-score, if  ̂ ,     ̂ ,    1 that means that a one unit change in   ,    
has an effect that differs from that of   ,    by up to 34.1%. In later chapters, I use 
the same measure of national importance for the coefficients of the macro variables 
as for the national coefficients since, whether the coefficients vary with mean 0 or 
mean   ,  
    ̂ ,     ̂ ,    ( ̂   ̂ ,   )  ( ̂   ̂ ,   )   ̂ ,     ̂ ,   . 
 
First Percentile Differences 
 For first percentile differences, I focus on percent change in y for a one unit 
increase in x, which I denote 
   
  
 (where     ( ) and  (. ) is the cumulative 
standard normal) since y is a z-score and change in probability (percentile) is more 
readily interpretable than 
  
  
. Since the magnitude of 
   
  
 depends on the linear 
combination of the slopes and the other explanatory variables, I base my estimates 
of the first percentile differences (and their credible intervals) on mean values of 
the other explanatory variables. To take the European coefficient of exclusionism as 
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an example that is representative of the continuous and also of the binary variables 
in M.P1: 
   
    
̂
 
1
     
∑ { ( ̂ 
    ̂ )   ( ̂ )}.
     
   
 
Where s indexes each of the MCMC simulations and  ̂  represents the effect of all of 
the other explanatory variables held at their mean level: 
 ̂   ̂ 
     ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
   ̅    ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
   ̅    ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
   ̅    ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
  ̅ 
  ̂ 
   ̅    ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
   ̅  . 
But, most of the explanatory variables are z-scores too, so this expression simplifies 
considerably to  ̂ 
     ̂ 
   ̅    ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
  ̅   ̂ 
   ̅    ̂ 
  ̅ . The remaining 
expression turns out to be quite small (if the explanatory variable is one of the z-
scores,  ̂   0.004), so, for the most part to be the same as when everything is set 
to zero: 
 
   
    
̂
 
1
     
∑ { ( ̂ 
    ̂ )   ( ̂ )}
     
   
  ( ̂  )   (0)   ( ̂  )  0.5. 
The definition differs slightly for the (other) categorical variable (religion) since, for 
example, if we are estimating the effects of Christian, then Muslim and No religion 
are set to zero.  
 The national first percentile differences are defined analogously in terms of   
and their respective country means for the explanatory variables. Interestingly (that 
is, despite the variation in the national means of the data), in analysis not presented 
here, I find that the above simplification holds at the national level, too: 
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̂
 
1
     
∑ { ( ̂ , 
    ̂ , )   ( ̂ , )}
     
   
  ( ̂ 
  )   (0)   ( ̂ 
  )  0.5. 
Maximal Differences 
 
Maximal differences are, for unbounded explanatory variables, defined as the 
difference between two respondents who are  2  on the explanatory variable of 
interest. Using the above notation, the maximal national difference in terms of 
ideology is:  
 
1
     
∑ { (2 ̂ , 
   ̂ , )   ( 2 ̂ , 
   ̂ , )}
     
   
  (2 ̂ 
  )   ( 2 ̂ 
  ). 
For sex and migrant background, I simply graph the first percentile differences. For 
religion, I graph the national differences between Christians and Muslims: 
 
1
     
∑ { ( ̂ , 
   ̂ , )   ( ̂ , 
   ̂ , )}
     
   
  ( ̂ 
 )   ( ̂ 
 ). 
Credible Intervals 
 
Credible intervals are similar in spirit to (Frequentist) confidence intervals 
but differ in that in Bayesian analysis the parameter (not the data) is considered a 
random variable. In Bayesian analysis, a highest posterior density is a credible 
interval that has certain intuitive and desirable properties. In this case, the HPD is 
continuous, centered on the point estimate, short as possible, and corresponds to 
the most powerful test; in this project, all credible intervals are also HPDs. For 
unimodal posteriors like those investigated here, the HPD can be written: 
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{ :  (   )     (        )   (      | )} where ∫  (   )  
      
      
 1    
(Casella and Berger 2002, 441, 447-8; Jackman 2009, 26).  
APPENDIX H: INTENSIFICATION OF NATIONAL EFFECTS 
This appendix presents estimates of the extent to which increases in given 
macro variables explain more intense national (total) effects of individual-level 
explanatory variables. In the tables below, point estimates are followed by        
values. For the intercepts and slopes,        is the posterior probability that the 
parameter has the opposite sign of the point estimate. For  ̅ , 
 , I present the 
posterior probability that the measure of fit is negative (so that, as usual, low values 
indicate that the model explains a trend that is unlikely to be due to chance). I apply 
the logit transformation to the macro explanatory variables that are proportions to 
account for potential slippage with (the unbounded support) of the national effects 
(indicated with an asterisk).    
 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.069 (0) 0.045 (0) 0.145 (0) 0.016 (0.006) -0.093 (0) 
EU-15 0.015 (0.055) -0.086 (0) 0.091 (0) 0.138 (0) -0.053 (0) 
 ̅  -0.012 (0.736) 0.425 (0) 0.188 (0) 0.607 (0) 0.168 (0.002) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.013 (0.093) -0.425 (0) 0.143 (0) -0.31 (0.003) 0.086 (0.021) 
EU-15 -0.016 (0.1) -0.186 (0.001) -0.019 (0.359) -0.077 (0.236) 0.015 (0.383) 
 ̅  -0.011 (0.727) 0.09 (0.075) -0.023 (0.88) 0.013 (0.585) -0.022 (0.864) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.067 (0) 0.023 (0.001) -0.003 (0.328) 
 EU-15 0.007 (0.348) 0.022 (0.014) -0.098 (0) 
   ̅  -0.023 (0.867) -0.008 (0.684) 0.483 (0) 
  
Table H.1: Intensifications: EU-15 
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 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.089 (0) -0.064 (0) 0.205 (0) 0.156 (0) -0.134 (0) 
    0.004 (0.117) -0.02 (0) 0.003 (0.191) 0.02 (0) -0.004 (0.164) 
 ̅  -0.02 (0.842) 0.171 (0) -0.035 (0.998) 0.084 (0.002) -0.024 (0.894) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) -0.068 (0) -0.799 (0) 0.122 (0.023) -0.454 (0) 0.047 (0.225) 
    -0.023 (0) -0.087 (0) -0.003 (0.428) -0.032 (0.193) -0.015 (0.184) 
 ̅  0.308 (0) 0.199 (0.022) -0.025 (0.892) 0.026 (0.524) -0.013 (0.755) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.036 (0.042) 0.063 (0) -0.107 (0) 
      0.009 (0.069) 0.009 (0.004) -0.016 (0) 
   ̅ ' 0.007 (0.564) 0.005 (0.502) 0.084 (0.015) 
 
Table H.2: Intensifications: Immigrant Population 
 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.082 (0) 0.001 (0.459) 0.207 (0) 0.088 (0) -0.117 (0) 
     -3.829 (0.001) -2.464 (0.031) -7.521 (0) 3.109 (0.008) -3.852 (0.003) 
 ̅  0.041 (0.191) -0.012 (0.755) 0.05 (0.032) -0.018 (0.867) 0.027 (0.298) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.005 (0.205) -0.486 (0) 0.148 (0) -0.334 (0) 0.121 (0) 
     -0.827 (0.313) -29.995 (0) -10.64 (0.048) -13.066 (0.171) -18.175 (0.004) 
 ̅  -0.026 (0.907) 0.146 (0.002) 0.006 (0.543) 0.023 (0.525) 0.09 (0.12) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.074 (0) 0.039 (0) -0.053 (0) 
       7.232 (0.002) -2.932 (0.019) -2.854 (0.017) 
   ̅  0.119 (0.068) -0.005 (0.655) -0.009 (0.71) 
  
Table H.3: Intensifications: Immigration Trend 
  
 193 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.177 (0) -0.154 (0) 0.519 (0) 0.347 (0) -0.225 (0) 
    0.032 (0) -0.048 (0) 0.103 (0) 0.081 (0) -0.033 (0) 
 ̅  0.135 (0.007) 0.233 (0) 0.496 (0) 0.381 (0) 0.108 (0.023) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) -0.017 (0.278) -0.79 (0) 0.266 (0.017) -0.412 (0.028) 0.277 (0.019) 
    -0.007 (0.233) -0.083 (0.031) 0.043 (0.142) -0.019 (0.39) 0.058 (0.089) 
 ̅  -0.022 (0.863) 0.016 (0.444) -0.007 (0.7) -0.009 (0.739) 0.016 (0.492) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.152 (0) 0.097 (0) -0.23 (0) 
      -0.028 (0.017) 0.02 (0.004) -0.055 (0) 
   ̅  0.046 (0.28) 0.008 (0.481) 0.271 (0) 
  
Table H.4: Intensifications: Crime Rate 
 
 
 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.074 (0) 0.007 (0.093) 0.197 (0) 0.084 (0) -0.12 (0) 
CF 0 (0.031) 0 (0) 0 (0.322) 0 (0) 0 (0.073) 
 ̅  -0.018 (0.836) 0.115 (0.002) -0.037 (1) 0.023 (0.181) -0.024 (0.909) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.003 (0.306) -0.508 (0) 0.138 (0) -0.348 (0) 0.097 (0.001) 
CF 0 (0.312) -0.001 (0.003) 0 (0.207) 0 (0.353) 0 (0.354) 
 ̅  -0.032 (0.979) 0.002 (0.541) -0.031 (0.965) -0.024 (0.885) -0.032 (0.974) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.067 (0) 0.034 (0) -0.058 (0) 
  CF 0 (0.134) 0 (0.261) 0 (0.481) 
   ̅  -0.013 (0.758) -0.034 (0.993) -0.037 (0.999) 
 
Table H.5: Intensifications: Conflict Fatalities 
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 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.075 (0) -0.059 (0) 0.238 (0) 0.227 (0) -0.188 (0) 
    0 (0.436) -0.013 (0) 0.01 (0) 0.031 (0) -0.015 (0) 
 ̅  -0.032 (0.973) 0.095 (0.01) -0.005 (0.642) 0.37 (0) 0.166 (0.004) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) -0.014 (0.204) -0.76 (0) 0.13 (0.045) -0.386 (0.001) 0.036 (0.308) 
    -0.004 (0.127) -0.053 (0) -0.001 (0.486) -0.008 (0.41) -0.013 (0.185) 
 ̅  -0.011 (0.743) 0.094 (0.067) -0.025 (0.891) 0.004 (0.642) -0.009 (0.726) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.052 (0.014) 0.061 (0) -0.141 (0) 
      0.003 (0.297) 0.006 (0.016) -0.019 (0) 
   ̅  -0.02 (0.842) -0.008 (0.689) 0.213 (0) 
  
Table H.6: Intensifications: Muslim population 
 
 
 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.083 (0) 0.007 (0.108) 0.196 (0) 0.074 (0) -0.113 (0) 
     -0.009 (0.032) -0.013 (0.001) 0 (0.48) 0.026 (0) -0.013 (0.007) 
 ̅  -0.002 (0.618) 0.016 (0.365) -0.037 (1) 0.068 (0.005) 0.022 (0.368) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.01 (0.095) -0.455 (0) 0.152 (0) -0.319 (0) 0.132 (0) 
     -0.008 (0.107) -0.103 (0) -0.027 (0.153) -0.048 (0.165) -0.051 (0.053) 
 ̅  -0.006 (0.679) 0.135 (0.006) -0.005 (0.68) 0.025 (0.512) 0.057 (0.311) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.07 (0) 0.038 (0) -0.04 (0) 
       0.009 (0.164) -0.004 (0.196) -0.025 (0) 
   ̅  -0.004 (0.673) -0.028 (0.935) 0.119 (0.003) 
 
Table H.7: Intensifications: Muslim population growth 
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 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.079 (0) -0.011 (0.056) 0.204 (0) 0.124 (0) -0.121 (0) 
     0.001 (0.372) -0.006 (0.048) 0.006 (0.062) 0.025 (0) 0.001 (0.381) 
 ̅  -0.032 (0.975) -0.02 (0.86) -0.031 (0.988) 0.096 (0) -0.031 (0.97) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) -0.009 (0.152) -0.543 (0) 0.121 (0) -0.421 (0) 0.083 (0.011) 
     -0.011 (0.01) -0.012 (0.288) -0.009 (0.335) -0.055 (0.084) -0.009 (0.338) 
 ̅  0.018 (0.391) -0.028 (0.93) -0.023 (0.867) 0.043 (0.404) -0.017 (0.815) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.056 (0) 0.047 (0) -0.058 (0) 
       0.006 (0.193) 0.01 (0.006) 0 (0.476) 
   ̅  -0.015 (0.78) -0.001 (0.588) -0.035 (0.995) 
 
Table H.8: Intensifications: Linguistic Diversity Index 
 
 
 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.06 (0) 0.029 (0) 0.155 (0) 0.047 (0) -0.105 (0) 
IL 0.001 (0) -0.003 (0) 0.003 (0) 0.004 (0) -0.001 (0) 
 ̅  0.068 (0.061) 0.223 (0) 0.145 (0) 0.24 (0) 0.05 (0.136) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.013 (0.072) -0.495 (0) 0.1 (0.008) -0.351 (0) 0.037 (0.185) 
IL -0.001 (0.064) -0.003 (0.054) 0.003 (0.084) 0 (0.475) 0.005 (0.009) 
 ̅  -0.012 (0.741) -0.018 (0.827) -0.006 (0.673) -0.021 (0.851) 0.055 (0.219) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.052 (0) 0.013 (0.039) -0.041 (0) 
  IL -0.001 (0.081) 0.002 (0) -0.001 (0) 
   ̅  -0.003 (0.646) 0.079 (0.018) 0.026 (0.219) 
 
Table H.9: Intensifications: immigrant languages 
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 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.107 (0.004) -0.024 (0.277) 0.277 (0) 0.001 (0.497) -0.062 (0.085) 
   0.011 (0.224) -0.008 (0.301) 0.03 (0.029) -0.033 (0.008) 0.022 (0.089) 
 ̅  -0.027 (0.922) -0.033 (0.981) -0.026 (0.964) -0.02 (0.91) -0.017 (0.801) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.131 (0.003) -0.537 (0.004) 0.024 (0.452) -0.172 (0.317) 0.12 (0.281) 
   0.046 (0.004) -0.003 (0.483) -0.04 (0.284) 0.066 (0.316) 0.009 (0.452) 
 ̅  0.037 (0.26) -0.032 (0.974) -0.024 (0.886) -0.011 (0.751) -0.024 (0.887) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) 0 (0.502) -0.045 (0.138) 0.02 (0.313) 
    0.023 (0.192) -0.029 (0.026) 0.028 (0.027) 
  ̅  -0.013 (0.764) -0.013 (0.76) -0.016 (0.806) 
 
Table H.10: Intensifications: unemployment 
 
 
 
 
 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.083 (0) -0.025 (0) 0.201 (0) 0.114 (0) -0.142 (0) 
    0.12 (0.059) -0.428 (0) 0.106 (0.099) 0.418 (0) -0.368 (0) 
 ̅  -0.011 (0.724) 0.152 (0) -0.032 (0.991) 0.061 (0.011) 0.127 (0.017) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) -0.018 (0.007) -0.635 (0) 0.161 (0) -0.365 (0) 0.111 (0.002) 
    -0.427 (0) -2.048 (0) 0.548 (0.094) -0.222 (0.399) 0.306 (0.236) 
 ̅  0.188 (0.003) 0.214 (0.011) 0.001 (0.617) 0.004 (0.65) -0.012 (0.763) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.06 (0) 0.026 (0) -0.078 (0) 
      0.057 (0.332) -0.165 (0.018) -0.399 (0) 
   ̅  -0.022 (0.868) -0.009 (0.704) 0.108 (0.004) 
 
Table H.11: Intensifications: unemployment trend 
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 ̂    ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.075 (0) 0.05 (0) 0.137 (0) -0.004 (0.366) -0.083 (0) 
GDP 0 (0.415) -0.001 (0) 0.001 (0) 0.001 (0) 0 (0) 
 ̅  -0.032 (0.977) 0.102 (0.006) 0.038 (0.067) 0.215 (0) 0.055 (0.1) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂    ̂   ̂   ̂   
(Intercept) 0.039 (0.004) -0.342 (0) 0.232 (0) -0.263 (0.034) 0.191 (0) 
GDP 0 (0.003) -0.002 (0) -0.001 (0.03) -0.001 (0.18) -0.001 (0.029) 
 ̅  0.038 (0.241) 0.063 (0.081) 0.016 (0.47) 0.004 (0.626) 0.019 (0.446) 
      
 
 ̂   ̂   ̂   
  (Intercept) -0.071 (0.001) 0.032 (0.002) 0 (0.485) 
  GDP 0 (0.343) 0 (0.39) -0.001 (0) 
   ̅  -0.024 (0.886) -0.035 (0.993) 0.106 (0.003) 
 
Table H.12: Intensifications: GDP 
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